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ABSTRACT 
Digital technology, coupled with present economic conditions and the 
interest of younger Americans in sustainability, has enabled a climate favorable 
to collaborative consumption.  More individuals will be engaged over time in 
the on-demand “sharing economy” because underemployment of the middle 
class, and a majority of all non- or under-skilled workers, is a chronic condition 
eluding ready solution.  This new resources “lending” and social networking 
culture assures ongoing introductions of sharing producers and consumers to 
each other and into residential neighborhoods.  The result of such engagement 
will include increased traffic trips, overtaxed curbside parking spaces, 
additional ambient noise and enhanced stress upon electric and other utility 
grids tapped by sharing enterprises.  Since these neighborhood burdens are not 
addressed in the form of sales taxes or license fees directly returned to host 
enclaves, many of these burdens are borne largely by dwellers.  Local persons not 
participating in the sharing economy expect their daily routines to continue 
without interference from unfamiliar persons, noises and odors, or the 
disadvantages of increased traffic and reduced curbside parking. 
Communities now are challenged to regulate sharing uses in this new 
economic order while accommodating opportunities for such enterprises to 
generate revenue and taxes.  In one regard, accommodation invites struggles 
between established neighborhood dwellers and later-arriving sharing producers 
operating outside zoning regulations.  Even so, outright prohibiting of 
entrepreneurial models in residential zoning districts counters local 
governments’ efforts to remake the economic and social landscapes of urban 
communities, especially those mired precariously in circumstances of joblessness, 
crime and other types of disorder.  Many sharing economy voices argue that 
today’s good land use decisions mandate subordinating neighborhood 
inconvenience to this new business climate’s benefit to the larger community, the 
“greater good.”  This is the first paper in American academic legal literature 
addressing how communities might accept this challenge to accommodate the 
new economy, productively modernizing governmental spatial regulatory 
prerogatives through incorporating crucial citizen inputs at this land use 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Does your neighbor rent out his or her apartment or condo short-
term through Airbnb, Inc. without violating the local zoning code?1  
Why not rent out space in your single-family home—is that permitted 
in your neighborhood?2  Classic (Euclidean) zoning codes 
 
*Adjunct Professor, Arizona Summit Law School; Zoning Adjustment Hearing Officer, 
City of Phoenix; Of Counsel, Bonnett, Fairbourn, Friedman & Balint, P.C.  This is for 
Peggy, with gratitude for sharing our lives and love.  Unfamiliar terms contained in 
this paper likely are defined in the Lexicon appearing at the end.  
 1  See Stephen R. Miller, First Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy, 52 HARV. 
J. ON LEGIS. (forthcoming 2015).  Professor Miller’s fine treatment highlights positive 
and negative externalities of the transient lodging Sharing Enterprise niche. 
 2  This has occurred for decades in some communities, in violation of many 
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purposefully draw sharp distinctions between land uses, permitting 
some types in certain districts3 while discriminating against remaining 
uses either by outright prohibition or imposing expensive or 
inconvenient constraints.  Depending on the community, such codes 
may or may not accommodate flexibility of residentially-zoned activity.4  
The demographics of cities are changing, and a population increase in 
young, single workers already has impacted housing stock, illustrated 
by evolution of the micro-dwelling unit.5  While this “bolt-on” housing 
accommodation type initially may have been intended to move elderly 
family members back with relatives,6 these units become fertile sources 
of steady income when let to younger professional workers or short 
term travelers.7  Yet some communities lament occupancy of these 
units by unknown persons.8 
 
 
zoning regulations, in the form of home rentals in environments of major events such 
as professional golf tournaments or the Super Bowl.  See, e.g., Laurie Merrill, Super Bowl 
Home Rental Prices Soar in Phoenix Area, THE ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Aug. 11, 2014 5:45 PM), 
http://www.azcentral.com/story/money/business/2014/08/11/super-bowl-home-
rental-prices-soar-in-phoenix-area/13896283/; Meg Mirshak, Augusta Homeowners Earn 
Big on Masters Week Rentals, THE AUGUSTA CHRONICLE (Feb. 25, 2012), 
http://chronicle.augusta.com/news/business/local-business/2012-02-25/augusta-
homeowners-earn-big-masters-week-rentals.  
 3  For instance, some classic “sharing economy” activities of the charitable sort, 
such as food and clothing banks, are specified permitted uses in some districts.  Also, 
“sharing” uses and activities, such as boarding houses, group homes and yard sales, are 
addressed by specific zoning ordinance provisions, as they have been for decades, 
often as the subject of conditional use permits.  See, e.g., Conditional Use Permit 
(CUP), CITY OF TACOMA, http://www.govme.com/Common/Doc/DisplayDoc.aspx? 
category=TipSheet&id=P-111 (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).  
 4  For the most part, segregation of uses continues to dominate American zoning 
schemes, even in New Urbanist communities where modest-scale commercial uses are 
“zoned out.”  See Miller, supra note 1, at 17 n.70. 
 5  See Vicki Been, Benjamin Gross & John Infranca, Responding to Changing 
Households: Regulatory Challenges for Micro-Units and Accessory Dwelling Units, NYU FURMAN 
CENTER FOR REAL ESTATE AND URBAN POLICY 8–10 (Jan. 2014), 
http://furmancenter.org/files/NYUFurmanCenter_RespondingtoChangingHouseh
olds_2014_1.pdf. 
 6  See John Infranca, Housing Changing Households: Regulatory Challenges for Micro-
Units and Accessory Dwelling Units, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 53, 64–65 (2014), available 
at http://journals.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/stanford-law-policy-
review/print/2014/01/infranca_25_stan._l._poly_rev_53.pdf; The Other Boomerang 
Generation, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 5, 2014, 11:41 AM), http://www.wsj.com/video/the-
other-boomerang-generation/DC079F2C-72D9-441F-9218-
7E01121BAC58.html?mod=wsj_email_newsletter.  
 7  See Infranca, supra note 6, at 61 (noting that micro-units may not provide 
affordable housing but may exacerbate high community rental rates).  
 8  See id. at 62–63 (discussing how opponents state fears of flooding 
neighborhoods with itinerant or “sketchy” dwellers).  
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Another example of a sharing economy model9 is the “pop-up 
family dinner,” where strangers share a table and prepared food.10  Are 
local land use regulations flexible enough to contemplate meal 
sharing (outside of social, gratuitous settings where the diners know 
their hosts)?  What about bicycle,11 motorcycle or even car12 or parking-
 
 9  To skirt utter definitional confusion, I acknowledge here the work of Lawrence 
Lessig, who perhaps would view this illustration as exemplifying what he calls the 
“hybrid economy,” existing when “a commercial entity . . . aims to leverage value from 
a sharing economy, or . . . a sharing economy that builds a commercial entity to better 
support its sharing aims.”  Either way, the hybrid links two simpler, or purer, 
economies and produces something from the link.  See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: 
MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID ECONOMY, 177–78 (2008).  Lessig’s 
definition of a sharing economy, in purest form, is one not involving an actor’s 
engagement in generating revenue.  See id. at 118–19, 152–54.  Of course, most of 
today’s references to “the sharing economy” in the tech world conflate information-
sharing and money-making, so long as revenue is spread among the “vendors,” with 
business-model entrepreneurs reaping a percentage of the sums paid by consumers 
for the goods and services offered by sharing producers.  
 10  See Amy Lombard, Five Noteworthy Startups from TechCrunch Disrupt NY, TIME 
INNOVATION BLOG (May 2, 2013), http://techland.time.com/2013/05/02/five-
noteworthy-startups-from-techcrunch-disrupt-ny/slide/eatwith-airbnb-for-the-
restaurant-industry/ (describing EatWith, a sharing cuisine site); competition in this 
space already includes With Locals (www.withlocals.com) and KitchHike 
(https://en.kitchhike.com/).  There is a non-tech element to this and other types of 
sharing entrepreneurship models that can be overlooked due to “sub-radar” scale and 
skirting of local regulatory requirements.  See Scott Beyer, The Motor City’s Regulators Are 
Hitting the Brakes on Regrowth, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2014, at A13, available at 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/scott-beyer-the-motor-citys-regulators-are-hitting-the-
brakes-on-regrowth-1418426736.  It is short-sighted to welcome some forms of Sharing 
Enterprises that are better-financed while repressing “self-help” activities that mean 
economic survival for their actors, so long as certain minimum health and safety 
standards are observed by the sharing producers; the trick is finding the sensible 
balance affording participants public safety (e.g., avoidance of food-borne illness), 
entrepreneurial opportunity and community building settings.  See Sarah Schindler, 
Regulating the Underground: Secret Supper Clubs, Pop-Up Restaurants, and the Role of Law, 82 
U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 16, 27–29, 35 (2015), available at https:// 
lawreview.uchicago.edu/sites/lawreview.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/Schindler_Dial
ogue.pdf.  
 11  See Jeremy Rifkin, Op-Ed., The Rise of the Sharing Economy, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 6, 
2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/apr/06/opinion/la-oe-rifkin-airbnb-
20140406 (“[A]n increasing number of young people are deciding they don’t need to 
own bikes; they are perfectly happy to have access to shared bikes, and pay only for the 
time they use them.”).  
 12  According to Rifkin, “1.7 million people globally are members of car-sharing 
services.  A recent survey found that the number of vehicles owned by car-sharing 
participants decreased by half after joining the service, with members preferring access 
over ownership.”  See Jeremy Rifkin, The Rise of Anti-Capitalism, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 
2014, at SR4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/16/opinion/sunday/the-
rise-of-anti-capitalism.html?_r=0. 
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space13 sharing by persons on a sole-proprietor scale?14  Will 3D 
printing and other additive manufacturing techniques15 be enabled or 
hindered by zoning codes, authorizing equipment sharing in 
residential and other spaces not zoned for “compounding of materials” 
 
 13  See PARKING PANDA, https://www.parkingpanda.com/how-it-works (last visited 
Sept. 11, 2015),(allowing advance parking reservation from computers or in real-time 
from mobile phones).  
 14  The sole proprietors with “one off” or micro-scale operations (think of single 
person web-page designing for barter, for instance) are seemingly undetectable, 
therefore ungovernable in the literal sense.  Thus, this sharing economy is replete with 
“outliers,” exploiting new norms imbedded in this collaborative environment (as is 
true in any other form of economy); but they defy easy identification.  See Dana 
Sauchelli and Bruce Golding, Hookers Turning Airbnb Apartments into Brothels, N.Y. POST 
(Apr. 14, 2014, 2:19 AM), http://nypost.com/2014/04/14/hookers-using-airbnb-to-
use-apartments-for-sex-sessions/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email& 
utm_term=NYP%20180%20Day%20Openers%20and%2030%20Day%20Signups&ut
m_campaign=NY%2520Post%2520Newsletter.  It seems likely that criminal justice 
systems will be more likely these outliers’ interface if any with government 
regulation. 
 15  See generally, STEPHEN HOSKINS, 3D PRINTING FOR ARTISTS, DESIGNERS AND MAKERS: 
TECHNOLOGY CROSSING ART AND INDUSTRY (2014).  Nanotechnology will be the next 
breakthrough in home-scale production.  See, e.g., K. ERIC DREXLER, RADICAL 
ABUNDANCE: HOW A REVOLUTION IN NANOTECHNOLOGY WILL CHANGE CIVILIZATION 77, 
156 (2013) (discussing when this technology’s equipment becomes affordable, 
products of modest size will be makeable from home on machines as small as desktop 
printers, using open-source digital design files).  It may be closer than intuition 
suggests.  See Junqi Li, Steven G. Ballmer, Eric P. Gillis, Seiko Fujii, Michael J. Schmidt, 
Andrea M. E. Palazzolo, Jonathan W. Lehmann, Greg F. Morehouse, and Martin D. 
Burke, Synthesis of Many Different Types of Organic Small Molecules Using One Automated 
Process, 347 SCIENCE 1221 (2015).  Another breakthrough is the continuous liquid 
interface production (CLIP) process; continuous curing promises a quantum leap in 
additive production speed. See Rising from the Ooze, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 17, 2015), 
http://www.economist.com/news/science-and-technology/21646537-quicker-way-
print-objects-rising-ooze.  Those scoffing at the possibility of “citizen craftsmen” 
manufacturing from dwellings at the molecular level should recall that in only a few 
years’ time, 3D printing venues morphed from research laboratories to dwellings, as 
equipment became smaller and affordable to everyday citizens.  See, e.g., IAN GIBSON, 
DAVID ROSEN & BRENT STUCKER, ADDITIVE MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGIES: 3D 
PRINTING, RAPID PROTOTYPING, AND DIRECT DIGITAL MANUFACTURING 33, 42, 171, 299–
300, 482–85 (2015).  Scant economic reason exists for rejecting a means to restore 
competitiveness to the nation and jobs to the “digi-proneurship” segment of the 
public.  Cf. id. at 39, 385, 484.  Gartner projects global end-user spending on the seven 
technologies constituting the 3D printer market will reach $13.4 billion by 2018, 
although it is unclear whether those users will have sufficient revenue to cover not only 
their production and overhead costs but also service, sales and channel development.  
See Press Release, Gartner, Gartner Says Worldwide Shipments of 3D Printers to Reach 
More than 217,000 in 2015 (Oct. 27, 2014), available at http://www.gartner.com/ 
newsroom/id/2887417.  In the meantime, 3D printing service bureaus serve the 
production needs of developers, such as Shapeways.  See Steve Rosenbush, 3-D Printing, 
Cloud Converge in New Business Services, WALL ST. J. CIO JOURNAL (May 26, 2015, 12:26 
PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2015/05/26/3-d-printing-cloud-converge-in-new-
business-services/?mod=WSJ_TechWSJD_cioJournal. 
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and, for that matter, sharing the manufacturing spaces themselves 
among “makers?”16 
Sharing entrepreneurs generally desire to operate around shared 
tools and technologies.  So-called “maker spaces” attract such 
providers; and their proximity to each other pays some dividends to 
the community due to synergies among ideas and economies of scale.  
But such spaces under Euclidean-grounded codes often are termed 
“manufacturing” or similar industrial-based uses violating earlier 
conventions separating blue-collar operations from residential, retail 
and other “cleaner” commercial activities.  An initial paradox in 
attempting to assert land use controls over sharing entrepreneurs is 
this: Zoning law fundamentally seeks predictability in land regulation 
through structured lists of permitted uses in defined “districts” within 
its jurisdiction;17 but the sharing economy experiments continuously 
 
 16  Artisan’s Asylum in Sommerville, MA, a 40,000 square foot, multi-tenant, 
community “maker space” thrives in a town in which its zoning code salubriously allows 
light industrial uses next to residential areas.  See Juliet B. Schor, After the Jobs Disappear, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/15/opinion/after-the-
jobs-disappear.html?pagewanted=all; David Lang, Kickstarted: Finding Space (and 
Making a Makerspace), MAKE BLOG (Oct. 15, 2012, 4:06 PM), 
http://makezine.com/2012/10/15/kickstarted-finding-space-and-making-a-maker 
space/.  A “makerspace” is defined as a community center combining manufacturing 
equipment, community and education for the purposes of enabling community 
members to design, prototype and fabricate manufactured works impossible to create 
with the resources available to individuals working alone.  These spaces of 
independent individuals sharing space and tools, can be hosted by for-profit 
companies, non-profit corporations, or organizations affiliated with or hosted within 
schools, universities or libraries.  “Makerspaces represent the democratization of 
design, engineering, fabrication and education.”  How to Make a Makerspace, 
EVENTBRITE, http://www.eventbrite.com/e/how-to-make-a-makerspace-registration-
4585453214 (last visited Sept. 11, 2015). 
 17  Readers familiar with “form-based codes” stemming from New Urbanism 
principles may protest that these codes address the conflict of values described in this 
Article, but this assertion is incorrect beyond “optics.”  Form-based codes vary in type 
and extent, but generally place less emphasis on use as the basis for a code; instead, 
they “foster predictable built results and a high-quality public realm by using physical 
form (rather than separation of uses) as the organizing principle for the code.”  See 
Form-Based Codes Defined, FORM-BASED CODES INSTITUTE, “FORM-BASED CODES DEFINED,” 
http://formbasedcodes.org/definition (last visited Sept. 11, 2015).  Form-based codes 
encourage a variety of uses to be located near one another, but in a way that attempts 
to ensure they work well together and maintain a desired community character.  
Implicitly, then, the actual form and aesthetics of the area, engaging a mix of uses both 
attractive and walkable, creates cohesion and a somewhat-predictable neighborhood 
appearance.  See Richard S. Geller, The Legality of Form-Based Zoning Codes, 26 J.  LAND 
USE & ENVTL L. 36, 53 (2010).  Form-based codes’ ability to create “visual harmony in 
the public realm,” “continuous urban frontage to ensure a degree of uniformity,” and 
control over spatial relationships in the built environment makes them useful 
governance tools.  See FORM-BASED CODES INSTITUTE, supra note 17; Emily Talen, Design 
by the Rules: The Historical Underpinnings of Form-Based Codes, 75 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 144, 
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with assets and technology, disrupting established business models.  
Indeed, some new Sharing Enterprise business models hardly 
resemble business activities to the outsider.18  This results in less 
predictability and an appearance that authorities and those governed 
work at cross-purposes.  Nimbleness and iterative development of 
resource use are chief traits of sharing producers, foreign to the 
relative formulaic operations of Euclidean zoning regimes.  A related 
paradox is that community land planning seemingly moves toward 
increasingly regional authority, while in the rich environment of 
sharing entrepreneurialism, the neighborhood19 appears a more 
sensible unit for planning activity.  Transportation planning 
particularly appears destined for greater regionalism, but what 
happens within specific transit nodes increasingly seems destined to be 
governed by smaller governance units than the municipality.20 
Adherents of a movement toward a “New Science of Cities”21 assert 
that understanding the intrinsic order of cities requires planners to 
undertake and endorse others’ actions that create economic growth 
from networks of proximity, casual encounters and their economic 
“spillovers” in optimizing municipal performance.22  Any planning 
action therefore should promote social interactions known as 
knowledge exchanges, encouraging these economic spillovers.23  
Advocates for social interaction find private infrastructure that 
 
155–56 (2009).  These codes do not, however, entirely eliminate separation of uses; 
instead, they prescribe “building functions,” often in a simple matrix.  See Geller, supra 
note 17, at 36.  The issues pertinent to this Article are the purposes to which building 
interiors and surrounding streets of a neighborhood are put, and the resulting (often 
adverse) effects on traffic and parking congestion. 
 18  See Matt Hickman, Outdoor Living Meets the Sharing Economy at UK’s First “on-
demand” Garden Space, MOTHER NATURE NETWORK BLOG (Aug. 11, 2014), 
http://www.mnn.com/your-home/organic-farming-gardening/blogs/outdoor-living-
meets-the-sharing-economy-at-uks-first-on (describing reservable “by the hour” private 
garden spaces as an alternative to public park visitation in Manchester, England).  
 19  In this Article, I will refer often to a distinguishable neighborhood or cluster of 
similarly situated (however organized for regulatory purposes) neighborhoods as a 
“District,” meaning a designated local planning unit. 
 20  See Stephen R. Miller, Legal Neighborhoods, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 105, 156–58 
(2013). 
 21  See, e.g., Michael Mehaffy, 5 Key Themes Emerging from the “New Science of Cities,” 
ATLANTIC CITYLAB BLOG (Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.citylab.com/design/2014/09/5-
key-themes-emerging-from-the-new-science-of-cities/380233/; Michael Mehaffy, What 
Can a “Science of Cities” Offer Planners?, PLANETIZEN (June 25, 2014, 5:00 PM), 
http://www.planetizen.com/node/69957 [hereinafter “Mehaffy Planners”]. 
 22  See Mehaffy Planners, supra note 21. 
 23  See id.  Local governments intuitively would encourage the sharing economy 
because it permits jurisdictionally-bound municipalities to grow their economies with 
minimal infrastructure costs or annexation battles calculated to increase the tax base.  
Miller, supra note 1, at 24.  
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depends largely upon automobiles, telephones, and the Internet—
and the unsustainably high consumption of resources required to 
maintain their operations—less resilient than a system of physical 
urban place networks, whether public or semi-public spaces.24  
Conventional planning, therefore, should abandon its focus on 
architecture and objects (ensuring visual order) that rely upon 
isolating, high resource-consumption systems and instead 
implement walkable, connected public realms inducing casual 
encounters among a wide network of acquaintances and strangers.25  
This view endorses a certain magnitude of visual disorder in a 
dynamic organism like the city.26 
This purportedly “scientific” view of cities holds that optimal 
performance follows ceding to residents some measure of land use 
control of their spatial structure.27  Naturally, sharing producers 
who wish to operate from their residences and “maker space” 
locales will find this notion initially satisfying.28  The balance of this 
article addresses whether—and if so, how—to accommodate dwellers 
while embracing scientifically-supported views that socio-economic 
“reactors” like cities must promote efficient exchanges and creative 
interactions among their citizens and visitors by accelerating physical 
interaction rates.  Part II below describes persons forming and 
frequenting Sharing Enterprises and explains how the burgeoning 
sharing economy impacts the neighborhood model as a residential 
safe harbor from negative impacts typical of non-residential uses.  Part 
III argues that even saluting their commitments to values like 
sustainability and trust demonstrated by most participants, unchecked 
operation of Sharing Enterprises leads to distrust and conflict among 
a neighborhood’s stakeholders.  Part IV assesses alternatives for land 
use governance of Sharing Enterprises and proposes an inclusive 
model balancing various stakeholders’ agendas for their enclaves.  Part 
V disposes with claims that no land use administration of Sharing 
Enterprises is optimal, while Part VI addresses how private land use 
governance may contribute to creating détente among district 
stakeholders.  Part VII sums up why the sharing producer is not 
destined to become a fleeting figure in the urban landscape and, 
therefore, why minimizing the negative externalities of Sharing 
 
 24  See Mehaffy Planners, supra note 21. 
 25  See id. 
 26  See JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 222–23, 382–84 
(Vintage Ed., 1992).  
 27  See Mehaffy Planners, supra note 21. 
 28  But see infra text accompanying notes 169–77. 
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Enterprises must be addressed by the local administrations to preserve 
neighborhood expectations while promoting municipal 
competitiveness.  Governments’ special attention to defining a 
neighborhood to preserve the local character of (and retaining those 
“characters” who season) the urban fabric while driving high-value 
knowledge workers and tourists into the enclave is a daunting task.29  
The challenge involves a reinvention of regulation by joining citizens 
and sharing producers as partners in flexible approaches to sharing 
risks and rewards of integrating these enterprises into our 
communities. 
II. THE PARAMETERS OF THE SHARED ECONOMY MOVEMENT, AND ITS 
SALUTARY FEATURES 
A.  Players in the Sharing Economy 
Five categories (listed below) of participants on the “producer” 
side populate the sharing economy.30  A permanent entrepreneurial 
class consisting of persons hovering near economic subsistence is one 
demographic constituent, remaining solvent by leveraging underused 
personal assets to share with others.31  These assets will consist of 
personal labor on a “one-off” hired basis and goods for loan like 
dwelling rooms, personal motor vehicles, clothes, tools, works of art, 
items of personal adornment and other expendable rental items.  
Redeployment of these goods hedges against their owners’ economic 
uncertainty by creating new revenue streams.  While selling one’s 
goods and services in this fashion is hardly unprecedented—think, for 
 
 29  See Miller, supra note 1, at 35. 
 30  The sharing economy has long-historic antecedents in the United States.  
During the 17th and 18th Centuries, money (script) was scarce, so many colonists relied 
primarily on bartering, with commodities such as beaver pelts, corn, musket balls, 
nails, tobacco and deer skins (from which we get our modern slang, “buck,” meaning 
“dollar”).  Everyone schooled in America during the 20th Century learned of the 
“barter deal” of all time reportedly made in 1626 by Peter Minuit with local Native 
peoples, trading a valueless deed (Mana-hatin was not “titled” to any of the tribes) to 
twenty-two square miles of island for goods allegedly worth about sixty guilders, or 
$23.70 in those times.  See L.J. KRIZNER, LISA SITA, PETER STUYVESANT: NEW AMSTERDAM 
AND THE ORIGINS OF NEW YORK 38–41 (2001) (stating that at best, this quit-claim deed 
deterred challenges by other native peoples to the “entitlements” of the New 
Netherland colony). 
 31  See CHRISTOPHER KOOPMAN, MATTHEW MITCHELL & ADAM THIERER, THE SHARING 
ECONOMY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION REGULATION: THE CASE FOR POLICY CHANGE 4 
(Dec. 2014). 
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example, of boarding houses32 and car-pooling33—the magnitude of 
voluntary collaborative consumption is unprecedented. 
Conventional “yard sale” or eBay “merchant” models34 will not 
cease; but there will be increasing emphasis on temporary ceding of an 
asset’s use instead of permanent asset disposition.  Sharing economy 
activists assess their assets and skill sets in this uncertain fiscal 
environment and unlock the value of their possessions and talents in 
unprecedented ways, leveraging their personal resources for others 
who gain by sharing in food, shelter, transportation, and other goods 
and services, such as know-how, on an individualized basis.35  The 
permanent sharing producer class will consist of a number of subsets,36 
among them: 
1. Senior citizens, retired on fixed incomes or their saved funds, 
leveraging their outright-owned assets like spare rooms and 
implements;37 
2. Manually-skilled persons “moonlighting” from their 
residences outside regular work hours, fabricating goods or 
rendering services on their own time;38 
3. Micro-jobbers in the “knowledge economy”39 working on a 
 
 32  See generally PAUL GROTH, LIVING DOWNTOWN: THE HISTORY OF RESIDENTIAL 
HOTELS IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (1994). 
 33  See generally Selective History of Ridesharing, MIT “REAL-TIME” RIDESHARE RESEARCH 
(Jan. 24, 2009), http://ridesharechoices.scripts.mit.edu/home/histstats/. 
 34 See generally eBay Merchant eCommerce Solutions Center, EBAY, 
http://pages.ebay.com/merchantsolutions/whyebay/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2015). 
 35  See Dara Kerr, Vexed in the City: The “Sharing Economy’s Hidden Toll on San 
Francisco, CNET BLOG (Aug. 20, 2014 4:00 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/vexed-in-
the-city-the-sharing-economys-hidden-toll-on-san-francisco/.  
 36  See, e.g., Leo Burnett, Meet the 6 Types of Sharers, HUMANS BEING 
http://humansbeing.leoburnett.com/#/meet-the-6-types-of-sharers/ (last visited Feb. 
26, 2015).  Every sharing economy oriented website or paper endeavors to categorize 
participants (producers, consumers and prosumers) in some manner.  See, e.g., 
Collaborative Economy Honeycomb 2—Watch it Grow, JEREMIAH OWYANG (Dec. 7, 2014), 
http://www.web-strategist.com/blog/2014/12/07/collaborative-economy-
honeycomb-2-watch-it-grow/ (noting twelve market sectors populated by Sharing 
Enterprises). 
 37  See Rodney Brooks, Creative Ideas for Cash Flow in Retirement, USA TODAY, July 20, 
2014, at 7B (illustrating revenue-generating options for dealing with shortfall in 
seniors’ retirement funds).  
 38  Cf. Tamar Jacoby, This Way Up: Mobility in America, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2014, at 
C1–2, available at http://online.wsj.com/articles/this-way-up-mobility-in-america-
1405710779 (discussing how many future American jobs will require some sort of 
technical or practical training that emphasizes skills excluding producing things 
without manipulating computer programs). 
 39  See Knut Ingar Westeren, Introductory Comments to FOUNDATIONS OF THE 
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY, 1–2 (2012).  In a knowledge economy, a significant part of a 
business’ value may consist of its intangible assets, such as the value of workers’ 
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single-assignment basis as independent contractors from 
home-office space or other remote “third spaces,” unaffiliated 
with an employer other than on a “jobbing” basis”;40 
4. “Makers” exploiting cutting-edge technology like additive 
manufacturing devices (3D printers, for example),41 along 
with more conventional artisans continuing to work from 
home studios, renting their products from those spaces as 
ersatz galleries;42 and 
5. “Hustlers,” engaging in any income-producing method 
defraying recurring expense of living in cities without reliable 
means of financial support, including persons characterized 
as chronically unemployed or underemployed.43 
 
intellectual capability, especially regarding use and applications of technology in 
producing and disseminating information.  See Walter W. Powell & Kaisa Snellman, 
The Knowledge Economy, 30 ANN. REV. SOCIOL. 199, 199 (2004). 
 40  See Justin Fox, Breaking Down the Freelance Economy, HARV. BUS. REV. 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP (Sept. 2, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/09/breaking-down-the-
freelance-economy/. 
 41  See Michael N. Widener, Begone Euclid! Leasing Custom and Zoning Provision 
Engaging Retail Consumer Tastes and Technologies in Thriving Urban Centers, 35 PACE L. 
REV. 834, 857–59 (2015). 
 42  See, e.g., Geoffrey A. Fowler, MakerBot Replicator Mini Review: 3-D Printing Comes 
Home, WALL ST. J., June 17, 2014, at D1–2, available at http://online.wsj.com 
/articles/makerbot-replicator-mini-review-3-d-printing-comes-home-1403021932 
(explaining how MakerBot Replicator Mini now enables persons to work from a 
residence to create 3D objects).  Local Motors, a Phoenix-based 3D-printing company 
which built an entire automobile in 2014 with help from Oak Ridge National Lab and 
the manufacturing company SABIC, says it is the first to 3D print both a body and 
chassis (carbon fiber-reinforced plastic) together.  Brian Fung, So, This Exists: A 
Working Car Has Been 3D-Printed Out of Carbon Fiber Plastic, WASH. POST THE SWITCH BLOG 
(Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/ 
09/19/so-this-exists-a-working-car-has-been-3d-printed-out-of-carbon-fiber-plastic/.  
Even if one accepts the notion that such printing is twenty years away from everyday 
citizens’ access for a variety of reasons (product safety, cost, etc.), it is naïve to insist 
that large consumer products will not be built with the intention of shared use from 
individual residences and garages as soon as price and competence permits 
implementation. 
 43  See, e.g., Kevin Roose, The Sharing Economy Isn’t About Trust, It’s About Desperation, 
NEW YORK DAILY INTELLIGENCER/THE GIG ECONOMY (Apr. 24, 2014), 
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2014/04/sharing-economy-is-about-despera 
tion.html.  See also Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 114th Cong. (July 15, 2014), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/yellen 201407 15a.htm 
(Testimony of Janet L. Yellen, Chair of the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.) 
(“Even with the recent declines, the unemployment rate remains above Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC) participants’ estimates of its longer-run normal level. 
Labor force participation appears weaker than one would expect based on the aging 
of the population and the level of unemployment.”).  Some speculate that the 
persistent weakness in the labor force participation rate reflects adults working in the 
freelance economy.  See Stephen Gandel, America’s Biggest Job Market Problem is Uniquely 
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B. Principles of the Sharing Economy Movement 
The central elements of the sharing economy are an emphasis on 
sustainability and value creation through reuse of materials and 
objects; underpinnings of trust between and among producers, 
prosumers and consumers;44 and marketing of participants exploiting 
Web 2.0 platforms45 combined with an element of self-policing to 
evaluate and rate both providers and customers.46  Peer-to-peer 
communications capitalizing on expanding access to technology using 
open and collaborative design47 has spurred the idea that hospitality 
and generosity with one’s costly privately-owned physical assets and 
talents can expand exponentially, thereby conserving non-renewable 
resources.  Anthony Townsend muses that this is evidence of the 
“sociability of cities,” propelled by the technologically-astute urban 
dweller’s desire to connect, collaborate and share.48 
The best argument for the essential sustainability of the sharing 
economy is that bartering with one’s excess or underutilized—thus 
disposable or loanable—resources49 represents centuries-old social 
behavior.  In America, sharing of resources is evident from the days of 
 
American, FORTUNE FINANCE (July 2, 2015, 11:18 AM), https:// 
fortune.com/2015/07/02/us-labor-force-participation-drops/.  It is unknown how 
many of such persons are paid in cash (or equivalents in goods or services) by others 
without declaring cash income or in-kind payments.  Chairwoman Yellen’s speech to 
the National Association for Business Economics Policy Conference was more sobering 
yet.  See Janet L. Yellen, Chair, the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at 
the 2013 National Association for Business Economics Policy Conference: Challenges 
Confronting Monetary Policy (Mar. 4, 2013) (transcript available at http:// 
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20130302a. htm). 
 44  See Juliet B. Schor and Connor J. Fitzmaurice, Collaborating and Connecting: The 
Emergence of the Sharing Economy, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON SUSTAINABLE 
CONSUMPTION 410, 416–17 (Lucia A. Reisch and John Thogersen eds., 2015).  
 45  See Uri Friedman, Airbnb CEO: Cities are Becoming Villages, THE ATLANTIC (Jun 29, 
2014, 9:51 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/airbnb-
ceo-cities-are-becoming-villages/373676/.  
 46  See KOOPMAN, supra note 31, at 15–17. 
 47  See ANTHONY M. TOWNSEND, SMART CITIES: BIG DATA, CIVIC HACKERS, AND THE 
QUEST FOR A NEW UTOPIA 153 (2013).  Indeed, in the Internet universe, Tim Berners-
Lee was the ultimate sharing economy founder, as his vision in inventing the Web was 
to facilitate particle scientists’ publishing of aggregated data for sharing within that 
community.  See Christopher Mims, Apps’ Walled Garden Closes Off Wide-Open Web, WALL 
ST. J., Nov. 17, 2014 at B1, available at http://online.wsj.com/articles/the-web-is-dying-
apps-are-killing-it-1416169934. 
 48  See TOWNSEND, supra note 47, at 162. 
 49  Ecologists call this phenomenon “niche construction”—that people (and even 
some other animals) will create new opportunities for themselves by making their 
habitats more productive in some way.  See Matt Ridley, The World’s Resources Aren’t 
Running Out, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 25, 2014), available at http://online.wsj.com/ 
news/articles/SB10001424052702304279904579517862612287156. 
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The Library Company of Philadelphia.50  Trading goods for services 
and goods for other goods, or renting goods or services, supports 
sustainability when that concept means limiting exhaustion of non-
renewable resources.51  While residence sharing, like that afforded 
through Airbnb, may not be substantially less carbon-intensive than 
staying at a hotel, construction of the hotel per se accounts for a 
significant fraction of its carbon “footprint.”52 
Importance of sustainability benefits aside, the key component of 
the sharing economy disrupting entire sectors of the global economy 
(such as the hospitality industry) is near zero marginal cost to sharing 
producers.53  Marginal cost is the cost of producing an additional unit 
of a good or a service once a business establishes its fixed costs.54  While 
a hotel chain must build a project to add inventory for consumers, 
Airbnb builds almost nothing in addition to occasional tweakings of its 
website.55  People merely connect to the Internet and other networks, 
as the “Internet of Things”56 expands; they can use big data, analytics, 
and algorithms to accelerate efficiency and lower the marginal cost of 
producing and sharing a wide range of products and services to near 
 
 50  In 1731, Benjamin Franklin convinced members of the Junto, his “society of 
mutual improvement,” to pool their resources to purchase a collection of books no 
member could have afforded individually.  Articles of Agreement were drafted on July 
1, 1731, and the Library Company of Philadelphia was established when fifty founding 
shareholders signed on.  Each founder contributed forty shillings and agreed to pay 
ten shillings per year thereafter. As the Library Company’s collection grew, the book 
capital of each shareholder expanded as well.  Later supported by taxes, until the 1850s 
it was the largest public library in America.  See generally The History of the Library Company 
of Philadelphia, THE LIBRARY COMPANY, http://librarycompany.org/about/history.htm 
(last visited Sept. 12, 2015). 
 51  ALEX STEPHANY, THE BUSINESS OF SHARING: MAKING IT IN THE NEW SHARING 
ECONOMY 12, 16, 32–33, 184–85 (2015).  See also Anne-Sophie Novel, Is Sharing More 
Sustainable? The Environmental Promises of the Sharing Economy, in A PLANET FOR LIFE: 
INNOVATION FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 139–44 (Jean-Yves Grosclaude, Rajandra 
Pachauri, and Laurence Tubiana eds., 2014). 
 52  See TOWNSEND, supra note 47, at 163.  
 53  Rifkin, supra note 11.   
 54  See id.  
 55  See id.  
 56  This three-word term (abbreviated sometimes as the “IoT”) refers to collections 
of physical objects linked to each other, and to users, through the Internet or other 
computer networks.  Computers themselves are not usually thought of as belonging to 
the IoT, featuring objects like geo-positional tracking devices and home security 
systems that until recently were not linked through computer networks.  See John A. 
Rothchild, Net Gets Physical: What You Need to Know About the Internet of Things, BUS. L. 
TODAY (The American Bar Association, Chi, Ill.), Nov. 2014, available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/blt/2014/11/full-
issue-201411.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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zero.57  Economic rent-seeking shrinks when institutional gate-keepers 
traditionally tracking payments and asset movements in monitoring 
transaction completion are not the lone repositories of trust in 
commerce.58 
City officials know that the sharing economy promotes 
community development and repatriates capital into neighborhoods59: 
a transaction in the sharing economy promotes neighborhood 
economic investment more than a deal engaging a typical 
multinational corporation.  A Forbes Magazine report estimated that the 
sharing economy generated $3.5 billion for its participants.60  The 
sharing economy allows people to shorten the chains of commerce and 
ultimately to invest repeatedly and directly in their communities.  
Notably, sharing systems can be deployed rapidly, leveraging already-
available Web technologies. Cataloging recent business models at 
length with collaborative-consumption users would be pointless since, 
while preparing this article for publication, myriad models of such 
sharing provision will rise and others will crash when no clear value 
proposition addressing an authentic need emerges.61  Today’s market-
niche dominant models will be surpassed by new models, while others 
adjust nimbly to capture new consumer opportunities.  For instance, 
consider that Uber’s origination featured limousine services, a very 
different model than its present operating system.62 
Nonetheless, this economy offers cities several advantages in an 
entirely new development scheme, beginning with creating mixed-use 
 
 57  See Rifkin, supra note 11.  The point is that disruption arises from the sharing 
economy’s undercutting many established sectors’ already dangerously-low profit 
margins.  
 58  See PAUL VIGNA AND MICHAEL CASEY, THE AGE OF CRYPTOCURRENCY: HOW BITCOIN 
AND DIGITAL MONEY ARE CHALLENGING THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER 4–5, 8, 62, 244 
(2014). 
 59  See Resolution In Support of Policies for Sharable Cities, THE UNITED STATES 
CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, 81ST ANN. MEETING (June 21–24, 2013), 
www.usmayors.org/resolutions/81st_Conference/metro18.asp. 
 60  See Tomio Geron, Airbnb and the Unstoppable Rise of the Share Economy, FORBES 
(Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/01/23/airbnb-and-
the-unstoppable-rise-of-the-share-economy/.  PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) 
reported in August 2014, its belief that by 2025 the potential value of the five main 
sharing economy “sectors” will be $335 billion.  See The Sharing Economy—Sizing the 
Revenue Opportunity, PWC,  www.pwc.co.uk//issues/megatrends/collisions/ 
sharingeconomy/the-sharing-economy-sizing-the-revenue-opportunity.jhtml (last 
visited Sept. 12, 2015).   
 61  See Marc-Arthur Gauthey, Why the Majority of Sharing Economy Start Ups Will Fail, 
OUI SHARE MAG. (Nov. 20, 2014), http://magazine.ouishare.net/2014/11/why-the-
majority-of-sharing-economy-start-ups-will-fail/. 
 62  See Julian Chikkattu & Jordan Crook, A Brief History of Uber, TECH CRUNCH (Aug. 
14, 2014), www.techcrunch.com/gallery/a-brief-history-of-uber/. 
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enclaves out of strictly residential neighborhoods.63  The economic 
advantages include providing desired services to these enclaves’ 
dwellers as well as consumer services not warranting traditional 
market-entrance brick and mortar stores and their higher price 
structures.64  Some sharing-economy models substantially impact land 
occupancy and burden spatial infrastructure and their dwellers.  This 
article muses on neighborhood transformations occurring when 
unfamiliar persons appear in buildings, rights of way and curbside 
parking areas.  Readers will think about models featuring home-based 
custom retailers, persons with rooms or offices to let,65 food (fresh from 
the garden and prepared on the stove) and rides to share, and 
equipment and clothing to rent.  The sustainability “value proposition” 
described in land use terms addresses whether sharing economy 
enterprises (and their on-site consumers in combination) afford more 
net benefit than nuisance to people jointly occupying the producers’ 
spatial surroundings.66 
III. WHY THE SHARING ECONOMY REQUIRES LAND USE REGULATION 
Cities need uniformity in regulations, unless one believes “natural 
law”67 sufficiently governs activities springing up in neighborhoods.  As 
Justice Scalia reminds us, one cannot conform one’s behavior to the 
unknowable.68  Accordingly, in residential neighborhoods, 
municipalities historically have limited land uses that tend to introduce 
unfamiliar persons such as laborers and customers.69  Such regulated 
uses in residential areas include home occupations such as watching 
children in residences, after school-hours tutoring, musical and arts 
training, yard sales, and boarding houses and other congregate living 
 
 63  See Miller, supra note 1, at 11. 
 64  See id. at 12. 
 65  See, e.g., LIQUIDSPACE, https://liquidspace.com (last visited Sept. 12, 2015) 
(providing workspaces to rent by the hour, day, week, etc.). 
 66  Cf. NAVI RADJOU & JAIDEEP PRABHU, FRUGAL INNOVATION: HOW TO DO MORE WITH 
LESS xiv (2015) (describing the value proposition of doing better in business with fewer 
costs, greater sustainability and an enhanced sense of purpose).  
 67  See John E. Donaldson, Regulation of Conduct in Relation to Land—the Need to Purge 
Natural Law Constraints from the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 187, 197, 
200 (1974) (discussing the idea that property and liberty are natural rights protected 
by higher law undergirds “natural law”; legislation in appropriate instances must 
circumscribe natural rights, however, as in exercises of the police power, asserting that 
all land is held under a servitude in favor of the states). 
 68  Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178–
79 (1989). 
 69  See, e.g., EMILY TALEN, CITY RULES: HOW REGULATIONS AFFECT URBAN FORM 122 
(2012) (noting that rules requiring functional separation are still the norm, so, for the 
most part, residentially zoned areas host strictly residential uses). 
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arrangements.70 
Municipalities increasingly experiment with, and occasionally 
embrace, regulatory innovation enabling neighborhoods to thrive 
harmoniously with entrepreneurs leveraging new forms of 
collaborative consumption.71  If cities embracing regulatory change are 
more likely to thrive in economic development, job retention, and 
affordable housing production, the question is begged whether the 
evolving informal economy’s impact on land use demands any 
regulation.  If the answer is affirmative, here is why.  First, a sharing 
economy potentially overtaxes parts of the infrastructure without 
sharing producers contributing in the way of offsets and mitigation of 
burdens.72  Sometimes known as “fiscal freeloading,”73 this 
phenomenon applies to developments that increase demand for 
public services by a sheer growth in persons introduced into a 
community.  For instance, owners who aggressively use Airbnb to rent 
their homes impose significant impacts on their neighbors, such as 
heightened traffic and noise74 generated on local streets.75  Renters of 
these properties may occupy curbside stalls otherwise allocable to local 
 
 70  See generally, Nicole Stelle Garnett, On Castles and Commerce: Zoning Law and the 
Home-Business Dilemma, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1191 (2001); Thomas E. Roberts, The 
Regulation of Home Occupations under Zoning Ordinances—Some Constitutional 
Consideration, 56 TEMP. L. Q. 49, 49–50 (1983). 
 71  For example, Los Angeles’ Department of City Planning is experimenting with 
industrial mixed-use areas that may support limited residential units through its 
Hybrid Industrial Live/Work Zone.  See generally Hybrid Industrial Live/Work (HI) Zone 
Quick Guide, L.A. DEPT. CITY PLANNING (June 10, 2015), 
http://planning.lacity.org/Documents/policy/HIZoneFAQandOrdinance.pdf.  This 
guide contains a draft of the proposed Sec. 12.04.06 and text amendments to the Los 
Angeles Municipal Code.  Ironically, Euclidean zoning arose from a perceived need to 
separate industrial uses from residences altogether for public health preservation.  
 72  See, e.g., Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, But for Local Government 
Policy: The Future of Local Regulation of the Sharing Economy 15 (unpublished George 





3081&EXT=pdf) (asserting that Sharing Enterprises lead to more intensive resource 
uses than anticipated by local regulation).  
 73  See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Zoning: A Reply to the Critics, 10 J. LAND USE & 
ENVTL. L. 45, 49 (1994) (addressing how new developments place a greater burden on 
public services than they contribute in new taxes). 
 74  See Carolyn Said, Airbnb Irks Twin Peaks Neighbors, SFGATE BLOG (Aug. 14, 2014, 
7:28 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/realestate/article/Airbnb-irks-neighbors-
5687123.php.  
 75  See, e.g., Eric Biber and J.B. Ruhl, Regulating the “Sharing Economy,” REGBLOG (July 
28, 2014), http://www.regblog.org/2014/07/28/28-biber-ruhl-regulating-the-
sharing-economy/. 
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residents,76 unless the property owner offers sufficient onsite parking 
space.  Renters use the water and sewer systems; an overabundance of 
such renters in one neighborhood could overtax a city block’s service 
capacity.  Owners not maintaining their rental units may create 
problems for public health and sanitation77 if, for example, an owner 
fails to dispose of the rental unit’s refuse routinely or neglects to 
service the “shared” swimming pool.  The owner of property who lacks 
funds to make needed repairs may allow the improvements to become 
derelict. 
Second, while well-planned rental business models may have 
vetted suppliers of goods and services, invariably there will be “knock-
offs” of successful entrepreneurs in the sharing economy.  Although 
imitation flatters, underfunded and inexperienced-management 
operations may endanger neighborhoods by luring poorly-screened 
producers and consumers alike.  Rental units may become venues for 
drug dealing, stashing and use,78 prostitution79 and other criminal 
conduct, or housing persons with infectious health conditions or 
chronic economic problems.80 
Third, some sharing producers inevitably will “defect” from land 
use and related regulations just as they will from any social norm.81  
 
 76  See Said, supra note 74.  See also Karen Klinger, City Plan to Allow Residential Zipcar 
Parking Sparks Controversy, CAMBRIDGE CMTY. TELEVISION (May 21, 2009), 
https://www.cctvcambridge.org/node/18076 (discussing objection to zoning change 
allowing ZipCar parking in residential areas because users will be “coming and going 
at all hours of the day and night” and will reduce available parking spaces for 
residents). 
 77  See Said, supra note 74.  Transient dwellers do not properly lid garbage cans, 
allowing animals access to the garbage inside. 
 78  In response to “raves,” parties at which ecstasy is served and partiers dance for 
long hours, facilitating dehydration or drug toxicity leading to death, Congress passed 
the Ecstasy Anti-Proliferation Act of 2000 in October, 42 U.S.C. § 290aa-5b (2012) and 
the Illicit Drug Anti-Proliferation Act of 2003, 21 U.S.C. § 856 (2012 & Supp. 2004).  
Raves are conducted in residential areas in addition to clubs.  See, e.g., Kent Page 
McGroarty, How to Throw an Awesome Private Rave at Home, SFGATE, 
http://homeguides.sfgate.com/throw-awesome-private-rave-home-24945.html (last 
visited Sept. 12, 2015). 
 79  Dana Sauchelli and Bruce Golding, Hookers Turning Airbnb Apartments into 




 80  See, e.g., AIRBNB HELL, http://www.airbnbhell.com/tag/airbnb-criminal/ (last 
visited Sept. 12, 2015), for anecdotal material. 
 81  This fact illustrates why digital reputation and monitoring systems for self-
policing in the sharing economy are critical.  See Molly Cohen & Arun Sundararajan, 
Self-Regulation and Innovation in the Peer-to-Peer Sharing Economy, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 116, 
128 (2015) [hereinafter Cohen & Sundararajan]. 
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“Gaming” of a system is human nature and endemic in highly 
competitive scenarios82 where an otherwise first-class operation suffers 
under low margins.  Inevitably, such defection compromises public 
safety and the quality of life in the surrounding community.  Moreover, 
tolerance of flouting established norms like zoning codes, without 
enforcement of standards, spurs disregard for the local regulatory 
system overall, contributing to a downward spiral of compliance and 
blighted conditions. 
How do governments accommodate entrepreneurial freedom 
and fundamental property rights to the need for baseline community 
health and safety standards?  Advocates say sharing creates jobs, cuts 
greenhouse gasses, reduces traffic (along with wear and tear on roads 
and bridges in addition to reducing exhaustion of raw materials used 
in vehicular construction), fights crime and even ameliorates the 
impact of natural disasters.83  In communities where “ownership” or 
possession of goods rapidly changes, cities facilitate citizens sharing 
their resources by reducing the volume and complexity of their 
regulations.  Unregulated collaborative consumption transactions may 
endanger public welfare, regardless of consumer “verification,” photos 
online, or ratings methods.84  For example, food exchanged via 
leftovers-sharing sites may have been prepared inexpertly or under 
unsanitary conditions, creating a potential public health hazard 
unpreventable by “peer” monitoring mechanisms.85  The typical 
consumer does not have the expertise to analyze a food-poisoning 
environment.  Peer review and self-regulation foster a sense of 
community and may be cheaper to implement than centralized 
administration.  Even so, existing trust and enforcement mechanisms 
do not require communities to disregard potential safety incidents, 
 
 82  See Nigel Nicholson, How Hardwired is Human Behavior?, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 
1998) (noting that humans are hardwired to avoid loss when comfortable, but 
scramble desperately when threatened and citing behavior of Nick Leeson, who 
destroyed Barings Bank by gaming the trading system). 
 83  See STEPHANY, supra note 51, at 139–42. 
 84  See Brenden Mulligan, Dirty Pillows: The Unsolved Problems of Sharing Services, 
TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 1, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/04/01/dirty-pillows-the-
unsolved-problems-of-sharing-services/. 
 85  Typically, in sharing-economy companies, after each transaction both the 
consumer and sharing provider are rated.  These ratings provide transparency and 
accountability and induce sharing parties to provide quality service to protect their 
reputations.  See, e.g., Rachel Botsman, The Currency of the New Economy is Trust, 
TEDGLOBAL 2012 (June 2012), http://www.ted.com/talks/rachel_botsman_t 
he_currency_of_the_new_economy_is_trust?language=en; Tom Slee, Some Obvious 
Things about Internet Reputation Systems, WHIMSLEY (Sept. 29, 2013), 
http://tomslee.net/2013/09/some-obvious-things-about-internet-reputation-systems 
.html.  But see infra note 119 and accompanying text. 
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epidemics, or other improprieties imposing taxpayer costs resulting 
from a lack of express standards and professional enforcement.86 
Another problem of unregulated sharing stems from introducing 
strangers into communities.87  Although raising this issue invites 
overtones of racism or other bias against unfamiliar persons, some who 
occupy temporary housing or visit meal-sharing venues investigate 
neighborhoods seeking targets for future burglary.88  Distinguishing 
transient residents from potential thieves is challenging enough, and 
no modestly-organized “block watch” program properly tracks 
multiple, subtle canvasses of possible targets for mischief unless the 
neighborhood has substantial collective efficiency.89 
Even if no malice is intended, “sharing consumers” introduced 
into a neighborhood increase traffic movements (some of which, due 
to unfamiliarity with the neighborhood’s streets, will create risk of 
collisions), fill parking spaces on local streets, generate additional 
ambient noise, and further burden electric and other utility grids 
proximate to the sharing sites.90  These neighborhood burdens often 
are not being addressed in the form of sales taxes or license fees 
 
 86  See Cohen & Sundararajan, supra note 81, at 126–27. 
 87  See Miller, supra note 1, at 34 (noting that sudden influxes of unfamiliar persons 
rapidly changes feeling of familiarity among locals). 
 88  Sources support the finding that thieves case neighborhoods.  See Victor 
Urbach, What Burglars Don’t want you to Know, URBACH LETTER (Mar., 2010), 
http://www.urbachletter.com/Archive/Safety_1003_BurglaryPrevention.htm; cf. 
JOHN HUGHES, HOME ALONE (1990) (characters Harry Lime and Marv Merchants 
canvassing a neighborhood). 
 89  Neighborhoods with more transient residents and social disorganization tend 
to see increases in crime rates due to their weakened social control (where a 
community of concerned citizens is missing).  See John C. Kilburn, et al., A Paper Tiger 
on Chestnut Lane: The Significance of NIMBY Battles in Decaying Communities, 4 URBANITES 
3, 7 (2014), available at http://www.researchgate.net/profile/John_ 
Kilburn2/publication/269408776_A_Paper_Tiger_on_Chestnut_Lane_The_Significa
nce_of_NIMBY_Battles_in_Decaying_Communities/links/548b14720cf225bf669f830
0.pdf.  Neighborhood “watch” programs are mostly ineffective in preventing crime; 
nor do they result in reduced fear of crime or increased information flow between 
citizens and law enforcement.  See Jenny Fleming, “Working Together”: Neighborhood 
Watch, Reassurance Policing and the Potential of Partnerships, TRENDS & ISSUES IN CRIME AND 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE No. 303, 1, 3 (Sept. 2005), available at http://www.aic.gov.au/ 
media_library/publications/tandi_pdf/tandi303.pdf. 
 90  See, e.g., Cohen & Sundararajan, supra note 81, at 122 (noting that an additional 
Lyft car on the road creates congestion and lengthens travel times for other drivers, 
while a noisy Airbnb guest in an apartment building might impose costs on the other 
residents from his or her disturbing behavior); Dean Baker, Don’t Buy the ‘Sharing 
Economy’ Hype: Airbnb and Uber are Facilitating Rip-Offs, GUARDIAN TECHNOLOGY (May 27, 
2014, 7:30 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/27/ 
airbnb-uber-taxes-regulation (“Airbnb can also raise issues of safety for its customers 
and nuisance for hosts’ neighbors.”). 
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repatriated directly to the host enclaves.91  Further, persons not 
participating in the sharing economy expect to maintain their daily 
routines without interference from unfamiliar persons, strange noises 
and odors, increased traffic and reduced curbside parking.92 
Finally, controversy about the economic impact of regulating the 
sharing economy shows no signs of waning.  Why should the land use 
control of the sharing economy be restrained?  Does limiting 
regulatory restraint encourage entrepreneurism by eliminating costly 
overlays on businesses?93  Might entrepreneurism be stifled in an 
environment where “anything goes”?  Does deregulation encourage 
institutional innovation as conventional companies compete for space 
in the innovation environment occupied by sharing producers? 
Debate over whether or how to regulate the informal economy’s 
land use dimensions shall not subside, because this burgeoning 
economy will not disappear.  Technology will continue “introducing” 
sharing consumers and producers to each other, through “freelance” 
worker—contingent-employer platforms94 and otherwise.  More 
individuals will be engaged over time in this economy because 
underemployment of the middle class and all non- or under-skilled 
workers is a chronic problem with no immediate solution in sight.95  
 
 91  Cf. Vicki Been, What’s Fairness Got to Do With It? Environmental Justice and the Siting 
of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INEQUALITY 255–57 
(Frank Ackerman ed., 2000) (noting undesirable land use siting implicates principles 
of environmental justice). 
 92  Accusations of NIMBY-ism notwithstanding, there is little immoral about a 
resident’s wanting to live in a residential area not saturated with transients.  See, e.g., 
Tani Sutley, Whatcom County and the New Sharing Economy, NORTHWESTCITIZEN (Dec. 9, 
2014, 2:25 AM), http://www.nwcitizen.com/entry/whatcom-county-welcomes-the-
new-sharing-economy. 
 93  Perhaps the test illustration will be Malibu, California, which has allowed short-
term rentals as of right without zoning regulation since 2009, so long as property 
owners register with the city and pay the same percentage transient occupancy tax that 
hotels remit.  See Matt Stevens & Martha Groves, Malibu to Crack Down on Short-Term 
Rentals via Airbnb, Other Websites, L.A. TIMES (May 27, 2014, 8:09 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-malibu-renting-20140528-story.html#page=1. 
 94  See Lauren Weber & Rachel Emma Silverman, On-Demand Workers: We are not 
Robots, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2015, at B1, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/on-
demand-workers-we-are-not-robots-1422406524.  The authors note that companies 
using this form of worker engagement now tout their workers as “micro-entrepreneurs 
of the vanguard of a new, flexible future of work in which people only do the jobs they 
like.”  Id.  Essentially, these are options with no possibility of advancement and no 
benefits.  Contingent arrangements permit business cost-savings by avoiding health-
care insurance premiums and retirement-system administrative expenses. 
 95  Full-time employment opportunities particularly are elusive in America’s 
current economic and employer-mandated health-care circumstances, due to higher 
costs of retaining full-time workers.  See Nick Timiraos, Many Face New Normal: Part-Time 
Pay, Full-Time Bills, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2014, at A1 (video available at 
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Indeed, some pundits blame technological developments for creating 
this problem.96  The class of youthful adherents to sustainability 
principles is growing.97  The number of persons with little or no savings 
is staggering,98 compelling many to address how to “cut corners” on 
everyday expenses.  Additionally, evidence mounts that forthcoming 
generations of entrepreneurs are decreasing in numbers,99 suggesting 
that new business models in the knowledge economy will not place 
most of the underemployed and unemployed in full-time, subsistence-
wage positions, particularly in circumstances where workers lack 
crucial technical job skills.100  Finally, from rebellion, desire for 
schedule flexibility, or other reasons, some adults will not rejoin the 
conventional workforce whether or not jobs numbers grow.101 
 
http://www.wsj.com/video/is-high-part-time-employment-the-new-normal/57FA23 
DD-E5C3-4B03-B707-1448598161F5.html?KEYWORDS=timiraos+part+time).  Given 
the American economy’s recovery circumstances, while full time jobs have been added 
in 2014, the total number is short of jobs numbers during 2007, when America’s 
recession commenced.  See id. at A2.  Timiraos speculates that part-time employment 
will replace full-time work, but cannot prove this theory given currently decreasing 
part-time U.S. jobs numbers.  See id. 
 96  William A. Galston, Countering Tech’s Damaging Effect on Jobs, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 
2014, at A17, available at http://online.wsj.com/articles/william-galston-countering-
techs-damaging-effect-on-jobs-1413328435 (discussing how many jobs will be 
automated away over the next twenty years).  Gartner reports that robots and other 
automated devices will perform one-third of all jobs within a decade.  See Timothy 
Aeppel, What Clever Robots Mean for Jobs, WALL ST. J. TECH (Feb. 24, 2015, 10:30 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/what-clever-robots-mean-for-jobs-1424835002. 
 97  See JEREMY L. CARADONNA, SUSTAINABILITY: A HISTORY 2, 205–06 (2014). 
 98  See, e.g., Rani Molla, Americans Have a Hard Time Covering Emergency Expenses, 
WALL ST. J. THE NUMBERS BLOG (Aug. 13, 2014, 10:09 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/numbers/americans-have-a-hard-time-covering-emergency-
expenses-1698/ (noting that Americans have little savings, and perhaps twenty-five 
percent of Americans have none at all, making emergency expenses difficult to cover); 
see also Ann Carrns, Why it’s Hard to Build Emergency Savings, N.Y. TIMES BUCKS BLOG 
(June 25, 2013, 1:08 PM), http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/25/why-its-hard-
to-build-emergency-savings/?_r=0 (noting that half of Americans have less than three 
months of expenses saved up, and just a quarter have six months of expenses saved, 
which is the typical recommendation for emergency financial reserves, according to 
Bankrate.com’s report based on a 2013 survey by Princeton Survey Research Associates 
International). 
 99  See Mitchell E. Daniels, How Student Debt Harms the Economy, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 
2015, at A15, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/mitchell-e-daniels-how-student-
debt-harms-the-economy-1422401693 (discussing that the percentage of younger 
people reporting owning part of a new business has decreased as has the percentage 
of business begun by Americans under thirty-four years of age; and former-student 
debt magnitude seems to correlate to new venture formation). 
 100  See Mark Trumbull, Unemployment, Inc.: Six reasons why America can’t create jobs, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/ 
2011/0902/Unemployment-Inc.-Six-reasons-why-America-can-t-create-jobs.  
 101  See Kate Taylor, Why Millennials are ending the 9 to 5, FORBES WOMAN (Aug. 23, 
2013, 2:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/katetaylor/2013/08/23/why-
WIDENER (DO NOT DELETE) 11/3/2015  2:56 PM 
132 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:111 
In truth, no thoughtful person should want, outright, to stifle this 
phenomenon.  Among other reasons, consider that: 
1. Working at/from the home saves on office-based utilities 
consumed inside suites and in building common areas and on 
worker business overhead costs, so it is a sustainable business 
practice; 
2. Having neighborhood proximity of consumers and producers 
builds familiarity with the neighborhood and strengthens 
immediate community ties, with the side effect of 
discouraging petty crime (the so-called “regulating functions” 
of sidewalk-level life102); 
3. This on-demand economy, bolstered by social media 
platforms, spurs entrepreneurism among workers in the 
knowledge economy and enables some financial support 
means for a shrinking class of workers; 
4. Creating jobs, even if in small numbers, in the present chronic 
condition of unemployment and underemployment among 
the unskilled work force could result in a “virtuous cycle” of 
additional training and employment placement 
opportunities;103 
5. Enabling a permanent class of small business owners/
partners, whether or not serial entrepreneurs (those building 
companies with intention of selling and cashing in), can 
produce diversity of business models for a protracted period, 
affording additional income to those engaged in the 
 
millennials-are-ending-the-9-to-5/.  A compelling social dimension of the sharing 
economy is experience consumption, opposed to goods acquisition, leading to 
heightened contentment in some younger persons preferring to spend disposable 
income on life experiences, economizing through borrowing instead of owing 
possessions.  See Joel Stein, Baby You Can Drive My Car and Stay in My Guest Room.  And 
do my Errands.  And Rent My Stuff.  My Wild Ride through the New On-Demand Economy, 
TIME, Feb. 9, 2015, at 32, available at http://time.com/3687305/testing-the-sharing-
economy/.  This partially explains why persons who do not need sharing platforms use 
them nonetheless.  See id. at 40. 
 102  JACOBS, supra note 26, at 60–88. 
 103  Following the recession of the later years of the 21st Century’s initial decade, 
the challenge of replacing living-wage jobs is amplified by the rise of automation as a 
proxy for human workplace labor.  See Derek Thompson, A World Without Work, THE 
ATLANTIC, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/07/world-without-
work/395294/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2015).  Some economists and other observers 
contend the sharing economy is not built to create long-term, stable jobs but instead 
is fostering downward mobility among Millennials.  See, e.g., Reid Cramer, How the 
Sharing Economy is Hurting Millennials, TIME (June 29, 2015), 
http://time.com/3939850/sharing-economy-pitfalls/; Monica Potts, The Post-
Ownership Society, WASH. MONTHLY (June 2015), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/ 
magazine/junejulyaugust_2015/features/the_postownership_society055896.php. 
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“conventional” workplace; and 
6. Reducing the personal habit of overconsumption, which 
heavily burdens certain non-renewable resources and 
contributes to mounting personal debt,104 is a positive 
behavioral modification. 
Wealthy and underemployed micro-giggers alike will conduct small 
businesses in their (or their parents’) homes, undetectably in many 
cases, unless they produce noxious by-products of their businesses or 
they self-identify to authorities as occupying workplaces.  A reactionary 
community policy will not arrest this growing social norm.  Part IV 
considers those instrumentalities of regulation ideally positioned and 
otherwise well suited to regulate this sector of social and economic life 
in America. 
IV. HARNESSING SHARING ECONOMY LAND USE REGULATION: PUBLIC 
AND PRIVATE INPUTS 
This Part addresses two themes: who possesses needed inputs and 
wisdom to regulate the collaborative consumption environment within 
conventional residential enclaves and whether Sharing Enterprises can 
be regulated without upending the ownership expectations of 
residents and the social equity underpinnings of sharing. 
A. Public Regulation of Sharing Economy Land Use Dimensions. 
Local American governments have experience in regulating land 
use and efficiency going back a century.  Together with public faith in 
accountability of local government structures, this background favors 
continued local government—or perhaps regional government—
control of new sharing economy business models and initiatives.  Here 
are the arguments supporting this view.  A precast system of reasonably 
stable105 and precise laws and regulations discourages favoritism or 
exercising individual bureaucratic venality.106  When regulations are 
 
 104  See Claire Cain Miller, Is Owning Overrated? The Rental Economy Rises, N.Y. TIMES 
THE UPSHOT BLOG (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/30/upshot/is-
owning-overrated-the-rental-economy-rises.html?_r=0&abt=0002&abg=1. 
 105  See Jonathan Rothwell & Douglas S. Massey, The Effect of Density Zoning on Racial 
Segregation in U.S. Urban Areas, 44 URB. AFF. REV. 779, 789 (2009) (providing that many 
local jurisdictions report that zoning regulations do not change much over time). 
 106  Some critics assert that macro-level zoning regulations sustain segregation (a 
type of “favoritism”) in communities with low-density residential zoning.  See generally 
Rothwell & Massey, supra note 105.  See also Charles Lord & Keaton Norquist, Cities as 
Emergent Systems: Race as a Rule in Organized Complexity, 40 ENVTL. L. 551, 584–99 (2010).  
Such critics also argue that zoning adjustment is rife with authorities succumbing to 
their own desires and fears as well as emotional responses of others who exert the most 
influence upon them.  See Stewart M. Wiener, Comment, Substantive Due Process in the 
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sufficiently explicit, they may be uniformly applied without fear of 
contamination by individual discretion;107 this predictability comforts 
many citizens.  Additionally, the economic rationale for zoning 
adopted and enforced by public bodies states that land use creates 
positive and negative local externalities.108  Thus, while if a resident 
plants flowers in her front yard, her whole city block benefits; but filled 
with inoperable vehicles awaiting repairs, the resident’s yard spoils her 
neighbors’ streetscape and property values.  A low-tech factory sited 
next to a suburb usually presents an eyesore.109  While a popular cafe 
may enliven a neighborhood, its patrons compete with adjacent 
residents for scarce curbside parking.  Faced with such local 
externalities, principles of “market efficiency” cease to apply, as 
publicly administered zoning laws balance social welfare issues.  
Zoning rules seek to mitigate citizen-entrepreneur activities with 
negative externalities while encouraging activities with positive 
impacts.110  For instance, San Francisco’s response to Airbnb-generated 
problems is legislation (a) allowing only permanent city residents to 
rent out rooms or entire homes, provided citizens enroll in a city 
registry and purchase liability insurance, (b) limiting rentals of full 
residences to ninety days annually and (c) providing for its Planning 
Department to enforce the new regulation.111 
 
Twilight Zone: Protecting Property Interests from Arbitrary Land Use Decisions, 69 TEMP. L. 
REV. 1467, 1467 (1996). 
 107  Cf. Rob Imrie & Emma Street, Regulating Design: The Practices of Architecture, 
Governance and Control, 46 URB. STUDIES 2507, 2507 (2009) (noting that building 
regulations, codes and rules are formulated to provide specific and predictable 
outcomes for all aspects of architectural production). 
 108  See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Cities, Property, and Positive 
Externalities, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 214, 220 (2012). 
 109  See Nathan Smith, Zoned Out: Why and How We Should Seek to Restore a Free Market 
in Land, THE FREEMAN (Mar. 18, 2014), http://fee.org/freeman/detail/zoned-out.  
An exception arises when the factory is adaptively reused for another purpose serving 
the residential population.  See, e.g., Michael N. Widener, Tactical Urbanism v2: Dynamic 
Land Use Regulation and Partnership Tools Regenerating First Suburbs, 8 DREXEL L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2015) [hereinafter Widener, Tactical Urbanism].  See also Michael N. 
Widener, Renewed Energy: Sustainable Historic Assets as Keystones in Urban Center 
Revitalization, 32 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 723, 744–47 (2015). 
 110  See Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 108, at 225.  
 111 See San Francisco, Cal., Ordinance 218-14 (Oct. 17, 2014), available at 
https://sfgov.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&ID=3292337&GUID=67C37394-6A63-
49DC-A886-675E294384C1 [hereinafter SF Ord.].  Highlights of the legislation 
include: 
 All city residential buildings of two or more units are subject to this rental 
regulation;  
 Residents who are not registered with the city but are found renting short-term 
after a complaint is filed are automatically in violation of the legislation; 
 Registered residents must demonstrate compliance in the event of a complaint; 
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The standard counterargument to employing precast systems 
imposed across diffused environments of entrepreneurism, is that 
central planning inflexibly values compliance over outcomes.112  
Opponents of centralized planning may cite the City of Winona’s 
rental-housing unit “percentage per block” ordinance as an illustration 
of this inflexibility.113  Adopted December 5, 2005 by Winona’s City 
Council114 and affirmed by a task force appointed by it in 2010,115 the 
ordinance limits rental housing units in a given city block to thirty 
 
and 
 Residents that violate the law (i.e., cannot demonstrate compliance) are 
“blacklisted” from listing their unit on all platforms until they achieve 
compliance. 
Among stakeholder reactions was a lawsuit seeking injunctive relief filed by 
HomeAway, Inc., which claims the permanent resident restriction accommodates 
Airbnb’s business model but not their clients’ business models, many of whom do not 
live in the city.  See HomeAway Inc. v. City of San Francisco, No. 3:14-cv-04859-JCS 
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2015).  The suit also alleged the new ordinance violates the 
Constitution’s interstate commerce clause by requiring companies providing “Hosting 
Platforms,” defined as  ”a person or entity through which an Owner [or lessee] may 
offer a Residential Unit” for short-term use, to conform to a single business model or 
face legal penalties.  See SF Ord., at 11.  In short, the plaintiff concludes that the 
ordinance evidences the Supervisors’ desire “to favor a local business at the expense 
of out of state competitors,” instead of creating policies fairly treating residence owners 
regardless of their domiciles.  See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief for 
Constitutional Violations at ¶ 64, HomeAway, Inc. v. City of San Francisco, No. 14-cv-
04859-JCS (N.D. Cal. Jan 27, 2015), 2014 WL 5510760.  The United States District for 
the Northern District of California on January 27, 2015, granted the Defendants’ 
motion to dismiss on several grounds, including lack of standing (Plaintiff owned no 
homes in the City).  See HomeAway, Inc. v. City of San Francisco, No. 14-cv-04859-JCS, 
2015 WL 367121 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2015). 
 112  See PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE RULE OF NOBODY: SAVING AMERICA FROM DEAD LAWS 
AND BROKEN GOVERNMENT 38 (2014). 
 113  The zoning law’s “Thirty Percent Rule” was aimed at diffusing private-sector 
student housing, which tends to be concentrated near the campuses of Winona State 
University and Saint Mary’s University in Winona.  See John Croman, Winona Faces 
Lawsuit over Rental Property Cap, KARE 11 BLOG (Oct. 26, 2011, 8:11 PM), 
http://www.kare11.com/news/article/944026/14/Winona-faces-lawsuit-over-rental-
property-cap.  Winona is intemperate, climatologically speaking, during much of the 
conventional August through May school year.  See Winona, MN, Period of Record Monthly 
Climate Summary, WESTERN REGIONAL CLIMATE CENTER, http://www.wrcc.dri.edu/cgi-
bin/cliMAIN.pl?mn9067 (last visited Sept. 6, 2015).  One reasonably assumes walking 
and biking to classes are challenging, inducing motor vehicle usage that is less 
sustainable (more carbon monoxide and particulate emissions and increased demand 
for parking lots) than a shorter walk or bike ride from more densely rental housing 
areas affords.  This ordinance likely is incompatible with the stated mission of Sustain 
Winona, a collaboration of the city, Winona County and the area public schools and 
local universities.  See SUSTAIN WINONA, http://www.sustainwinona.org/index.html 
(last visited Sept. 12, 2015). 
 114  See WINONA, MINN. CITY CODE ch. 33A, §33A.03(i) (2013). 
 115  Dean v. City of Winona, 843 N.W.2d 249, 254 (Minn. Ct. App. 2014). 
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percent of the total dwelling units.116  There is no apparent reason why 
the “Thirty Percent Rule” identified the optimal percentage, although 
apparently it achieved some intended “dispersal of rental patterns” 
effect.117 
The argument against command-and-control style regulation 
further proceeds that centralized planning stifles innovation in 
producing goods and services by slowing the rate of innovation.  
Outright public bans on Sharing Enterprises are the worst offense in 
this regard, and banning or de minimis variations on bans will not 
engender compliance.118  Instead, many sharing producers will react to 
regulatory banishment by going farther underground, risking 
detection at a later time.119  This is because the very illegality of the 
sharing producer’s operation—by avoiding costs of regulatory 
compliance—often affords her a competitive advantage over the 
established market players in an entrepreneurial space.120  Yet as one 
result of ineffective or piecemeal regulation enforcement weakening 
the community is the citizens’ diminished trust in the rule of law,121 this 
anti-centralized regulation argument must be bolstered by advocacy 
for peer self-regulation.122  Furthermore, centrally planned regimes 
become rigid and increasingly distanced from “market-pricing” signals 
about efficient use of resources.123  Market flexibility and 
 
 116  In 2011, owners of houses in Winona challenged the rule in Minnesota state 
court, alleging the “Thirty Percent Rule” as an ultra vires act exceeding the city’s 
zoning powers under the state’s Zoning Enabling Act.  See MINN. STAT. § 462.357 
(2012), and violating their rights to equal protection, substantive due process and 
procedural due process secured by the Minnesota Constitution (Article I, Sections 2 
or 7) and asking for injunctive and declaratory relief.  The decision of the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals affirming the city’s right to pass the ordinance on appeal to the 
Minnesota Supreme Court, was dismissed as moot; the high court found that 
appellants no longer had an interest in the appeal’s outcome and “the case does not 
present the urgency and impact that were present in other cases that we have found 
functionally justiciable and of statewide significance” justifying an exception to the 
doctrine of mootness.  See Dean v. City of Winona, 868 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2015). 
 117  See Dean, 843 N.W.2d at 254.  Mankato (MN) City Attorney Eileen Wells wrote 
in an amicus brief to Minnesota’s Supreme Court: “Now and into the uncertain future, 
Minnesota cities need to be able to use all of the ‘tools’ within their authority, 
including the ability to limit the number of rental units, to fulfill their obligations to 
their citizens.”  Id.  
 118  Miller, supra note 1, at 20. 
 119  See id. at 37.  Miller correctly notes that the likelihood of monitoring all Internet 
sites marketing peer-to-peer sharing involving neighborhoods is highly remote. 
 120  See id. at 16. 
 121  See id. at 25, 37. 
 122  See, e.g., Cohen & Sundararajan, supra note 81 at 116 (arguing that resolving 
challenges of peer-to-peer regulatory challenges must include self-regulatory 
approaches). 
 123  See Smith, supra note 109. 
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complementarily flexible public policies are critical in a time when 
technology will reorganize cities.124 
Another fundamental shortcoming in zoning laws is that they 
operate at a higher-grained level than the individual level, ineffectively 
controlling the myriad of particular shared circumstances in cities and 
rural areas across our nation.125  Central planning is too removed from 
the local environment to address nuanced circumstances.  Naturally, 
the knowledge of people in the neighborhood is one foundation of a 
community’s successful planning.126  Their inputs are lost, however, 
when town planners believe themselves more knowledgeable than 
their citizens, so these “experts” listen less as a result.  With the 
increasing complexity of cities as systems, they become less predictable 
and therefore less subject to good decision-making about resource 
allocation, management and related planning decisions.127  Indeed, 
when coordination of mass mobile and fixed technological devices 
reports individual actions and movements in real time, the need to 
“plan” anything diminishes.128  As the use of technology distinguishes 
minute variations in conditions between locations, centralizing plans 
and policies will increasingly be irrelevant.129  In the sharing economy, 
this translates to sophisticated controls imbedded in peer-to-peer 
marketplaces, such as digital “reputation systems” featuring detailed 
post-transaction ratings and identity-verification systems.130  There may 
be reason, however, to doubt the trustworthiness of the parties 
 
 124  See Peter M. Townroe, Urban Sustainability and Social Cohesion, in SUSTAINABILITY 
THE ENVIRONMENT AND URBANISATION 181–85 (Cedric Pugh ed., 1996); Balaji 
Srinivasan,  Software Is Reorganizing the World, WIRED BLOG (Nov. 22, 2013, 9:30 AM), 
http://www.wired.com/2013/11/software-is-reorganizing-the-world-and-cloud-
formations-could-lead-to-physical-nations/.  
 125  Anthony M. Townsend, Life in the Real Time City: Mobile Telephones and Urban 
Metabolism, 7 J. URB. TECH. 85, 89 (2000). 
 126  See, e.g., K. Al-Kodmany, Using visualization techniques for enhancing public 
participation in planning and design: process, implementation, and evaluation, 45 LANDSCAPE 
& URB. PLAN. 37, 38 (1999) (noting that access to community expertise and local 
knowledge produces better plans and designs). 
 127  Townsend, supra note 125, at 89, 98–99 (arguing that diffusion of the 
decentralized networks of individuals renders urban theory (relying on “centralized 
thinking”) ineffective to explain how cities function and ought to grow and, therefore, 
a new era is coming in which the individual ought to be the unit of planning analysis). 
 128  Id. at 96. 
 129  Id. at 101–02. 
 130  See, e.g., Arun Sundararajan, Trusting the ‘Sharing Economy’ to Regulate Itself, N.Y. 
TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG (Mar. 3, 2014, 12:01 AM), http:// 
economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/03/03/trusting-the-sharing-economy-to-regulate-
itself/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 (explaining that protocols verifying identity and 
screening suppliers lowers market failure risks by making suppliers and consumers feel 
safer, rendering government oversight less crucial).  
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establishing platforms for citizen inputs.131  A 2014 study finds 
widespread discriminatory pricing on several popular e-commerce 
sites, revealing steering of consumers to sub-optimal “deals” and 
charging different sums for the same goods or services.132 
Changes in identifying and analyzing those finer-grained details 
and manipulating technologies of data gathering in the realm of so-
called “Big Data”133 weigh in favor of continued municipal control of 
planning in a new milieu.  Researchers gather data at street level to 
quantify urban life, save money and improve the quality of lives in their 
cities.134  Tracking both cell phone activity of private citizens and 
readings from sensor packs mounted (among other places) on street 
lamps, city agencies can monitor dozens of activities and conditions, 
including hours when citizens turn on and off light fixtures in their 
residences, vehicular traffic counts, sound volume, wind speeds, 
pedestrian flows along sidewalks, and carbon-dioxide and other 
pollutants levels.135  In the near term, public data collection will come 
from “remote sensing” and “social sensing.”136  The former relies upon 
remotely-sensed data collected from a variety of devices such as radar, 
radiometer and LiDAR,137 collectively tracking the physical features of 
the surface of the landscape explored.138  In 2014, more than eleven 
billion sensors were attached to natural resources, production lines, 
 
 131  And trust levels are paramount even in self-regulating, as Elinor Ostrum noted: 
governing complex systems depends on good, trustworthy information processes 
including information pertaining to uncertainty and its magnitude.  See Elinor Ostrum 
et al., Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges, 284 SCIENCE 278, 279 
(1999). 
 132  See Elizabeth Dwoskin, Why You Can’t Trust You’re Getting the Best Deal Online, 
WALL ST. J. TECH BLOG, (Oct. 23, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/ 
articles/why-you-cant-trust-youre-getting-the-best-deal-online-1414036862?mod= 
trending_now_4. Several of these e-commerce sites investigated were leisure and 
hospitality industry-related, the same sector occupied by Airbnb.  See id. 
 133  TOWNSEND, supra note 47, at 17–18, 29. 
 134  Elizabeth Dwoskin, They’re Tracking When You Turn Off the Lights, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 21, 2014, at B1–2, available at http://online.wsj.com/articles/theyre-tracking-
when-you-turn-off-the-lights-1413854422. 
 135  See id. 
 136  See Yu Liu, et al., Social Sensing: A new Approach to Understanding Our Socio-Economic 
Environments, 105 ANN. ASSOC. AM. GEOG. 512, 513, 515–16 (2015), available at 
http://www.geog.ucsb.edu/~sgao/papers/2015_AnnalsAAG_SocialSensing.pdf.  
 137  LIDAR is a remote sensing technology measuring distances by illuminating a 
target with a laser and analyzing the reflected light; it is frequently employed to make 
high-resolution maps, including 3D elevation maps of terrain, but has multiple 
applications in transportation as well as geospatial reckoning.  See MICHAEL J. OLSEN, 
GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF MOBILE LIDAR IN TRANSPORTATION APPLICATIONS 1–3, 50–
53 (2013).  
 138  See id.  
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electricity grids, logistics networks and recycling flows, as well as in 
homes, offices, stores and vehicles, feeding Big Data into the “Internet 
of Things.”139  By 2020, experts project that at least fifty billion sensors 
will connect to that Internet.140 
Social sensing involves spatially and temporally tagged data 
collected from location-aware devices such as mobile phones and GPS 
systems continuously operated and monitored by citizens.  Social 
sensing devices detect social and economic features of the landscape, 
with the individual using her device in the role of “sensor.”141  In social 
sensing, there is greater temporal variation of activities than more 
static operations of remote sensing devices.142  Fusing such multi-source 
data, geospatial activities are analyzable through conventional image 
processing methods, leading to a vastly more complete picture of 
geographical environments.143 
While issues like municipal invasion of privacy from such 
surveillance and the lack of transparency of data gathered for analysis 
are consequential,144 it seems less true today that local knowledge of 
people on the ground is both foundational and unknowable to 
community agencies.  More interesting than debating who ought to 
harness land use policy is determining how data mined by “disruptive” 
technologies impacts centralized land use planning and the roles of 
the everyday citizen in analyzing, collecting, and manipulating streams 
of data and planning and executing suitable actions in the public 
interest.  Commuter-parking mapping provides a common-sense 
illustration of the power of harnessed data streams.  SmoothParking 
Inc. supplies a smartphone application guiding users to curbside 
parking zones indicating where it is—and shortly will become—legal 
to park, aiding both commuters and residents who will otherwise 
relocate their vehicles to avoid ticketing.145  Cities, the private sector 
and consumers all want the same thing from such parking data: ease 
of access.  Greater accessibility minimizes frustration levels, which 
 
 139  See Rifkin, supra note 11. 
 140  See Dave Evans, The Internet of Things: How the Next Evolution of the Internet is 
Changing Everything, CISCO INTERNET BUSINESS SOLUTIONS GROUP 1, 3 (Apr. 2011), 
https://www.cisco.com/web/about/ac79/docs/innov/IoT_IBSG_0411FINAL.pdf.  
 141  See Rifkin, supra note 11. 
 142  Id. 
 143  Id. 
 144  See Dwoskin, supra note 134, at B2.  Privacy issues from this surveillance are not 
subjects of this Article.  
 145  Javier Espinoza, Parking Spaces are a Perfect Niche, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 3, 2014), 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/entrepreneur-finds-profitable-niche-parking-spaces-
1414965251.  Recently, the application now allows commuters to identify available 
parking garages as well. 
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prompts less rational risk-taking, conflicting traffic movements and 
collisions or “road rage” events. 
Location (proximity of one land use or a single operation in its 
spatial context) will be merged with known consequences of thousands 
of minute transactions (such as social contacts) among citizens.  This 
more accurately measures “capacity” and “saturation” impacts on 
surroundings arising from specific land use project proposals.146  
Greater predictability of needed outcome mitigation in development 
project execution from real-time reporting and studying of street-level 
transactions in neighborhoods awaits the public.  Analyzing this data 
with public inputs pertaining to neighborhood cultural values, history, 
and context will be more useful than planner’s training-based 
assumptions or planning models based on historical data (such as 
parking demand or traffic trips’ generation) about a project’s 
expected consequences.147 
B.  Private Regulation of Sharing Economy Land Use Dimensions 
“[Jane Jacobs’] critique of top-down planning was entirely 
consistent with the evolutionary biologist’s understanding of cities.”148  
“[T]he planning elite ‘completely failed to understand and respect the 
far more complex order that healthy cities already embodied.  This 
complex order . . . was the result not of big plans but of all the little 
plans of ordinary people that alone can generate the diversity that is 
the true glory of a great city.’”149  “[U]rban design is as much art as it is 
science.  It has to respond to countless local variables and 
idiosyncrasies.”150 
Jacobsian micro-planning by ordinary citizens begins with a 
generalized view that cities are messy places, not centrally ordered but 
 
 146  An example is in local government siting of public facilities (playgrounds, 
senior centers, etc.) inducing social interaction of various segments of a community’s 
population; the intention is to optimize the location’s support of individual well-being 
and neighborhood livability.  See, e.g., Rejuvenating Neighborhoods and Communities 




 147  See Al-Kodmany,, supra note 126, at 4041, 45.   
 148  TOWNSEND, supra note 47, at 98.   
 149  Id. (quoting Robert Fishman, The Death and Life of Regional Planning, in 
REFLECTIONS ON REGIONALISM 114 (Bruce Katz ed., 2000)).  Jacobs’ comments on 
diversity’s contribution to complex order are contained in JACOBS, supra note 26, at 14, 
394–95, 402–03.  See also id. at 84 (“Working places and commerce must be mingled 
right in with residences . . . .”). 
 150  TOWNSEND, supra note 47, at 231. 
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evolving mainly from the bottom upwards, and products of millions of 
individual and small group decisions and transactions, occasionally 
counter-balanced by top-down, centralized action.151  The primary 
argument against exclusively private regulation of land use dimensions 
of the sharing economy is: consumer trust, incorporating the wisdom 
of crowds expressed through crowd-sourcing behavior in marketing 
(by social media exposure), thereby endorsing or repudiating new 
business models through ratings sites,152 however productive, does not 
alone curb “defection” from social norms required to maintain a 
community’s public health and safety.153  Human nature demonstrates, 
when individuals share common resources or work together seemingly 
for mutual benefit, that some (called “free-riders” or “opportunists”) 
seek to reap benefits without paying their associated costs, mandating 
mechanisms to build substantial cooperation among potential 
defectors over time.154  In theory, the sharing economy provides its own 
alternative to traditional legal protections via reputation and ranking 
systems.155  If consumers are constantly able to review the performance 
of producers, norm-defecting actors inevitably will “pay” under a 
 
 151  See Townsend, supra note 125, at 86 (quoting MICHAEL BATTY, THE NEW SCIENCE 
OF CITIES 14–15 (2013)) (identifying cities as more “biological organisms” than 
“mechanical machines” featuring some grand design and restoring equilibrium 
through periodic negative feedbacks such as regulation schemes).  
 152  Rating sites reliability soon may be replaced by a trust “marketplace,” in which 
consumers rely on personal networks and ratings of “raters” for vetting of vendors. cf. 
NICK BILTON, I LIVE IN THE FUTURE & HERE’S HOW IT WORKS, 112–13 (2010).  Bloggers 
already have made significant inroads in the “trust market” compared to prosumer 
sites like Yelp, which is a company under frequent attack for questionable ethical 
conduct that cannot seem to deflect credibly the accusations.  See, e.g., How One 
Restaurant Fought Yelp’s Alleged Extortion, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 13, 2014), 
http://nypost.com/2014/10/13/restaurant-fights-yelps-alleged-extortion/; Eric 
Goldman, Court Says Yelp Doesn’t Extort Businesses, FORBES TECH BLOG (Sept. 3, 2014, 
12:20 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2014/09/03/court-says-yelp-
doesnt-extort-businesses/.  See also BILTON, supra note 152, at 111–12. 
 153  See Tarun Wadhwa, Who’s Looking Out for Consumers in the Sharing Economy?, HUFF 
POST TECH BLOG (May 5, 2014, 5:02 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tarun-
wadhwa/whos-looking-out-for-cons_b_5269138.html. 
 154  Sarah Schoenmakers, Christian Hilbe, Bernd Blasius & Arne Traulsen, Sanctions 
as Honest Signals—The Evolution of Pool Punishment by Public Sanctioning Institutions, 356 
J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 36, 36–37 (Sept. 2014), available at http://ac.els-
cdn.com/S0022519314002392/1-s2.0-S0022519314002392-main.pdf?_tid=b9471a58-
5b27-11e5-b9cf-
00000aab0f6b&acdnat=1442266367_3cab50d7b54ccc134f50d92ad0ff3e6a.  See also 
Christian Hilbe, Arne Taurlsen, Torsten Rohl & Manfred Milinski, Democratic Decisions 
Establish Stable Authorities That Overcome the Paradox of Second-Order Punishment, 111 PROC. 
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 752 (2014) available at http://web.evolbio.mpg.de/~hilbe/ 
Research_files/Hilbe%20et%20al%20(PNAS%202014)%20Decocratic%20decisions.
pdf. 
 155  See Wadhwa, supra note 153. 
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hailstorm of public criticism.  In practice, however, these group 
customer feedback systems can be opaque, guilty of varying credibility 
and uneven “enforcement.”156  If there is no sense of shame within 
“cheaters” among sharing providers, there are few barriers to flouting 
“trust norms” occasionally or serially.157  Unfortunately, peer 
punishment—where victims or third parties punish cheaters in the 
same circumstances as the defector—can be viewed as a type of self-
justice, subject to its own catalog of abuses like antisocial punishment 
and retaliation.158 
Conversely, “pool punishment,” featuring highly-visible 
sanctioning institutions, serves as a costly signal, inducing most 
defectors to cooperate over time.159  Such institutions are especially 
relevant in relatively “anonymous” communities; sharing producers, 
for one group, are too large to be aware of everyone’s reputation.  In 
such cases, mere notice of a central “sanctioning” body’s existence 
improves cooperation.160  So, if private actors will implement 
punishment mechanisms and institutions, those non-public official 
stakeholders in the sharing economy must endorse appropriate 
cooperation levels within each business “type.”  Such is a daunting task 
when many stakeholders’ own business models are so recent, and their 
lack of operating experience hampers private parties’ crafting 
regulations and behavior standards applicable to a continuously 
evolving spectrum of business conduct.161  The novelty of a steady moral 
 
 156  See id. 
 157  See generally, June P. Tangney, Jeffrey Stuewig and Andres G. Martinez, Two Faces 
of Shame: The Roles of Shame and Guilt in Predicting Recidivism, 25 PSYCH. SCI. 799–805 
(Mar. 2014).  Perhaps the bigger problem in flouting norms is actors perceiving a small 
deviation from standards to be immaterial, ignoring the cumulative effect of myriad 
small violations—creation of sizable negative externalities in the community, cf. Miller, 
supra note 1, at 20. 
 158  See Schoenmakers et al., supra note 154, at 37. 
 159  See id. at 40, 44. 
 160  See id. at 44.  Conversely, these authors note, opportunists start cheating when 
it is apparent that there is no central punishment authority.  Id.  Such institutions are 
especially effective when they require a mix of different mechanisms such as second-
order punishment to induce fair outcomes and reliance on the signaling effect to 
reduce free-riding.  Id.  When individuals have to accept the decision of the majority, 
they prefer a society with second-order punishment.  See Hilbe et al., supra note 154, at 
752, 755.  
 161  Cf. Alfredo Mendez, Startup Ethics: Is the New Sharing Economy Unfair for Workers?, 
MARCULA CTR FOR APPLIED ETHICS BLOG (Aug. 27, 2014), 
http://www.scu.edu/r/ethics-center/ethicsblog/business-ethics-news/20343/ 
STARTUP-ETHICS:-Is-the-New-Sharing-Economy-Unfair-for-Workers?; Wadhwa, supra 
note 153 (“For an industry that claims to be built on trust, the companies that make 
up the sharing economy have adeptly avoided addressing these [trust] issues directly.  
When regulators have tried to bring up legitimate questions about safety and standards 
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compass, one built typically (but not exclusively) by years of experience 
in independent living—an experience not native to youthful sharing 
producers and prosumers only adds to this challenge.162 
1. Grass Roots Citizens’ Regulation 
General plans, the “visionary” document guiding a city’s planning 
intentions,163 result from thousands of conversations; these lead to 
decisions about proper balancing of a community’s set of virtues.164  In 
organically slow-growing cities, these decisions are made incrementally 
on a small scale, responding to local needs and larger trends.165  
Economies of scale and advancing “smart city” technologies, however, 
will usher in progressively more technocratic and frenetically paced 
real estate development.  In this era, decisions by the administrative 
state might become less well-informed and increasingly ad hoc.166 
To return to a more grass roots, “bottom-up” participatory 
approach to community master planning, officials ought to consider 
whether new agencies—such as micro-village governance structures, 
neighborhood citizen land use panels, and community benefits 
agreement managers—offer better monitoring and enforcement of 
zoning rules at the “granular” level of the neighborhood.167  The 
 
these companies have been quick to paint themselves as innovators under attack by 
special interests.  In some cases this is true, in others it’s just a distraction from 
[addressing] a reasonable complaint.”).  See also infra Part VI (discussing challenges in 
private regulation of Sharing Enterprises). 
 162 See Lauren Hudson, Who’s Responsible for the “Moral Compass” of the New Economy?, 
GRASSROOTS ECONOMIC ORGANIZING, http://www.geo.coop/story/whos-responsible-
moral-compass-new-economy (last visited Sept. 12, 2015); Natasha Singer, In the 
Sharing Economy, Workers Find Both Freedom and Uncertainty, N.Y TIMES TECH. (Aug. 16, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/17/technology/in-the-sharing-economy-
workers-find-both-freedom-and-uncertainty.html?_r=1 (discussing that micro-workers 
have little recourse against peer marketplace “hiring” firms when the companies for 
which they work on-call change their business models or pay rates or when consumers 
cancel reservations or service requests). 
 163  Michael N. Widener, Moderating Citizen “Visioning” in Town Comprehensive 
Planning: Deliberative Dialog Processes, 59 WAYNE L. REV. 29, 31–32 (2013). 
 164  TOWNSEND, supra note 47, at 112.  
 165  See id.  
 166  See id. 
 167  Skeptics of such granularity should be reminded that in some Western nations, 
small scale local planning is mandated.  In Germany, for instance, detailed 
development plans known as Bebauungsplan, provide developers following “zoning 
map and text” rules with the same legal certainty existing in most American 
communities; these plans dominate local land use administration and at times 
represent areas as small as a single city block.  See Sonia Hirt, Mixed Use by Default: How 
the Europeans (Don’t) Zone, 27 J. PLANNING LITERATURE 375, 385–87 (2012).  In Sweden, 
detaljplaner—detailed development plans outlining rules related to land use, bulk and 
density—may cover but one city block; Stockholm has more than 1,000 such plans.  Id. 
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following subsections consider the use of existing (and at times 
entrenched) citizen-based organizations to engage in small-scale land 
use regulation.  These bodies may be loosely referred to as “legal 
neighborhoods,” associations wielding certain quasi-political and legal 
tools to maintain order and exercise stewardship within their 
respective jurisdictions.168  The reader must understand preliminarily 
that municipalities lack the power to simply cede land use regulatory 
power to individual neighborhoods.169  While a few cities have 
attempted to delegate zoning powers to defined neighborhood 
groups, these efforts generally have not succeeded.170  Between 1912 
and 1928, the United States Supreme Court issued three opinions 
(Eubank v. City of Richmond,171 Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago172 and 
Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge173) holding that for the 
most part private property owners cannot regulate other property 
owners unless the controlling group deregulates a general prohibition 
on nuisances.174  These opinions effectively prohibited such delegation 
as unlawful abdication of a municipality’s duty to protect the 
community’s public health, safety and welfare against the arbitrary 
 
at 387. 
 168  See Miller, supra note 20, at 163–64. 
 169  See Kenneth A. Stahl, Neighborhood Empowerment and the Future of the City, 161 U. 
PA. L. REV. 939, 943–45 (2013) (arguing that as a result of this lack of authority, cities 
increasingly resort to BIDs as a “default option” to deal with a variety of localized urban 
planning issues).  
 170  See, e.g., Shannon v. City of Forsyth, 666 P.2d 750, 752 (Mont. 1983) 
(invalidating a neighbor-consent provision related to the location of mobile homes 
under the authority of Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912) and 
Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928)); Cary v. City 
of Rapid City, 559 N.W.2d 891, 895–96 (S.D. 1997) (invalidating a neighbor-consent 
provision under Eubank and Roberge while ignoring Cusack); Am. Chariot v. City of 
Memphis, 164 S.W.3d 600, 602–05 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (invalidating a landowner-
consent provision allowing restaurant owners to waive a prohibition on where horse-
drawn carriages in certain locations and distinguishing Cusack on the grounds that the 
ordinance here was for the benefit of the public, while the ordinance in Cusack solely 
benefitted local property owners); Williams v. Whitten, 451 S.W.2d 535, 536–38 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1970) (invalidating a neighbor-consent provision regarding location of 
mobile home parks, citing Roberge); County of Fairfax v. Fleet Indus. Park Ltd. P’ship, 
410 S.E.2d 669, 670, 673 (Va. 1991) (distinguishing Cusack, but nonetheless using 
Eubank principles to invalidate a provision conditioning zoning changes upon 
neighbors’ consent).  See also infra notes 171 & 172 and accompanying text pertaining 
to the United States Supreme Court cases. 
 171  Eubank, 226 U.S. at 137.  
 172  Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917). 
 173  Roberge, 278 U.S. at 116. 
 174  See Alexander Volokh, The New Private-Regulation Skepticism: Due Process, Non-
Delegation, and Antitrust Challenges, 37 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 931, 941–43 (2014); See 
also City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 677 (1976). 
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exercise of selfish or coercive power.175  Nonetheless, a few cities have 
experimented with methods to confer land use powers upon 
neighborhood groups.176  On occasion, particularly powerful 
neighborhood groups in certain cities featuring citywide citizen 
participation systems have successfully integrated themselves into the 
political process, but this is a rare event.177  It seems that a key to viability 
among citizen-based organizations engaged in land use planning is 
that they be meaningfully constrained by a large, diverse governmental 
body counteracting any threats of exploitation or other welfare-
reducing actions by these entities.178 
i. “Planned Community” Citizens’ Organizations: Adept 
at Saying “No” 
Associations of homeowners, or HOAs, arose as a means to offset 
tax burdens and to shift costs from residential developers to residents 
(through these associations) during and following project build-outs.179  
Unfortunately, however, the operation of an HOA as a planning-
advisory body faces too many hurdles.180  For instance, HOAs make 
 
 175  ARDEN H. RATHKOPF, DAREN A. RATHKOPF & EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR., RATHKOPF’S 
THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 43:15, § 61:30 (2014) (As a “separate independent 
restriction or standard,” a “consent requirement” may be held invalid as a 
“standardless and unlawful delegation of legislative power to a private group of 
property owners.”); see Volokh, supra note 174, at 942–43 (citing Carter v. Coal Co., 
298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936)); see also 8 EUGENE MCQUILLIAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 
25.35 at 111 (3d. ed., 2000) (explaining that zoning powers may not be delegated to 
private parties or property owners); Stahl, supra note 169, at 957–62 (citing Eubank, 
226 U.S. at 137; Roberge, 278 U.S. at 116; and Thomas Cusack Co., 242 U.S. at 526).  Stahl 
believes that the fatal flaw in neighborhood zoning districts is their “public-choice” 
foundationthat landowners “are permitted to exercise regulatory power in 
accordance with their own selfish interests rather than employing some notion of the 
public good.”  Stahl, supra note 169, at 962.  The public-choice view of local 
government, Stahl explains, posits “that a homogeneous governing entity is more 
efficient than a heterogeneous one because [the former] can directly affect [sic] the 
unanimous will of the public without such inefficiencies of vote-trading, such as 
conflict, bureaucracy, pork-barrel spending, and wealth redistribution.”  Id. at 970.  
Thus, the requirement of property owners’ consent to change in land use typically is 
viewed as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.  See, e.g., Roberge, 278 
U.S. at 122 (“A legislature may not delegate its authority to private persons over whom 
the legislature has no supervision or control.”); Emmett McLaughlin Realty, Inc. v. 
Pima Cnty., 58 P.3d 39, 41–42 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Indus. Comm’n v. C & D 
Pipeline, Inc., 607 P.2d 383, 385 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979)). 
 176  JEFFREY M. BERRY, KENT E. PORTNEY & KEN THOMSON, THE REBIRTH OF URBAN 
DEMOCRACY 141 (1993). 
 177  Id. at 289. 
 178  See Stahl, supra note 169, at 1004.  
 179  See Miller, supra note 20, at 161–62. 
 180  See JOHN WHITCOMB, THE ZEC GUIDE: A GUIDE FOR DEVELOPING ZERO ENERGY 
COMMUNITIES 160 (2014) (positing that the leadership, innovation, and financial and 
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operating decisions that impact narrow agendas, primarily keeping 
owners’ fractional shares of maintenance costs economical and 
incoming while arresting improvements or other owner actions that 
appear to threaten property values (from the perspective of their 
boards’ members).181  Additionally, HOA charters do not grant 
authority to forge relations with their governing jurisdiction or any 
other persons, “except as it might directly affect the HOA’s 
operations.”182  Further, an HOA’s tendency to micromanage within its 
subdivisions misses the larger picture of community development 
impacts.183  HOAs as a whole illustrate the danger of disaggregating 
zoning power from other municipal functions and the attendant risks 
that zoning decisions will be made without consideration of their 
impacts on these other city functions.184 
ii. Citizen Planning Committees (Multilateral 
Associations)185 
An early illustration of citizen vehicles for growth-planning input 
was Detroit’s Citizen District Councils, created by a 1945 Michigan law 
intended to stimulate urban growth while granting residents a voice in 
development.186  Council members were elected by residents and 
property owners of the zones they represented.  While these council 
 
technical expertise required for a zero energy community governing board “far exceed 
the capacity and operating capabilities required for a HOA.”). 
 181  See GARY POLIAKOFF & RYAN POLIAKOFF, NEW NEIGHBORHOODS: THE CONSUMER’S 
GUIDE TO CONDOMINIUM, CO-OP AND HOA LIVING 70, 146–55, 206 (2009); Cohen & 
Sundararajan, supra note 81, at 130. 
 182  See Miller, supra note 20, at 162. 
 183  See Cohen & Sundararajan, supra note 81, at 131 (noting the “excessive 
restrictions” imposed by self-regulating HOAs); Miller, supra note 20, at 162. 
 184  See William A. Fischel, Voting, Risk Aversion, and the NIMBY Syndrome: A Comment 
on Robert Nelson’s “Privatizing the Neighborhood,” 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 881, 899–901 
(1999); see also David L. Callies et al., Ramapo Looking Forward: Gated Communities, 
Covenants, and Concerns, 35 URB. LAW. 177, 197 (2003) (“[Any] privatized ‘zoning’ 
effort itself results in uncoordinated land use planning of the area. . . . Air quality, 
property values, environmental preservation, efficient public services, and well-located 
schools all are better coordinated by a more regional government responsible for the 
region’s public services.”).   
 185  For discussions of these types of land use focused alliances, primarily non-profit 
corporations, see Jessica Spelke Jansujwicz & Aram J.K. Calhoun, Chapter 10: Protecting 
Natural Resources on Private Lands: The Role of Collaboration in Land Use Planning, in 
LANDSCAPE-SCALE CONSERVATION PLANNING (Steven C. Trombulak & Robert Baldwin 
eds., 2010).  See also Tarry Hum, Planning in Neighborhoods with Multiple Publics: 
Opportunities and Challenges for Community-Based Nonprofit Organizations, 29 J. PLANNING 
EDUC. & RESEARCH 461–77 (2010).  
 186  Nancy Kaffer, Duggan Must Find Way to Give Citizens a Voice, DETROIT FREE PRESS 
(Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.freep.com/story/opinion/columnists/nancy-
kaffer/2014/10/02/citizens-district-detroit-orr-duggan/16549889/.  
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members never wielded actual authority over planning decisions, they 
sometimes used their positions to block projects seemingly 
destabilizing to neighborhoods.187  Kevin Orr, Detroit’s emergency 
manager, abolished these councils as he phased out his role in late 
2014.188 
Cities developing special zoning “vicinities” to protect specific 
enclaves or regions have spawned within the district boundaries’ 
associations to interpret and apply detailed regulations for 
neighborhood preservation or enhancement.189  For example, the City 
of Phoenix has fifteen urban villages pursuant to its General Plan, each 
with a Village Planning Committee (VPC) providing guidance on a 
wide range of local and citywide issues, including those addressing 
implementation of the City’s General Plan.190  A VPC’s positions are 
advisory to the City Planning Commission and the City Council on 
matters involving new zoning initiatives or major amendments to the 
General Plan for the City.191  Its findings are not binding, and both the 
Planning Commission and City Council may act on cases without input 
from the affected VPC.192 
San Francisco has more than twenty neighborhood commercial 
districts, each having a specific Planning Code section containing 
tailored regulations.193  Like Phoenix’s Urban Villages, these districts 
originated in the 1980s in response to perceived problems 
accompanying commercial growth in ten neighborhoods surrounding 
city commercial streets.194  Implementing so-called “formula retail” 
 
 187  See id.  
 188  Id.  
 189  See Miller, supra note 20, at 149. 
 190  See The Village Planning Handbook, CITY OF PHX. PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT 
DEPARTMENT, 
https://www.phoenix.gov/pddsite/Documents/pdd_pz_pdf_00020.pdf. 
 191  Id. at 6. 
 192  Id. 
 193  See Neighborhood District Zoning Control Table, S. F. PLANNING DEP’T (Sept. 22, 
2008), available at http://www.sf-planning.org/Modules/ShowDocument.aspx? 
documentid=3561.  All such regulations are found in Article 7 of the San Francisco 
Planning Code. S.F., CAL. PLANNING CODE art. 7, §§ 701–09 (2015), available at 
http://www.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/California/planning/planningcode?f=te
mplates$fn=default.htm$3.0$vid=amlegal:sanfrancisco_ca$sync=1.  The use 
definitions for these districts, consisting of nearly sixty parts, appear at id. at § 790.  
 194  See Mark Cohen, San Francisco’s Neighborhood Commercial Special Use District 
Ordinance: An Innovative Approach to Commercial Gentrification, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L. 
REV. 367, 369–70 (1983).  One mission of these districts is to minimize dominance of 
formula retailers merchants featuring formulaic floor plans and inventories 
capitalizing on economies of scale while deadening the shoppers’ experiences of 
novelty and locality. 
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establishments remains a persistent concern in these districts; such 
establishments trigger a conditional use hearing before the City’s 
Planning Commission.  In November, 2006, city voters passed a 
proposition whereby chain retailers operating eleven or more stores 
must receive a conditional use permit from the city to open a branch 
in a neighborhood commercial district.195  To approve the permit, the 
Planning Commission must find the applicant’s tenancy both 
“necessary and desirable.”  Neighbors within the planning areas 
comment at the Planning Commission hearing in support of findings, 
and the commission has denied permits following neighbor inputs.196  
To some fanfare, San Francisco Mayor Edwin Lee convened the city’s 
Sharing Economy Working Group in March 2012,197 to explore means 
to encourage a “shareable city”198 among its citizens.  While this body 
may eventually address emerging planning issues concerning the 
sharing economy (possibly leading to additional Neighborhood 
Commercial Districts or modifications of existing regulations), it has 
never met from its public introduction through mid-2014, apart from 
a brief kickoff gathering in April 2012.199 
iii. Business Improvement Districts 
Due to its consultative nature, the Business Improvement District 
(BID) model provides slight insight regarding how to augment 
inclusiveness on a relatively small scale.200  BIDs restrict participation, 
 
 195  S.F., CAL. PLANNING CODE art. 7, § 703.3 (2015); see Formula Business Restriction, 
INST. FOR LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE (Jan. 16, 2015), http://ilsr.org/rule/formula-business-
restrictions/2321-2/. 
 196  See, e.g., Amy Farah Weiss, Support Local Economic Development, THE BAY CITIZEN 
BLOG (July 25, 2011, 1:53 PM), https://www.baycitizen.org/blogs/citizen-
blog/support-local-economic-development-4/. 
 197  Hunter Franks, The Civic Innovation System Blooms in 2012, SF MAYOR’S OFFICE OF 
CIVIC INNOVATION (Jan. 11, 2013), http://innovatesf.com/category/citizen-
engagement/.   
 198  See DAVID BOLLIER, THINK LIKE A COMMONER: A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO THE LIFE 
OF THE COMMONS 134–35 (2014). 
 199  See Joe Eskenazi, City for Let: The Sharing Economy Proves it can Do Whatever it Wants, 
SF WEEKLY NEWS (May 14, 2014), http://www.sfweekly.com/sanfrancisco/city-for-let-
the-sharing-economy-proves-it-can-do-whatever-it-wants/Content?oid=2949607; 
Patrick Hoge, Critics Slam Mayor Lee’s Phantom “Sharing Economy” Working Group, S.F. 
BUS. TIMES (May 7, 2014, 1:49 PM), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/blog/techflash/2014/05/mayor-lees-
sharing-economy-task-force-never-met.html.  
 200  The initial establishment of a BID requires the support of the majority of 
affected land and business owners, so consultation underpins the existence of these 
public-private partnerships that exist to provide services formerly (or partially) in the 
government domain but also intervene in district land use planning decisions that are 
a prerogative of local government.  See Elisabeth Peyroux et al., Business Improvement 
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however, to business and property owners authorized by local 
ordinance to collect additional property assessments from their 
designated geographical areas to spend on additional services not 
provided (or underprovided) by their local governments.201  Saddled 
with limited goals, BIDs are less-perfect models of civic participation 
and lack those qualities of true deliberation and inclusion;202 for 
instance, “they fail to mix residents in the neighborhood with others 
who have stakes in the same area, such as educators, employers and 
environmentalists.”203  This article provides no additional coverage to 
this model because rarely is it truly inclusive, as BIDs nearly always are 
self-interested and outcome-oriented instead of process-oriented.204 
2. Newer Models of Citizen-Driven Organizations for Land 
Use Oversight 
Airbnb’s chief executive, Brian Chesky, told The Atlantic magazine 
in 2014 that trust, mediated by technology, was joining the paradigm 
of the village in making a comeback.  Specifically, he said, “[a]t the 
most macro level, I think we’re going to go back to the village, and 
cities will become communities again. . . .  I’m not saying they’re not 
communities now, but I think that we’ll have this real sensibility and 
everything will be small.”205  For Chesky’s observation to become 
accurate, communities must first determine what properly scaled units 
of village regulation look like.  Oregon, for instance, features small 
town-sized units that revise local zoning district maps and associated 
plans.206  Yet, Oregon’s state agency, the Land Conservation and 
Development Commission, regulates land use goals and guidelines, 
 
Districts (BIDs): The Internationalization and Contextualization of a ‘Travelling Concept,’ 19 
EUROP. URB. & REG’L STUD. 111, 112–13 (2012). 
 201  See Barbara L. Bezdek, Citizen Engagement in the Shrinking City: Toward Development 
Justice in an Era of Growing Inequality, 33 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 3, 15 (2013), Peyroux, 
supra note 200, at 112–13.  
 202  See Bedzek, supra note 201, at 3, 15.  
 203  Id.  
 204  See id.  Peyroux, supra note 200, at 113 notes that the design of public spaces 
according to commercial interest of BIDs risks promoting land use policy that excludes 
“objectionable” social groups such as the less affluent. 
 205  Uri Friedman, Airbnb CEO: Cities Are Becoming Villages, THE ATLANTIC (June 29, 
2014) http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/airbnb-ceo-cities-
are-becoming-villages/373676/.  
 206  An Introductory Guide to Land Use Planning for Small Cities and Counties in Oregon, 
OREGON DEP’T OF LAND CONSERVATION AND DEV. 2 (Jan. 2007), 
http://www.oregon.gov/lcd/docs/publications/introductory_guide_to_land_use_pl
anning_in_oregon.pdf (explaining that local governments provide opportunities for 
citizen involvement and set standards for how certain types of land are planned and 
zoned; but these acts must conform to state planning goals). 
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and ultimately determines if local-jurisdiction planning documents 
comply with those regulations207—irrefutably centralized planning.  
Disaster planning in some cities seems to be devolving to the smallest 
neighborhood units, but this type of planning is directed to life-
threatening emergencies—a different set of tools addressing different 
circumstances.208 
Advocates of localizing land use governance seek regulation from 
the base upwards,209 instead of from the apex downwards, without 
resolving the foundational question how, if at all, agencies of land use 
regulation survive separate from familiar trust-institutions from which 
residential dwellers sense familiarity and protection.  The public’s 
dilemma is whether we can ensure that the properly-scaled governance 
unit truly represents all sharing producers and residents within the 
unit’s boundaries.  Otherwise, as Mariana Valverde points out, local 
bylaws impose a set of culturally-biased ideals.210  Legal standards 
defining “cleanliness” and “tranquility,” for example, mirror aesthetic 
and moral ideals of an established, usually ethnic majority, group.  In 
many American cities, mostly white, middle-aged, middle- or upper-
class property owners dominate rule-making, as these persons own 
most of the urbanized real property.211  Deciding who defines these 
ideals affords different ethnic and socioeconomic groups with varying 
degrees of legal protection, usually entrenching established 
inequalities.212  Some sharing producers suspect regulations exist for 
improper purposes, such as protecting existing businesses, garnering 
community revenue and underwriting bureaucracy.213  As a 
consequence, these sharing producers prefer to remain out of sight 
and, when needed, seek subsequent forgiveness rather than 
 
 207  PAUL G. LEWIS, SHAPING SUBURBIA: HOW POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS ORGANIZE 
URBAN DEVELOPMENT 111–12 (1996). 
 208  See, e.g., Jim Carlton, San Francisco Readies for the Big One, a Block at a Time, WALL 
ST. J. (Nov. 19, 2014, 7:39 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/san-francisco-readies-for-
the-big-one-a-block-at-a-time-1416443960?tesla=y. 
 209  See KARL KEHDE, COLLABORATIVE LAND USE PLANNING (4th ed. 2007); ROGER J. 
MASON, COLLABORATIVE LAND USE MANAGEMENT (2008). 
 210  MARIANA VALVERDE, EVERYDAY LAW ON THE STREET: CITY GOVERNANCE IN AN AGE 
OF DIVERSITY 49–54 (2012). 
 211  See id. at 49, 58–59. 
 212  Id. at 22, 78–79, 84–85.  This bias, Valverde claims, is reinforced by city 
bureaucrats who enforce inherently biased rules, and local elected officials, who 
cherry-pick issues to champion based on interest group politics.  See id. at 21, 80–84.  
Valerde calls the resulting system “village elder politics” and “rule by aesthetic.”  See id. 
at 103–05, 227. 
 213  See, e.g., Scott Beyer, The Motor City’s Regulators Are Hitting the Brakes on Regrowth, 
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 13, 2014, 6:25 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/scott-beyer-the-
motor-citys-regulators-are-hitting-the-brakes-on-regrowth-1418426736. 
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permission from administrators at the outsets of their endeavors.214  
Accordingly, a sub-city regulatory unit desiring credibility must learn 
of the sharing producers and prosumers dwelling in that district and 
involve them, intimately, in the regulatory decision-making process, to 
assure them that their inputs will be thoughtfully considered. 
This engagement imperative is more easily spoken than achieved.  
Residents, especially long-time neighbors resistant to change, have 
legitimate claims that “they arrived first,” and that “they built this 
community” through their investments of money and energy.  It 
requires conditioning to educate such residents that a healthier mix of 
people facilitates exchanges of trade, labor and sociability—producing 
more robust community life.215  Next, it is important to persuade 
intransigent dwellers that introducing maker spaces and home 
businesses does not mandate visiting unfair cost burdens upon 
established communities, so long as a plan is implemented first to 
ensure that new neighborhood entrants mitigate negative externalities 
and otherwise offset increased economic burdens to the enclave.216 
On the part of sharing producers and prosumers, initial 
education includes wresting their acknowledgement of the long-time 
neighbors’ claims and conceding that multi-party deliberation, not 
asserting “operations entitlement” as a matter of fundamental property 
rights, better promotes acceptance of new business models within 
residential areas.  Deliberation means genuinely discussing problems 
and proposed solutions to them and in the process: (a) justifying each 
faction’s preferences to the others; and (b) indicating willingness to 
refine those preferences under conditions of public reasoning, mutual 
respect, recognition of the other faction’s legitimacy and inclusion of 
inputs from differing interests.217 
 
 214  See id. 
 215  Cf. Bezdek, supra note 201, at 5. 
 216  See, e.g., LuigART Maker’s Spaces, FAYETTE ALLIANCE (Sept. 18, 2014), 
http://fayettealliance.com/luigart-makers-spaces/ (providing that a site inventory 
and analysis is conducted to establish the baseline conditions of a proposed project, 
including a maximum vehicular use study, in turn forming the basis for written 
guidelines by which the Planning Staff and Planning Commission can evaluate future 
development plans associated with the project).  In October, 2014, Article 22 of 
Lexington-Fayette County, KY’s Zoning Ordinance was amended to establish a 
Planned Unit Development-2 (PUD-2) ZONE.  See LEXINGTON-FAYETTE COUNTY KY., 
ZONING ORDINANCE art 22B, available at http://www.lexingtonky.gov/ 
Modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentid=29196. 
 217  Bezdek, supra note 201, at 9.  See also id. at 32–35 (describing deliberative 
components and decision-making methods).  In effect, such deliberation will be a 
form of district-wide “visioning.”  See Widener, supra note 163, at 35–36, 39–46 
(describing district-wide visioning in greater detail).  As Professor Bezdek notes, 
funding in redevelopment occurring under the federal Community Development 
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Thus far, the existing neighborhood mechanism that seems most 
adaptable to the deliberation model is the negotiated contract.  
Community Benefits Agreements (CBAs) may be the result of sharing 
entrepreneurs’ negotiated peace with skeptical adjoining neighbors 
instead of agreements with planning administrators.  Under CBAs, the 
sharing producers must “pay it forward” by contributing to the 
infrastructure, like Internet and communications technologies’ (ICT) 
upgrades or “marketplace” enhancements within the District (such as 
installing bicycle racks), accommodating persons intimately affected 
by the later arrivals’ activities.  Under such agreements, the following 
sorts of stipulations may frame the sharing producer’s operation 
entitlements: 
a. Neighborhood enforcement mechanisms set forth by 
community-based non-profit organizations; 
b. Sanctions including the forfeiture of cash bonds or the 
posting of other monetary security posted as a pledge of 
continued performance of standards, such as limiting noise 
levels, hours of operation, and traffic and parking generation; 
and 
c.    Mandatory conciliation among disputants prior to involving 
government authorities in prosecuting actions over violations 
of the District’s bargained-for agreement. 
Many of these conventions are highly appropriate to the 
conditions of the sharing economy’s injection into the community.  
The flaw in these contractual solutions is that agreement takes too long 
to reach, especially when multiple stakeholders engage in 
negotiations.  Without some preexisting system in place (similar to a 
payback or repayment agreement, under which, upon commencing 
operation, each sharing producer in turn makes some fair-share cash 
payments in return for “setting up shop” in a District) under a pre-
arranged “master” agreement governing all similarly situated Sharing 
Enterprises, formal agreements consume substantial time when 







Block Grant Program is conditioned upon preparing and executing a citizen 
participation plan.  Bezdek, supra note 201, at 13. 
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3. A Proposal for Inclusiveness of Stakeholders in Sharing 
Economy Districts 
The following structure involves stakeholders’ inclusion in 
determining proper integration of sharing producers in a 
neighborhood.  It borrows somewhat from Los Angeles’ 
Neighborhood Councils, which have been in effect since City Charter 
revision in 1999.218  Los Angeles has ninety-five neighborhood councils 
that intend to be diverse, inclusive, and representative of all 
community stakeholders and to be catalysts for change in addressing 
the needs of their individual communities.219  This network of councils 
is overseen by the Board of Neighborhood Commissioners (the 
“Commission”), which is itself an inclusive body comprised of seven 
persons with diverse backgrounds and geographic locations appointed 
by the Mayor and confirmed by the City Council.220  The Commission 
meets twice monthly unless special meetings are called.221  The 
proposed structure might be staffed by a city employee (preferably a 
planning staff member) to be the Districts’ “information officer” 
overseeing a robust public website, giving regularly-scheduled 
briefings and providing technical assistance to what are known below 
as “District Councils.” 
The District Councils govern certain planning aspects within each 
District, defined by the community as one or more self-identified 
neighborhoods sharing a common character due to ethnic 
composition, geographic delimitations, or some other community of 
 
 218  About Us, L.A. NEIGHBORHOOD COUNCIL COAL., http://www.lancc.org/ (last 
visited Sept. 12, 2015); see L.A., CAL., CITY CHARTER art. IX, §§ 900–914 (2015), available 
at 
http://www.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/California/laac/administrativecode?f=te
mplates$fn=default.htm$3.0$vid=amlegal:losangeles_ca_mc; L.A., CAL., ADMIN. CODE, 
div. 22, § 22.801 (2015), available at http://www.amlegal.com/nxt/ 
gateway.dll/California/laac/administrativecode?f=templates$fn=default.htm$3.0$vid
=amlegal:losangeles_ca_mc; L.A., Cal., Ordinance, 174006 (effective May 31, 2001), 
available at http://www.lacityneighborhoods.com/Documents/PlanOrdinance.pdf 
(implementing the plan for the citywide system of councils). 
 219  Commission, EMPOWERLA: DEP’T OF NEIGHBORHOOD EMPOWERMENT, 
http://empowerla.org/commission/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2015) [hereinafter 
EmpowerLA]; cf. Bedzek, supra note 201, at 48–49 (emphasizing the importance of 
identifying those who usually are voiceless or deliberately excluded from input in 
order to maximize credibility and neighborhood acceptance of the process).  
According to the implementing ordinance, a proposed Neighborhood Council should 
represent approximately 20,000 residents at a minimum.  L.A., Cal., Ordinance 174006 
(effective May 31, 2001).   
 220  EmpowerLA, supra note 219. 
 221  Id. 
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interest.222  Following their appointment by the community’s planning 
commission,223 these Councils begin their work by conducting a public 
“convention” at which, after public deliberation,224 they identify sites 
where sharing producer operation is optimal and establish 
compatibility categories.225  Effectively setting forth these propositions 
as a sort of mini “general plan,”226 the Councils are tasked with 
overhauling that plan at short-duration intervals (between three to five 
years), and reviewing, after public deliberation, the efficacy of the plan 
at even more frequent intervals (perhaps annually).227 
Equipped with a schedule of compatibility categories,228 city-
appointed hearing officers, being persons not living in the district, 
initially apply these standards to applications for Sharing Enterprise 
operation within a neighborhood.  The hearing officers impartially 
receive evidence and testimony on a proposed sharing producer’s use 
from the applicant, who testifies under oath.  The hearing officers are 
asked presumptively to approve each application,229 subject to 
 
 222  Cf. Timothy A. Holveck, Land Use Lingo: A Glossary of Land Use Terms, WISCONSIN 
DEP’T OF NATURAL RESOURCES 19 (2001), http://www.kalkaskacounty.net/downloads/ 
land_use_lingo.pdf. 
 223  Appointment by Planning Commissioners (in those communities where they 
are not elected officials) does not ensure fewer “patronage” appointees than if the 
city’s legislative body appoints them; but such a method may render members less 
prone to member “obligation-discharging”—if the planning commissioners 
themselves are not prone to “deal-making.”  (In some communities, the Council and 
the Planning Commission have identical memberships.) 
 224  I use this term deliberately to differentiate it from the venue of a public hearing 
which, as Professor Bedzek notes, affords no real deliberative dialog among attendees 
and tends to be vitriolic instead of civil.  See Bedzek, supra note 201, at 33, 35. 
 225  See infra Part IV.C. 
 226  Cf. Richard White, Mini-downtowns a Growing Trend in Calgary’s Growth, CALGARY 
HERALD (Nov. 19, 2014), http://calgaryherald.com/life/homes/condos/white-mini-
downtowns-a-growing-trend-in-calgarys-growth (noting that city’s adoption of “major 
activity centers” around the city after extensive community engagement).  
 227  Cf. Sofia Ranchordas, Does Sharing Mean Caring? Regulating Innovation in the 
Sharing Economy, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 413, 450 (2015).  Professor Ranchordas 
suggests that because innovations arise incrementally, regulators should implement 
flexible regulations in a continuous process of experimentation and learning, and 
those regulations optimally incorporate a sunset clause.  See id. at 450–51.  This 
experimentation model seems suited to District determinations such as siting 
“enclaves” for aggregated Sharing Enterprises and reexamining its compatibility 
categories; implementing some Sharing Enterprises allows for District “test case” 
review and deliberation on whether (or not) to rework compatibility categorization or 
to adopt zoning overlay districts to regulate sharing producers.  Too-frequent revision 
of plans on the District (or the community-legislative) level, however, reflects an ad hoc 
approach undermining confidence in residents concerned about predictability and 
safety. 
 228  See infra Part IV.C. 
 229  See Miller, supra note 1, at 7 (“[T]he regulatory response should be based upon 
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stipulations of approval (“Conditions”),230 unless that evidence or 
testimony adduced establishes that the proposed Sharing Enterprise is 
deemed likely to be highly incompatible, in which event the hearing 
officer can deny the application altogether.  In either event, the 
hearing officer assigns the specific compatibility category (based upon 
the Councils’ initial work) she deems suitable based upon hearing 
evidence. 
If the hearing officer’s approval of the application is protested, 
the matter is next subject to conciliation,231 conducted by a public 
official or her designee, between the applicant Sharing Enterprise and 
protestors.  If the conciliation does not lead to an accommodation 
agreement,232 the protest next is heard by a subcommittee of the 
Council established without any participant residing in the impacted 
District.  This appellate body has no authority to modify the proposed 
use’s specific compatibility category; and it will uphold the hearing 
officer’s determination of denial of an application unless, by a 
supermajority vote of that body (the majority vote’s percentage being 
tied to the compatibility category), it is determined that the Sharing 
Enterprise has adequately addressed mitigating negative externalities.  
If the Council’s subcommittee upholds the denial of the permit, the 
sharing producer must wait a minimum of six months before re-
applying to the Council for the same or a similar Sharing Enterprise 
on the same street,233 or a minimum of ninety days before re-applying 
 
regulating the entry of the sharing economy platform into the existing market, as well 
as the new market created.”). 
 230  See Miller, supra note 1, at 44 (citing “good neighbor” rules like noise 
stipulations requiring a “quiet time” and limiting commercial activity during evening 
hours, parking regulations addressing on-street parking and parking permits in 
residential zones, and trash guidelines). 
 231  By “conciliation,” I mean a conference involving the stakeholders and a neutral 
person whose goals are to maintain civility and to attempt to generate an atmosphere 
of mutual trust.  Mediation, while often useful, renders the conference directed by a 
trained expert (whose expenses must be paid by the parties), a person who may be 
more interested in the deliberation process than in the inclusion of resident and 
sharing producer inputs, or another party with no experience in trust-building 
methods.  A District Council member with no stake in the particular application’s 
outcome or relationship to a stakeholder may be appropriate to “moderate” the 
conciliation meeting, if she is properly trained in her role. 
 232  The accommodation agreement, if reached, would be forwarded to the Hearing 
Officer for review, to determine whether the agreement has addressed the issues 
identified by that official in reaching the compatibility category.  In such event, the 
Hearing Officer may reopen the hearing for the purpose of making a revised 
determination, perhaps incorporating the conditions discussed by the conciliation’s 
participants. 
 233  The “cooling off” period serves to allow further consultation among the 
stakeholders and further refinement of the Sharing Enterprise’s business model in 
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in the same District but in a substantially different location within its 
boundaries.  The sharing producer applicant further can appeal the 
Commission’s denial to the community’s Planning Commission,234 but 
must first submit a narrative to that body that explains in detail those 
modifications and mitigation efforts the Sharing Enterprise will make, 
responding to issues raised by protestors in the conciliation meeting 
that caused the applicant’s failure to receive approval. 
If the hearing officer’s approval of the sharing use is not protested 
or ultimately “upheld” over a protest, then, upon securing any needed 
business license, the exterior of the building housing the sharing use 
will be physically tagged235 to identify Sharing Enterprise approval.  A 
Council review of the Sharing Enterprise operation must be conducted 
shortly after the anniversary of commencement of that use.236  No 
matter how the Sharing Enterprise is finally approved, if it “fails” its 
anniversary review or is the subject of later enforcement due to 
violation of the Conditions, the approval tag will be replaced with a 
new or “reprogrammed” tag, indicating the Sharing Enterprise has 
violated the Conditions or other applicable laws and, therefore, that 
the use is scheduled for a hearing on revocation of the approval.237  Any 
city agency, a membership trade association to which the sharing user 
belongs, or the Council shall have the right to act as complainant to 
revoke the prior city approval. 
This process entails a good deal of bureaucracy compared to 
existing special exception and dimensional variance hearing 
processes.  On the other hand, this proposal offsets much of the 
recurring criticisms that variance-granting bodies pay little to no 
attention to legal limitations on their powers238 and that public 
 
light of neighbor inputs. 
 234  Again, final say in a municipal zoning matter must be voiced by a municipal 
legislative body.  See supra text accompanying notes 155–67. 
 235  The author suggests tagging by using, on a building’s exterior, any of a QR Code 
plaque, a Near Field Communication (NFC) and an accompanying information tag 
(or an unpowered NFC chip) or some future form of “visible light communication” 
(such as that being developed by Fujitsu under its “Li-Fi” technology).  See Keith E. 
Mayers, Lazaros Kyrillidis, Konstantinos Markantonakis and Song Dong, A Brief 
Comparison of NFC Smart Posters and Quick Response Codes, NFC & CONTACTLESS 74–78 
(2012), available at http://www.crisptelecom.com/files/nfcworld.pdf.  
 236  This is not to support an elaborate bureaucracy but to ensure that the applicant 
did not misrepresent his or her true operating intentions and possible neighborhood 
repercussions. 
 237  Additionally, any trade group incorporating the Sharing Enterprise identified 
by the applicant will be notified to encourage that group to sanction the sharing 
producer by private penalization. 
 238  See, e.g., Randall W. Sampson, Theory and Practice in the Granting of Dimensional 
Land Use Variances: Is the Legal Standard Conscientiously Applied, Consciously Ignored, or 
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hearings are not deliberative moments, becoming platforms for 
emotionally-driven outcomes or the airing of prearranged outcomes 
instead.239 
C.  Determining Sharing Enterprise Neighborhood Compatibility 
Standards 
“[P]recisely the many small-scale nonresidential uses on the 
street . . . are responsible for much of the increased attractiveness and 
value of the street for residence. . . . [T]hey make the street interesting 
and safe.”240  “[N]o arguments arise over their desirability.  The 
arguments . . . revolve around the question of what kind of [zoning] 
categories . . . will be least at odds with the needs of real life.”241 
The community should establish standards, following hearings 
before the Councils,242 on Sharing Enterprises’ levels of compatibility 
with any District’s special character and circulation patterns.243  While 
Districts’ inputs are instrumental, the community ultimately must have 
final say on compatibility through its general or comprehensive plan, 
nearly always a creature of enabling legislation for urban planning.244  
This is because District boundaries likely are the centers of municipal 
 
Something in Between, 39 URB. LAW. 877, 894–905 (2007).  
 239  See Bedzek, supra note 201, at 16, 26–27; JACOBS, supra note 26, at 406 (“In many 
cases . . . it has all been decided before they are heard.”). 
 240  JACOBS, supra note 26, at 236.   
 241  Id. at 235.  Jacobs’ grievance with “monotonous” city zoning categorization was 
that it confused scale of use, instrumental in neighborhood planning, with kind of use; 
Jacobs argued that the latter dimension, misapplied, would lead to visual “street 
disintegration.”  See id. at 234–38.  To Jacobs, segregating uses no matter their size or 
empiric effect needlessly suppressed diversity of street life.  See id. at 238.  The very 
same large-scale fragmenting of the street’s visual harmony causes other negative 
externalities like traffic generation, street parking consumption, heightened levels of 
noise and other sensory overloading.  While all those impacts may not be perfect 
recipes for neighborhood “tranquility,” a certain quantum of these impacts are part of 
street activation—in short, the cost of place-making.  This constitutes a District 
question of balancing the costs and benefits of these externalities. 
 242  See infra notes 249–52 and accompanying text at subparts A–E, infra. 
 243  Indeed, some Districts may propose municipal adoption of overlay or special 
planning zoning districts by the City Council or other principal legislative body of their 
community allowing, as of right, living and working arrangements within the same 
structure.  See, e.g., ROBERT STEUTEVILLE & PHILIP LANGDON, NEW URBANISM: 
COMPREHENSIVE REPORT & BEST PRACTICES GUIDE § 6-6–6-7, 10-20 (2003) (explaining 
that terms employed are “flex house” (or unit) and “shopfront house” (or unit)). 
 244  See Charles M. Haar, The Master Plan: An Impermanent Constitution, 20 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 353, 353 (1955).  While neighborhood level planning is advocated 
in some quarters, these plans must be compatible with the core strategy of the local 
authority (and formally adopted by that authority) to be effective.  See HUGH BARTON, 
MARCUS GRANT & RICHARD GUISE, SHAPING NEIGHBORHOODS: FOR LOCAL HEALTH AND 
GLOBAL SUSTAINABILITY 8 (2010) [hereinafter BARTON & GRANT].  
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streets or edges (or centers) of other public spaces and because the 
impacts of some uses are felt in adjacent Districts or perhaps more 
regionally, such as in the community’s transit network.  Next, the 
community must have final approval rights because in many states, the 
statutory scheme requires the approval of a general or master plan at 
the elected local community official level.245  Legislative bodies have, 
and must continue, to decide the proper mix of land use classes, 
although local governments should not dictate specific locations of 
these uses within a District’s boundaries without citizen input.246  But a 
city’s legislative body must ensure that a minority fraction of the 
Districts are not disproportionately (and unwillingly) hosts of these 
uses—unless less risk-adverse or more entrepreneurial Districts 
affirmatively seek additional Sharing Enterprises’ inclusion within 
their boundaries.247 
The community must likewise assist the Districts in determining 
their individual “saturation points,” as it has the legal responsibility to 
 
 245  See State of California General Plan Guidelines, GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF PLANNING & 
RESEARCH 3 (2003), available at http://opr.ca.gov/docs/General_Plan_ 
Guidelines_2003.pdf (stating that each county and city must adopt a comprehensive, 
long term general plan); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-461.06(C), (M) (2015) (West) 
(illustrating a statute governing municipal planning that requires the “governing 
body” of an Arizona municipality to adopt the general plan). 
 246  The City of Seattle uses the phrase “live-work unit,” defining it as: 
[A] structure or portion of a structure: (1) that combines a commercial 
or manufacturing activity that is allowed in the zone with the residential 
living space for the owner of the commercial or manufacturing business, 
or the owner’s employee, and that person’s household; (2) where the 
resident owner or employee of the business is responsible for the 
commercial or manufacturing activity performed; and (3) where the 
commercial or manufacturing activity conducted takes place subject to 
a valid business license associated with the premises. 
SEATTLE, WASH., MUNI. CODE., § 23.84A.024(L).  By definition, Seattle live-work units 
can have a commercial or manufacturing component if it would otherwise be allowed 
in the zone.  Seattle’s Residential-Commercial zone allows live-work units and the 
following commercial uses outright: personal and household retail sales and services, 
medical services, restaurants, business support services, offices, and food processing 
and “craft work.”  Id. § 23.46.004(B).  In Seattle, live-work units are considered 
compatible with these uses.  Seattle limits the size of individual businesses to 4,000 
square feet.  See id. § 23.46.014.  This provision limits the size of businesses, thereby 
ensuring that large businesses that would jeopardize the residential character of the 
neighborhood will not be included. 
 247  In that event, the entrepreneurial District should familiarize itself with model 
code provisions for live-work units, such as those found in Sustainable Land Use Code 
Project, CAPITOL REGION COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS 1–3 (June  2013), 
http://www.sustainableknowledgecorridor.org/site/sites/default/files/CRCOG_Liv
e-Work_Units_Final_9-30-13.pdf.  See also MODEL LAND-DEVELOPMENT REGULATIONS 71–
74 (Marya Morris ed., 2008), available at http://austintexas.gov/sites/ 
default/files/files/Planning/CodeNEXT/PAS_556_4_2_live-work.pdf. 
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do so and possesses better intuition about the regional burdens than a 
Neighborhood Council with narrower interests than regional 
implications.248  The compatibility levels of the proposed uses will 
populate the following spectrum: 
A. Inherently incompatible uses, where noise, traffic generation, 
or other nuisance-oriented factors render a use essentially 
dangerous or substantially diminish the quality of life in 
surrounding enclaves.  In this category, a rare permit grant 
will satisfy the classic variance inquiry, in which the applicant 
essentially would be deprived, by rejection of the application, 
of all economically viable use of the property;249 and even here, 
for relief, the applicant would need to provide substantial 
(likely expensive) mitigation of negative externalities.  One 
anticipates the District’s residential-dwelling spokespersons 
always will oppose the application and (in all likelihood) 
propose some alternate use of the property implicating its 
acquisition (whether voluntarily or involuntarily) for the 
community leadership’s consideration.  The applicant will 
probably be required to present some expert testimony on the 
extent of nuisance elements (such as a traffic study or noise 
measurement by an engineer).  Presumptively, the 
application for a use permit in this category will fail in nearly 
all cases. 
B. Incompatible without substantial mitigation where, albeit not 
per se nuisance-creating (as characteristic in the preceding 
category), the use requires thorough addressing of its direct 
and indirect impacts, whether by reducing the hours of the 
proposed use’s operation or physical treatments, like 
implementing noise-dampening materials, odor filtration, 
 
 248  An unavoidable point is how to address the District that seeks to classify all 
Sharing Enterprises as “inherently incompatible,” meaning none shall be allowed in 
its boundaries.  Market forces may persuade sharing producers to avoid such 
intolerance and exclusion in the first instance, preferring those Districts that are” most 
exuberantly diversified.”  See JACOBS, supra note 26, at 255.  However, to encourage all 
Districts minimally to deliberate upon the utility of increasing mixtures of uses and the 
benefits of such diversity, it will be important to appoint to a Neighborhood Council’s 
board membership numbers of sharing producers or prosumers who live within the 
District’s boundaries.  It is worth remembering that solidly residential enclaves may 
already have in place contractual restrictive covenants (or General Plan boundaries) 
permitting no commercial activities.  If there are none of these, the sharing producer 
may wish to negotiate first a Good Neighbor Agreement, followed by an application 
for a permit.   
 249  Cf. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (noting that 
situations exist “where regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use 
of land”). 
WIDENER (DO NOT DELETE) 11/3/2015  2:56 PM 
160 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:111 
smoke-scrubbing, or other substantial mitigation.  (If 
licensing of this category of uses were privately controlled, 
“trade group” members might require this mitigation as a 
condition of that body’s licensing.)  One illustration is the 
operating of an outdoor batting cage for hitting instruction 
conducted nightly for three-hour intervals on a residential lot, 
involving multiple youth baseball teams.  Limiting operating 
hours to before a typical citizen’s bedtime, compelling 
acoustical treatment of vibrating-bat noises and requiring 
shielding of outdoor pole lighting sources all may contribute 
to the acceptability of this use; but the permit’s application 
may fail upon District resident opposition, especially if 
opponents demonstrate that acceptable alternatives for the 
Sharing Enterprise’s location exist within the District’s 
boundaries. 
C. Incompatible prosumers, where projected volumes of non-
locals-based traffic generation or behaviors exhibited by 
visitors to this same or analogous type of use predictably 
disturbs the District’s equilibrium.250  A motorcycle repairs 
teaching and tools-lending facility illustrate this 
circumstance.251  While the facility’s operation may be 
professional, inability of the neighbors to know with 
confidence who their street’s visitors are and what the noise 
level will be, coupled with history of such operations 
elsewhere in the community, may lead the District to question 
how much this activity contributes to its quality of life.252  In 
 
 250  Cf. Aisles Apart, ECONOMIST 36 (Mar. 21, 2015), available at 
http://www.economist.com/news/china/21646794-protests-about-mainland-
shoppers-reveal-graver-problems-aisles-apart (describing Hong Kong locals’ 
displeasure with influx of mainland visitors thronging to purchase staples and other 
goods, who are identified as strangers, even though many Hong Kong residents 
themselves were “mainlanders” migrating to the island in the 20th Century). 
 251  Worship centers in the 21st Century increasingly are becoming Sharing 
Enterprises, especially those with strong congregant convictions about “community 
mission.”  Operations include pocket shelters, feeding and clothing the disadvantaged, 
and numerous on-campus gatherings of the congregation, area service organizations, 
and day-care activities.  Once a quiet place for small gatherings, worship centers 
increasingly are dynamic and engaged with their surrounding communities.  See, e.g., 
Christianity and Its Major Branches, in RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AMERICA: FAITH, CULTURE 
AND  STRATEGIC CHOICES 71 (Robert Booth Fowler, Allen D. Hertzke, Laura R. Olson 
& Kevin R. Den Dulk eds., 2010). 
 252  This illustration is not class-war driven; I regard home-based hair salons 
featured in wealthy residential enclaves to be equally objectionable because of hosted 
parties that generate traffic.  See Nancy Keates, Latest Style: Home Hair Salons, WALL ST. 
J. (Jan. 15, 2015, 11:56 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/latest-style-home-hair-
salons-1421340965.  As these residence “parlors” rarely have a live-in stylist, salon 
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this permit application, one expects a number of stipulations 
proposed by the District’s residential-dwelling representatives 
and imposed by the hearing officer. 
D. Incompatible due to saturation, where the District has 
reached its maximum capacity to absorb additional Sharing 
Enterprises.  Under these conditions, a zoning permit may be 
granted but a city business license may be withheld until 
additional capacity is created by closure of another sharing 
producer’s business in the District.  Without such saturation 
limits, well-armed Districts may seek to move sharing 
producers to another district; a “saturation limit,” on the 
other hand, creates an objective standard that must be 
exceeded before justifying recommending denial of every 
application based in the now-saturated District. 
E. Compatible: An application for a sharing producer’s use will 
be approved subject to reasonable stipulations on hours of 
operation, maximum on-site capacity of consumers, and other 
elements addressing minor public health and safety concerns.  
V.  “ABSOLUTE” LAND USE DEREGULATION OF THE SHARING ECONOMY 
“[T]he legal rules should not target the businesses themselves, but 
rather their potential for generating negative externalities.  In other 
words, the ground rules should permit people to work at home so long 
as they do not unduly disrupt their neighbors by doing so.”253 
Professor Garnett’s argument above resonates across the sharing 
economy’s intersection with land use regulation.  Prior to the 
December 2007–June 2009 national recession254 (and the slow-recovery 
 
activity in a majestic home no more constitutes a “home occupation” under zoning 
ordinances than food-sharing enterprises do in more modest dwellings. 
 253  Garnett, supra note 70, at 1240.  This fifteen-year-old (2001) paper contains a 
number of prescient observations addressing current sharing-economy 
accommodation dilemmas, among them:  
An economic downturn resulting in new rounds of layoffs could wreak 
havoc on individuals who only recently exited welfare rolls and may be 
barred forever from returning . . . .  Home businesses might offer a 
partial buffer against these economic realities, leading some [officials] 
to consider the option of increasing opportunities to work at home as an 
economic development tool. . . .  [T]he preference in many zoning 
codes for professional rather than commercial [home] occupations 
works to the detriment of “techie” companies. . . . Few of these 
companies would qualify as “professional” occupations, and many would 
require the would-be entrepreneur to produce or sell goods or services.   
See id. at 1216–17, 1222. 
 254  See Press Release, National Bureau of Economic Research (Sept. 20, 2010), 
available at http://www.nber.org/cycles/sept2010.pdf (commenting that the 
eighteen-month American recession was the longest since World War II). 
WIDENER (DO NOT DELETE) 11/3/2015  2:56 PM 
162 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:111 
aftermath), her 2001 observations pertained to smaller-scale, lower 
revenue-number commercial businesses.  Professor Garnett suggested 
four better land governance alternatives to wholesale prohibition, the 
first being that residents presumptively could operate home 
occupations, with local government regulation confined to punishing 
abusers of that privilege, perhaps through a quasi-nuisance 
administrative adjudicatory process.255  Professor Garnett’s second 
suggested approach would allow smaller home businesses as a matter 
of right, but require some form of zoning adjustment for “major” 
home operations.256  A third option adapts “performance zoning” 
principles, under which business operators satisfy development criteria 
in advance of their openings and thereby present evidence that 
neighborhood disruptions or visible alterations of the neighborhood 
landscape will be non-existent or minimal.257  A fourth alternative 
allows neighborhoods to rely on recorded restrictive covenants 
binding on the land to prohibit such home businesses, a private check 
on local government processes, altogether ending the zoning 
authorities’ business of regulating home occupations.258  This last 
alternative aids only solidly residential subdivisions with a long 
continuity of existence and centralized management that have not 
 
 255  See Garnett, supra note 70, at 1243.  The infirmity in this system, of course, is 
that the complainant in many instances would be the immediate neighbor, so that the 
fabric of the neighborhood is disrupted by interminable neighbor versus neighbor 
contests over power to prescribe behavior.  This appears to be San Francisco’s attitude 
in respect to its Short-Term Residential Rentals Ordinance, According to Mayor Edwin 
Lee: “With this balanced, responsible ordinance in place, San Francisco residents can 
share their homes and we can enforce against bad actors to protect the public.”  Mayor 
Lee Signs Legislation to Regulate Short-Term Residential Rentals In San Francisco, S.F. OFFICE 
OF THE MAYOR (Oct. 27, 2014), http://sfmayor.org/index. 
aspx?recordid=691&page=846. 
 256  See Garnett, supra note 70, at 1242.  The art here is to determine the boundary 
between “minor” and “major” home-based businesses.  Is it based upon square footage 
of the business activity’s occupancy, the number of employees “in residence,” the 
volume of local streets’ vehicular traffic (including, one imagines, bicycle and 
skateboard traffic) generated by the business, the amount of utilities consumed, the 
noise level (apart from traffic sounds), or inherent dangers arising from the Sharing 
Economy?  Indeed, Professor Garnett’s major-minor dichotomy underpins somewhat 
this author’s “compatibility categories.”  See supra Part IV.C. 
 257  See Garnett, supra note 70, at 1242–43.  In truth, this alternative is similar in kind 
to zoning adjustments’ operation in many communities, where special exceptions (or 
use permits) are issued only when the applicant demonstrates a lack of material 
adverse impacts on the surrounding neighborhood, including minimal generation of 
residential vehicle or pedestrian traffic, or of noise, dust, odors, glare, fumes, vibration, 
and so on.  See RATHKOPF, supra note 175, at § 14.30.  This model seems to entail the 
business operator’s periodic recertification of standards compliance conducted by a 
third-party private standards organization.  See Part VI infra. 
 258  See Garnett, supra note 70, at 1234–35.  
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abandoned their original residential characters. 
Ultimately one asks whether any actors, public or private, should 
regulate land use, instead ceding this prerogative to the “wisdom of 
crowds” in Districts where Sharing Enterprises seek to reside.  Are 
“crowds” sufficiently reliable and robust within their individual 
enclaves to regulate Sharing Enterprises?  Perhaps it is axiomatic that 
complex systems require the inputs of great numbers because their 
collective insights are superior to those from handfuls of experts 
because of the diversity and breadth of experiences of the masses.259  
Some argue, for instance, that the safety benefit of passenger 
authentication in car-sharing arose not because of official perceptions 
but instead from entrepreneurs creating shared vehicular-use business 
models.260  Crowds tend collectively to have more consequential 
knowledge than the smartest small cadre of experts;261 and 
crowdsourcing is useful in the solution of certain problems such as 
navigating traffic jams and aiding disabled motorists in real time, such 
as is intended by Waze, Inc.262  Twitter Inc. and IBM have announced 
that the latter will have access to the full public stream of tweets back 
to Twitter’s foundation to develop new applications and services based 
on their information and to offer specific industries access to packets 
of data generated by this agglomerated data.263 
Crowds, however, tend not to organize and condense what they 
know into usable packets of data and information.  Crowds also have 
 
 259  See Vivek Wadhwa, When Experts Are a Waste of Money, WALL ST. J. THE 
ACCELERATORS BLOG (Oct. 27, 2014, 12:10 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/accelerators/ 
tag/vivek-wadhwa/.  See also Greg Brown, Engaging the Wisdom of Crowds and Public 
Judgement for Land Use Planning using Public Participation Geographic Information Systems, 
52 AUSTRALIAN PLANNER 1, 2 (2015), available at http://www.landscapemap2.org/ 
publications/australian_planner_wisdom.pdf.  Brown sagely points out the sharp 
distinction among mere crowd inputs, the “wisdom of crowds” (where collective 
opinion generates superior solutions to a problem than should one individual) and 
“public judgement,” where the collaborative product is high quality opinion that is 
“firm, consistent, and mindful of consequences.”  See id. at 3–4.  
 260  See Charley Moore, Why Ride Sharing Regulators Should “Tread Lightly,” LINKEDIN 
PULSE (Sept. 5, 2013) https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20130905223920-1523803-
why-ride-sharing-regulators-should-tread-lightly. 
 261  See SOWELL, supra note 126, at 16–17. 
 262  Waze urges participation by “millions of drivers out on the roads, working 
together towards a common goal: to outsmart traffic and get everyone the best route 
to work and back, every day.”  “Wazers” who edit and update maps on the Web 
interface are rewarded with more points than those who merely are consumers.  See 
WAZE, https://www.waze.com/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2015). 
 263  See Don Clark & Yoree Koh, Twitter, IBM to Harness Tweet Data for Business, WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 29, 2014, at B6, available at http://online.wsj.com/articles/ibm-and-twitter-
forge-partnership-on-data-analytics-1414601963?.  
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the habit of trending,264 instead of seeing a larger picture or engaging 
in “second-stage” thinking (anticipating ramifications of 
implementing one course of action).265  Trending, and reversing 
course, may be inefficient to the point of imposing an unacceptable 
cost.266  Furthermore, trending can be manipulated, even distorted, by 
technology masters, like schooling fish being re-directed by a 
“cyberfish.”267  Communities must consider whether technology can be 
applied even-handedly to analyze and process the “wisdom of crowds” 
where land-planning is concerned, and exactly whose wisdom is 
relevant.268  Should inputs from the portion of the crowd living farther 
from the applicant Sharing Enterprise carry equal weight to the crowd 
segment living and working adjacent to the sharing producer’s 
business?  If not, how is the pertinent “crowd” identified for any 
 
 264  Indeed, “trending” is a darling of media outlets believing it relevant (and hip) 
to report on the latest trends.  ABC News’ evening broadcast emphasizes a “trending 
now” segment, for example.  See ABC NEWS, www.abcnews.go.com/ (last visited Sept. 
12, 2015).  The point of Twitter “tweet” analytics is to discover regurgitated common 
denominators of breaking news and commentary, otherwise known as “trending 
topics” or “buzz.”  See Analytics, TWITTER, https://analytics.twitter.com/ (last visited 
Sept. 12, 2015). 
 265  See THOMAS SOWELL, APPLIED ECONOMICS: THINKING BEYOND STAGE ONE, 5–7 
(2009). 
 266  See Anindya Ghose, Build a Relationship with People in the ‘Crowd,’ WALL ST. J. THE 
ACCELERATORS, Oct. 30, 2014, at B5 (“A very high volume of half-baked ideas brings 
with it the overhead cost of evaluating those ideas . . . when ideas aren’t completely 
thought-through, they simply create a lot more work for the organization.”). 
 267  See, e.g., BBC Trending: Manipulating the Internet, BBC, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p01ndgys (last visited Sept. 12, 2015) (reporting 
fake identities to artificially create trends or boost “follower” numbers exploiting 
software routines called “bots”); Alok Shukla, Social Media Manipulation Is for Real, Some 
Call It as Crowd-Turfing!, MCAFEE BLOG CENTRAL (Dec. 2, 2013), 
https://blogs.mcafee.com/consumer/social-media-manipulation-is-for-real-some-
call-it-as-crowd-turfing (describing methods of manipulating social media through 
automated and manual approaches that are prevalent in many countries such as the 
United States and China).  See also John Drury et al., Transforming the Boundaries of 
Collective Identity: From the ‘Local’ Anti-Road Campaign to ‘Global’ Resistance? 2 SOCIAL 
MOVEMENT STUDIES 191–212 (2003) (discussing that collective action becomes possible 
when a particular social identity is simultaneously salient and therefore shared among 
crowd participants). 
 268  See Brown, supra note 259, at 9 (“[T]here is an assumption that making good 
decisions is about finding the right person or persons with the answer . . . many land 
use decisions involve social value decisions that are framed as technical decisions 
where experts offer no special insight into social values beyond the capacity of the 
crowd itself.”).  Perhaps an answer to this dilemma of manipulation will be accelerated 
in America by governments’ sharing data gathered with the general public, an 
initiative of the Obama Administration under Making Open and Machine Readable the 
New Default for Government Information, its Open Data Policy.  See Exec. Order No. 
13,642, 78 Fed. Reg. 28111 (May 9, 2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
pkg/DCPD-201300318/content-detail.html. 
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prospective Sharing Enterprise?269  The democracy element of “crowd 
wisdom” must be viewed through the lens of possible distortion of data 
mined using technology. 
Houston, Texas is the over-cited illustration of the virtue of 
eliminating land use regulation.270  Despite its putative lack of zoning, 
Houston is not the venue for a land-development free-for-all.271  
Development in Houston is regulated through three different 
processes.272 The city regulates development through an approval 
process that focuses mainly on the impact of land development on 
public services.273  New developments, for example, must conform to 
performance criteria for public services such as sewer and road 
capacity.274  A second regulatory mechanism is private restrictions on 
land use adopted through legally enforceable land covenants, or 
voluntary restrictions on future land uses by current property owners.275  
Real covenants can (and often do) exclude specific uses, such as 
commercial enterprises or businesses.276  Still, a surprising number of 
parcels are “unrestricted,” particularly in established neighborhoods 
of the city, enabling informal market forces, the third “governance” 
 
 269  In zoning adjustment public hearings, the author frequently asks advocates and 
opponents about their respective residential distances from the application’s site and 
rarely is surprised by the smaller numbers of speakers genuinely affected immediately 
by the proposed use in the slightest manner; after all, it is a public hearing. 
 270  See, e.g., ALAN EHRENHALT, THE GREAT INVERSION AND THE FUTURE OF THE 
AMERICAN CITY 170–74 (2013); Bernard H. Siegan, Non-Zoning in Houston, 13 J. L. & 
ECON. 71, 75 (1970). 
 271  See Samuel R. Staley, The Progressive Roots of Zoning, THE FREEMAN BLOG (Mar. 28, 
2012), http://fee.org/freeman/detail/the-progressive-roots-of-zoning.  
 272  Id.  
 273  Id.  The Houston Planning Commission, which includes citizens, elected 
officials, and the Director of Planning and Development, reviews and approves 
subdivision and development plats.  The Commission also studies and makes 
recommendations to City Council on development issues in Houston.  See Planning 
Commission, CITY OF HOUSTON, http://www.houstontx.gov/planning/ 
Commissions/Planning-Commission (last visited Aug. 5, 2015).  Finally, Houston’s 
City Ordinance enumerates and penalizes public nuisances.  See HOUS., TEX., CODE OF 
ORDINANCES, § 10-451 (1985), available at https://library.municode.com/ 
index.aspx?clientId=10123&stateId=43&stateName=Texas.  
 274  See Staley, supra note 271.  Houston’s development is governed by codes that 
address how property can be subdivided, while site plans are checked for compliance 
with city regulations that include off-street parking, tree and shrub requirements, 
setbacks and access.  See Planning and Development: Development Ordinances, CITY OF 
HOUSTON, http://www.houstontx.gov/planning/DevelopRegs/dev_ord.html (last 
visited Aug. 5, 2015).   
 275  See Staley, supra note 271.  
 276  See, e.g., Georgette Chapman Phillips, Boundaries of Exclusion, 72 MO. L. REV. 
1287, 1302 (2007) (explaining that deed restrictions insure expectations of exclusion 
are met). 
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mechanism, to regulate dimensions of timing, intensity and place of 
development.277 
Through Euclidean zoning regulation avoidance, Houston 
dramatically speeds up the approval process while enabling the land 
market’s effective response to economic trends.278  Under conventional 
zoning regimes, securing rezoning for a major project can take years.  
In Houston, substantial developments, such as multifamily housing 
projects, are approved through its performance-approval system and 
are fully constructed within a year.279  Houston’s market-oriented 
approach to land use has also allowed it to adapt, building multiple 
employment centers to accommodate new economic challenges and 
opportunities.280  While Houston was not immune to the recessionary 
housing market collapse, its housing market was more resilient and 
adaptable to changing circumstances.281 
While that convention seems enticing, Houston’s laxer land use 
regulatory methods have their critics.282  Its government asserts some 
types of control as part of its police power and its trust relationship to 
its citizens; as a result, certain projects can be delayed or stymied 
altogether.  But a city does not need to shed all zoning regimes to inject 
sharing producers into neighborhoods.  Fundamentally, what sharing 
producers need in order to work side by side with dwellers in 
residential neighborhoods are these few essential elements: 
a. Low barriers to “entry” into new sharing spaces, such as the 
opportunity to work from home (combining family 
management with entrepreneurial activities) so long as 
interference with the lives of other neighbors is not material; 
b. Proximity of other informal economy business spaces 
(because innovation occurs in physical clustering, as has been 
demonstrated time and again283), such as by allowing the 
 
 277  See Staley, supra note 271.  But see Teddy M. Kapur, Land Use Regulation in Houston 
Contradicts the City’s Free Market Reputation, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10045, 10051, 10061–62 
(2004), available at http://www.pszjlaw.com/media/publication/427_Kapur%20-
%20ELR%20land%20use%20regulation.pdf (discussing that, although perhaps three-
fourths of its land mass has no deed restrictions, Houston is not a good example of a 
free market for land use, as its government routinely intervenes in land use decisions).  
 278  See EHRENHALT, supra note 270, at 172–73; Staley, supra note 271. 
 279  See EHRENHALT, supra note 270, at 172–73; Staley, supra note 271. 
 280  See EHRENHALT, supra note 270, at 170; Staley, supra note 271. 
 281  See EHRENHALT, supra note 270, at 172–73; Staley, supra note 271. 
 282  See, e.g., EHRENHALT, supra note 270, at 175–78 (discussing the resulting auto-
centric dependency and sprawl); Michael Lewyn, How Overregulation Creates Sprawl 
(Even in a City Without Zoning), 50 WAYNE L. REV. 1171, 1177–92 (2005) (explaining that 
Houston has broken from “laissez-faire” development policies). 
 283  See, e.g., Bruce Katz & Julie Wagner, The Rise of Innovation Districts: A New 
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repurposing of unused or underutilized buildings for “maker 
spaces”;284 
c. Allowing street curbside parking for customers, delivery 
service personnel and sharing entrepreneurs’ work without 
enabling local traffic to become gridlocked; 
d. Flexible sign regulation for less obtrusive and standardized 
building-exterior business identification plaques like QR 
Codes; and 
e. A credible punishment scheme for “defectors,”285 so that one’s 
niche enterprise does not endure additional costs free-riders 
escape paying, or endure the “guilt by association” with those 
sharing producers regularly defecting from District norms. 
VI.  THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE REGULATION OF SHARING ENTERPRISES 
Thoughtful sharing economy advocates seeking accommodation 
with neighborhood dwellers should promote new types of self-
regulatory organizations setting and enforcing basic regulations for 
peer-to-peer sharing marketplaces and platforms,286 while 
collaborating with public agencies on government oversight of 
regulation enforcement.287  One such means is private certification, 
 
Geography of Innovation in America, THE BROOKINGS INST. 2, 4–5, 9, 12 (May 2014), 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Programs/metro/Images/Innovation/Innovat
ionDistricts1.pdf.  Such districts address three of the main challenges of our time: “[a] 
sluggish growth, national austerity and local fiscal challenges, [b] rising social 
inequality, and [c] extensive sprawl and continued environmental degradation”; and 
many districts are close to low- and moderate-income neighborhoods.  Id. at 2.  
Further, such districts impact neighborhoods by creating new public spaces and 
activating streets to draw people together, incidentally re-designing corridors to make 
them more pedestrian-friendly.  Id. at 17. 
 284  To incorporate “third spaces” as part of each new local development, 
entrepreneurial incubators that transition sharing producers with “scalable” business 
models to commercial offices or commerce park spaces outside the residential 
neighborhood accomplishes two goals: maintaining residential character and 
accelerating the sharing producer’s model.  Most Districts have vacant buildings where 
adaptive reuse presents the opportunity to make space available affordably to 
entrepreneurs.  See Widener, Tactical Urbanism, supra note 109. 
 285  See Schoenmakers, supra note 154, at 36 (explaining that “pool” or central 
institutions’ sanctions can create a sufficiently strong selective pressure to prevent 
cheating; and these institutions’ mere existence and visibility has some deterrent effect 
on defection).  The article’s authors claim that opportunists “always act as defectors in 
the absence of the threat of punishment in the form of an effective sanctioning 
system,” but become cooperators when the sanctioning institution, a “public signal,” 
is supported by others who are stakeholders.  See id. at 11–12. 
 286  See Cohen & Sundararajan, supra note 81, at 126–28. 
 287  See Sundararajan, supra note 130 (observing that industry consortiums for self-
policing could inform emerging oversight questions as Sharing Enterprises achieve 
scale, such as “whether residential zoning and noise laws should change when 
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where private entities assure that the products or the services they 
certify meet criteria specified by the proper professional associations, 
recognized standards-setting organizations and government 
agencies.288 
Sharing producers have superior knowledge of their means and 
methods of producing goods and services.  This superior knowledge is 
vastly more than the knowledge of surrounding residents or of local 
administrators who regulate land use, many of whom may view the 
operations of Sharing Enterprises with suspicion or alarm.  Logic 
initially supports the idea of the sharing producers’ self-regulation, to 
the extent they demonstrate capacity to implement standards earnestly 
(including by incorporating inputs from District Councils) and 
comprehensively.  Private standards-setting has substantial history and 
credibility.  Consumers rely on private certification when purchasing 
goods and services, while companies rely on such standards-
confirmation when choosing suppliers.289  Likewise, some government 
agencies use certification to gauge regulatory compliance.290  Private 
industry self-regulation is advantageous in responding to a market 
failure or addressing novel, unanticipated consequences of new levels 
of interdependence created by complex technologies and 
globalization unfamiliar to traditional government operations.291  
Business has much to gain from self-regulation when the reputation of 
an industry sector or profession is at stake;292 this is the historical reason 
for undertaking private standards-setting. 
Reliable private certification addresses the market’s appetite for 
certification293 without yielding to competitive pressures to “cut 
 
individual apartments become mixed-use real estate”).  See also Cohen & Sundararajan, 
supra note 81, at 131 (arguing the need for governmental oversight).  Of course, the 
neighbors might seek to resolve such issues prior to a building’s conversion to 
incorporate fully mixed-use business models.  See also Lawrence J. Lad & Craig B. 
Caldwell, Collaborative Standards, Voluntary Codes and Industry Self-regulation, 35 J. CORP. 
CITIZENSHIP 67, 69, 71 (2009).  In the case of land use regulation, the government must 
serve as the enforcer of last resort.  See supra text accompanying notes 169–77.  
Additionally, collaboration overcomes most antitrust claims potentially arising from 
alleged restraint of trade.  See Lad & Caldwell, supra note 287, at 71.  
 288  See Lad & Caldwell, supra note 287, at 71.  See also Timothy D. Lytton, Competitive 
Third-Party Regulation: How Private Certification Can Overcome Constraints That Frustrate 
Government Regulation, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW. 539, 540 (2014). 
 289  See Lytton, supra note 287.  
 290  See id.; Miller, supra note 1 (noting that licensure enables collecting information 
on licensees as well as being a means of regulating scofflaws). 
 291  See Lad & Caldwell, supra note 287, at 68. 
 292  See id. at 70. 
 293  Lytton, supra note 288, at 540. 
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corners.”294  Fire safety certification by Underwriters Laboratories (UL) 
of more than 20,000 different types of products made by 69,000 
manufacturers295 and the Product Safety Code implementation process 
under the Responsible Care Guiding Principles adopted by the 
American Chemistry Council296 illustrate two types of private standards-
setting and enforcement.297  Properly functioning reliable private 
certification compares favorably to government regulation because the 
former applies greater technical expertise.298  Indeed, many public 
regulators rely on private standards to give their regulations more 
credibility; often, government regulations incorporate a private-
industry standard by reference.299 
Private certification provides superior inspection and monitoring 
coverage of regulated entities when inspection and monitoring strain 
public agency budgets.300  For private certifiers, inspection and 
monitoring actions generate fees.301  “The income received from 
inspection services prompts UL to inspect facilities at least four times 
per year,” far more frequently than most government agencies can 
afford.302  Certification is often more efficient than government 
regulation.  Because private certifiers are motivated to regulate 
partially by industry demand, they are less likely than government 
regulators to develop cost-inefficient standards where costs outweigh 
the standards’ benefit to consumers.  Additionally, private certification 
is often more proactive and prospective than government regulation.303  
Private product-safety certifiers typically anticipate problems and revise 
standards in light of industry group experience;304 in contrast, 
government regulators generally await demand for responsive rule-
 
 294  Id. at 541. 
 295  Id. at 545–53.  
 296  See Responsible Care Product Safety Code, AMERICAN CHEMISTRY COUNCIL, 
http://responsiblecare.americanchemistry.com/Responsible-Care-Program-
Elements/Product-Safety-Code (last visited Sept. 12, 2015). 
 297  Cohen and Sundararajan would refer to these as SROs, distinguishing them 
from trade organizations seeking to promote their industries’ well-being.  An SRO, by 
contrast, polices an industry “by formulating regimes of collective rulemaking in which 
entities come together to develop, monitor, and, at times, enforce standards to govern 
the behavior of members.”  Cohen & Sundararajan, supra note 81, at 124. 
 298  See Lytton, supra note 288, at 543, 545. 
 299  Id. at 564.  To be sure, governments grant tacit approval to this process when 
electing to have the private sector set standards on its own.  See Lad & Caldwell, supra 
note 287, at 76. 
 300  See Lytton, supra note 288, at 564. 
 301  Id. at 564. 
 302  Id.. 
 303  Id. at 565. 
 304  See id. at 565–66. 
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making. 
Private certification may complement or compete with 
government regulation.305  The relationship between them may change 
over time.306  In matters of regulatory design, the important question 
may be how to most effectively combine these pathways to establish a 
problem-solving relationship in place of adversarial relations between 
small business and government.307  One solution in the land use realm 
may be to give sharing producers the election to comply with specific 
public regulations in the municipal zoning code (subject to periodic 
compliance inspections) or obtain certification from a private, 
industry-sponsored agency (with periodic renewals).  The latter option 
permits confirming sharing producers meet or exceed industry 
certification standards (including providing sufficient floor area to 
accommodate employees, ample parking and delivery vehicle access 
points to their places of business, fire and plumbing safety and 
sanitation of internal operations, proper insurance coverage of 
building and other improvements, and compliant business exterior 
identification308) for operating their particular Sharing Enterprise.  
Since industry certification standards can be tailored to address the 
particular circumstances of a business type, the majority of sharing 
entrepreneurs may prefer complying with particularized land-use-
oriented rules for their models of business operations.  This 
particularly is true as the number of Sharing Enterprise types 
increases.309 
Perhaps “therein lies the rub.”310  The current (and likely future) 
challenge for self-regulation is structural.  Few organized “trade 
groups” exist among sharing producers, even while a few form 
 
 305  Id. at 542. 
 306  Lytton, supra note 288, at 542.  
 307  See Lad & Caldwell, supra note 287, at 73. 
 308  Of course, these standards cannot conflict with the community’s zoning 
standards, thereby avoiding controversy over the proper means that meet mutually 
agreed-upon ends of land use regulation, in the process reframing the standards as a 
form of collaborative control.  See Lad & Caldwell, supra note 287, at 78. 
 309  Likely no one can calculate how many sharing producers exist today.  The 
reason references to “shadow economy” and “underground economy” exist in popular 
parlance is that many such businesses are not self-identifying, to avoid taxation and 
other regulatory costs.  See Cash Intensive Businesses Audit Techniques Guide—Chapter 8 
The Underground Economy, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (Apr. 2010), 
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Cash-Intensive-
Businesses-Audit-Techniques-Guide-Chapter-8; Brad Plumer, The $2 Trillion Shadow 
Economy Is the Recession’s Big Winner, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Apr. 23, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/04/23/americas-2-
trillion-shadow-economy-is-the-recessions-big-winner/.  
 310  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 2.   
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communities of interest on the Web.311  The rapid rate of this new 
economy’s innovation outstrips the capacity to organize formal trade 
groups like Underwriters Laboratories; and some sharing producers 
have scant experience, time or other resources, or the disposition, to 
form voluntary associations charged with credentialing their 
“members.”  Indeed, those in the vanguard of Sharing Enterprises 
today may not represent tomorrow’s sharing producers.  A “sector” of 
enterprises may innovate so quickly, radically changing methods and 
outputs, that the original vanguard is unqualified to pass judgment on 
the quality, safety or other standards of scantly-later entrants into a 
similar or “mutated” sector.  Since there are no convenient 
categorizations of today’s sharing producers in terms of their outputs 
of goods and services, interest communities must devote substantial 
time and thought just to define a “sector” and determine which 
producers (and their outputs) may have the knowledge to regulate 
through standards-setting, again assuming they were disposed to set 
standards for others. 
Additional roadblocks are apparent to short-term private 
certification of Sharing Enterprises.  First, citizens unacquainted with 
third-party private associations will not know how to report standards 
slippage by a sharing producer operating in their enclaves.312  While 
Sharing Enterprises may disclose on their building-exterior tags 
 
 311  In March 2015, a new trade body for the sharing economy, Sharing Economy 
UK (SEUK), was launched to represent and champion the sharing producer sector 
and ensure good business practices; its members include Airbnb, TaskRabbit and 
Zipcar.  See Susan McLean, The Rise of the Sharing Economy, 26 COMPUTERS & LAW 
MAGAZINE OF SCL 1 (Apr./May 2015), available at http://www.mofo.com/~/ 
media/Files/Articles/2015/04/150401RiseoftheSharingEconomy.pdf.  Peers.org is a 
self-described “grassroots organization” launched in 2013 in Silicon Valley to 
“mainstream, protect, and grow the sharing economy” by advocating for “smart 
regulations.”  See About, PEERS, http://www.peers.org/about/ (last visited Sept. 12, 
2015); Tarun Wadhwa, The Sharing Economy Fights Back Against Regulators, FORBES (Sept. 
16, 2013, 7:02 AM), http://www.forbes.com/ sites/tarunwadhwa/2013/09/16/the-
sharing-economy-fights-back-against-regulators-with-an-advocacy-group/ (“Peers is a 
self-described ‘grassroots organization’ that launched last month to ‘mainstream, 
protect, and grow the sharing economy.’”).  But reports are that Peers.org’s funding 
comes from “mission-aligned independent donors,” wealthy backers with a financial 
interest in the advance of the sharing economy.  In late 2014, Peers announced it 
would re-direct its emphasis toward sharing economy workers.  See Sarah Kessler, Peers 
Says Its New Focus Is Helping Sharing Economy Workers, FASTCOMPANY TECHNOLOGY (Nov. 
12, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.fastcompany.com/3038310/peers-says-its-new-focus-
is-helping-sharing-economy-workers. 
 312  Nor will they have intimate knowledge of the standards themselves, unless the 
resident is a member of the affected or similar Sharing Enterprise interest community.  
Of course, the “where to report a complaint” dilemma may be resolved by requiring 
that information to be posted on the platform of the Sharing Enterprise’s marketing 
technology. 
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contact information for the pertinent certifying body, not all residents 
have the technological devices to “read” that information.  In contrast, 
most citizens know how to telephone or email their community’s 
government.  Second, with a variety of “sector” standards, there is a 
clear danger of apparently inconsistent sanctions among trade groups 
of miscreant sharing producers.  This may undermine both producer 
and citizen confidence in the private certification process and would 
likely promote defections among sharing producers from established 
norms.  Third, it is unclear that the opportunity to be privately 
regulated is sufficient inducement for Sharing Enterprise participation 
in certification or oversight functions. 
There is much to contemplate among all stakeholder groups in 
outsourcing such regulation to private bodies, even for those believing 
that entrepreneurs can best govern themselves, in opposition to 
historically reactive local governments.  Regardless, government 
agencies ensuring land use compliance still must monitor activities of 
certifying bodies in the appropriate Sharing Enterprise sectors.313  
Private certification is not invariably reliable, and market competition 
among certifiers sometimes results in diminished standards to reduce 
costs of services and ease demands placed on clients.314  Enforcement 
of zoning entitlements in any event will remain the job of local 
governments.  A pragmatic reason here is that a community ultimately 
may be subject to claims of “regulatory taking” if private certification 
sanctions incorporate closure of a Sharing Enterprise for violating de 
facto land use regulations.  Moreover, mere approval of a Sharing 
Enterprise’s operation by a contracted private body over objections of 
a District’s citizens may engender claims of due process denial since a 






 313  Legally, land use regulation enforcement cannot be delegated altogether to 
private bodies.  See supra text accompanying notes 170–74.  Additionally, government 
may (in the background) threaten more severe regulation should self-regulation 
processes not achieve the intended ends.  See Lad & Caldwell, supra note 287, at 75. 
 314  Lytton, supra note 288, at 541. 
 315  See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 373 (1974) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting); Shirley L. Mays, Privatization of Municipal Services, A Contagion in the Body 
Politic, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 41, 53–55 (1995). 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
Sharing producers are a part of the urban and suburban 
economic landscapes and intend to remain so.  Perhaps “New Cities 
Scientists” hope that young entrepreneurs will be well-trained and 
sufficiently imaginative to invent new business models that will be jobs-
generators and will populate transit-oriented, densely built, mixed-use 
developments (so-called TOD zones) in municipal commercial cores 
or along mass transit corridors.  Positioned there, issues of 
neighborhood conflict among sharing producers, town planners and 
dwellers perhaps will diminish to the point of easy resolution by a 
single city department tasked with ad hoc conflict resolution. 
Cleaving this idealism are facts and anecdotal evidence, starting 
with an apparent shortage of youthful entrepreneurial persons eager 
to occupy downtowns conveniently catalyzing every urban center’s 
renaissance.  Demographer Wendell Cox reports that from 2010 to 
2013, the population of twenty- to twenty-nine-year-olds in core 
counties (which usually are identical to the core city of the 
metropolitan area) rose by about 3.4%,316 in contrast to the overall 
increase nationwide of 4% of that age group in that same interval.  
Despite the growth in raw numbers of twenty- to twenty-nine-year-olds 
living in core counties, the share of the age group living in these areas 
actually declined slightly, by 0.78%, compared to 2010.317  Meanwhile, 
the share of the age group living in the less dense portions of 
metropolitan and micropolitan statistical areas increased.  Overall, 
roughly just 30% of all Millennials live in core counties; and in the 
three years between 2011 and 2013, the number of Millennials outside 
core counties increased by 1.28 million.  In 2010, functional urban 
cores, meaning those characterized by higher-density development 
and greater reliance on transit, were home to 19% of the twenty- to 
twenty-nine-year-olds in major metropolitan areas, a reduction from 
20% in 2000.  It appears that Richard Florida’s expectation, that a 
majority of educated and theoretically committed “urbanite” 
Millennials will gravitate to the diverse city cores of their preference,318 
is suspect especially among those unemployed or out of the 
 
 316  See Wendell Cox, From Anecdotes to Data: Core & Suburban Growth Trends 2010–
2013, NEWGEOGRAPHY (May 23, 2014), http://www.newgeography.com/ 
content/004329-from-anecdotes-data-core-suburban-growth-trends-2010-2013.  
 317  Id. 
 318  See Richard Florida, The Rise of the Creative Class, WASH. MONTHLY (May, 2002), 
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2001/0205.florida.html.  Richard 
Florida’s creativity rankings, which anchored material for many of his books, originally 
appear in this Article, are a good précis of the body of his works on the Millennial 
“Creative Class.”  
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workforce and living in their parents’ homes.  Additionally, Millennials 
may well be living in suburban apartments where less expensive 
inventory is readily available;319 while others at the oldest margin of this 
generation may be starting families and buying houses, migrating 
instead to the suburbs and smaller cities .320 
According to survey data from Frank N. Magid Associates, young 
Millennials already reside in the suburbs to at least the same extent as 
older generations.321  The Magid data also suggests that this residential 
preference likely will not change as the Millennial generation matures 
and “settles down.”  Once Millennials marry, their firm preference is 
to live in a single-family home,322 atypical of hipster-urban settings such 
as lofts, condos or apartments.  Almost half of “settled” Millennials 
(those who are married, many with children) own their homes.  It 
appears today that community—and family—orientation of the 
Millennial generation will only reinforce the continued growth of 
America’s suburbs.  In the same vein, Joel Kotkin, author of The Next 
Hundred Million, believes that a significant majority of the forthcoming 
hundred million persons among Americans will make their homes in 
what Kotkin calls “greenurbia,” the suburbs of tomorrow whose 
dwellers rely less on major cities’ central business districts for jobs and 
cultural amenities, as working from home becomes customary.323  In 
 
 319  See Laura Kusisto & Kris Hudson, Renters Are Majority in Big U.S. Cities, WALL ST. 
J. (Feb. 8, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/renters-are-majority-in-big-u-s-cities-
1423432009 (noting that rents are rising in many cities and rents outpace inflation 
rates). 
 320  See April Lane, Why Millennials Are Moving to Suburbs and Smaller Cities, BENTLEY 
PREPAREDU BLOG (May 21, 2015), http://www.bentley.edu/prepared/why-millennials-
are-moving-suburbs-and-smaller-cities.  
 321  See MORLEY WINOGRAD & MICHAEL D. HAIS, MILLENNIAL MOMENTUM: HOW A NEW 
GENERATION IS REMAKING AMERICA 196–201, 208 (2011). 
 322  See id. at 201.  
 323  JOEL KOTKIN, THE NEXT HUNDRED MILLION: AMERICA IN 2050 85–87, 234–37 
(2011).  Kotkin may be beating this drum too loudly, however.  In his latest piece in 
The Daily Beast, Kotkin stridently asserts (a) Jane Jacobs was wrong about diversity 
characterizing today’s urban metropolis cores, and (b) the central city offers only a 
temporary lifestyle for all but the wealthy and childless, thus roughly three-fourths of 
Americans live in suburbs, especially when starting families, and will continue to do 
so.  See Joel Kotkin, What Jane Jacobs Got Wrong About Cities, DAILY BEAST (Aug. 1, 2015, 
10:00 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/08/01/what-jane-jacobs-
got-wrong-about-cities.html.  Kotkin’s vision fails to account for (a) the rising tide of 
student debtors among Millennials, (b) the volatility in vehicular fuels’ prices, and (c) 
the availability of mortgages to persons affected by these first two phenomena, coupled 
with underemployment, delaying marriage (compared to prior generations), and 
spiking rental costs impairing saving for a down-payment.  In their current 
circumstances, youth on the workforce margins will live (and often work) where and 
in what they can afford, often in their relatives’ abodes and in shared housing among 
unrelated persons (locational preferences be hanged).  
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short, the notion that sharing producers will concentrate in densely 
urbanized pockets of cities may be illusory, while scattering throughout 
the metropolis may be the continuing pattern of sharing producers for 
some time.324 
The business community, like demographic pundits, is conflicted 
about the shortfall in entrepreneur supply.  While the Wall Street Journal 
reported in 2015325 resurgence in the preference to live and work 
downtown, it concurrently reported a decrease in the ownership of 
businesses by young adults struggling to find their niche in the 
American workplace.  Richard Florida himself observes that the 
emerging micro-gig labor pool participants today identify more with 
their occupation, skills or livelihood than with an employer, in part 
due to what he calls “domain specific knowledge.”326  Florida believes 
that Millennials and those generations following will define themselves 
by their work’s creative content and their lifestyle interests instead of 
by their career track or institutional affiliations.327  Why, then, might 
most micro-business owners prefer occupying pricier downtown 
districts?  Perhaps the current circumstances embody Florida’s 
observation that: 
[People] have come to accept that they are completely on 
their own—that the traditional sources of security and 
entitlement no longer exist, or even matter.  This is a sea 
change . . . .  The shift to self-motivation and personal 
autonomy in the workplace is bound up with the fact that we 
no longer take our identity from the company we work for, 
but find it in the kind of work we do, our profession, our 
lifestyle interests and the community we live in.328 
 
 
 324  See Philip Lawton, Michal Meczynski & Austin Barber, Policies Towards Place 
Attraction and Policies for Place Retention, in PLACE-MAKING AND POLICIES FOR COMPETITIVE 
CITIES 105, 110, 123 (Sako Musterd & Zoltán Kovács eds., 2013) [hereinafter MUSTERD] 
(noting the “wide selection of living environments among the ‘creative class’ in 
selecting a residential area”); Marco Bontje & Kaisa Kepsu, Creative Knowledge Strategies 
for Polycentric City-Regions, in MUSTERD, supra note 324, at 191, 192, 200 (making like 
observations). 
 325  Clarifying, “the same time” literally means the same day, January 3, 2015; 
compare Eliot Brown, Young Drive an Urban Rebound, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 2015, at A3, 
available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/young-drive-an-urban-rebound-1420250736, 
with Ruth Simon & Caelainn Barr, Endangered Species: The Young Entrepreneur, WALL ST. 
J., Jan. 3, 2015, at A1, available at http://finance.yahoo.com/news/endangered-
species-young-u-entrepreneurs-004800314.html. 
 326  RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS AND HOW IT’S TRANSFORMING 
WORK, LEISURE, COMMUNITY AND EVERYDAY LIFE 114 (2002). 
 327  Id. 
 328  Id. at 11516. 
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In summary, the sharing entrepreneur producing goods and 
services without a full time job or the intention to generate work for 
employees is not temporary; these widely dispersed proprietors are 
growing by magnitudes among the working age population.329  Sharing 
producers are here to stay330 and communities must learn how they will 
be integrated, not (conveniently) only into downtowns and other 
mixed-use centers but throughout the general population in small 
cities and villages331—and even in semi-rural areas.  Such a role will not 
be easy to discharge.  Middle or upper class populations’ resistance to 
reusing residentially-zoned property for new models of occupancy 
entrenches support for existing zoning patterns.332  Historically, zoning 
 
 329  Derivative start-ups, where new entrants to the sharing economy “piggyback” on 
the success of a growing business model, will accelerate in numbers, increasing the 
growth potential of all Sharing Enterprises.  See Charlie Wells, “Piggybackers” Hitch 
Themselves to Airbnb, Uber, WALL ST. J. SMALL BUSINESS, Feb. 19, 2015, at B5, available at 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/piggybackers-hitch-themselves-to-airbnb-uber-
1424305849?mod=LS1.  A plausible analogy is to the supply chain in the automobile 
industry with “tiered” parts suppliers. 
 330  The single data point known as the “labor force participation rate” proves this 
proposition.  That term refers collectively to adults who are working or currently 
seeking work.  See Definition of Labor Force Participation Rate, DAVE MANUEL.COM, 
http://www.davemanuel.com/investor-dictionary/labor-force-participation-rate/ 
(last visited Aug. 2, 2015).  In June 2015, the American labor force, using raw jobs 
numbers, grew by about 223,000 workers.  See Gandel, supra note 43.  That increase 
effectively dropped the labor force participation rate to a tepid 62.6%of the working-
age population, the lowest that rate has been since 1977.  Id.  The decline in the 
participation rate accelerated in recent years in large part because many Americans 
gave up searching for conventional forty-hour-per-week jobs.  Id.  And employed young 
Americans are not earning higher wages in these new jobs.  Id.  These figures do not 
mean, however, that younger workers have abandoned pursuing financial self-
sufficiency.  Those who cannot earn sufficient wages to be independent will seek 
alternatives to reach their desired standard of living.  While one alternative may be 
“the dole,” another option for those more educated, capable of accessing the 
implements of technology, may be to exploit social media and engage in one or 
multiple Sharing Enterprise opportunities. 
 331  See generally Kris Hudson, Generation Y Prefers Suburban Home Over City Condo, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2015, at A2, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/millennials-
prefer-single-family-homes-in-the-suburbs-1421896797?tesla=y&autologin=y 
(discussing that the overwhelming majority of Millennials’ preference to reside in 
inner-city suburbs may alter future demand for single-family homes); Neil Shah, Signs 
of a Suburban Comeback, WALL ST. J. (May 22, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/ 
news/articles/SB10001424052702303749904579576440578771478?mg=reno64-wsj 
(suggesting that the “bottoming out” of city growth may signify a resurgence of 
suburban living).  Alan Ehrenhalt sees, in the desire for an urban-seeking cohort of 
Millennials, a possible trend to “urbanize the suburbs,” building new fulcrums of 
activity by densifying suburban “retrofits.”  See EHRENHALT, supra note 270, at 208–17.  
 332  See supra text accompanying notes 209 & 210; cf. Simon Vallee, Zoning’s Self-
Defense Mechanism: When Local Democracy Is Local Tyranny, URBAN KCHOZE BLOG (Apr. 29, 
2014, 1:10 AM), http://urbankchoze.blogspot.com/2014/04/zonings-self-defense-
mechanism-when.html (arguing that attempts to change zoning are better submitted 
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has been calculated in residential districts to establish homogeneous 
neighborhoods; thus, inserting a new sharing producer business 
model either requires a change in the property’s zoning category or 
some form of zoning adjustment.  Non-residents typically have little 
voice in this discussion, since modifying a zoning map to introduce 
new types of housing occupancy benefits only non-residents (i.e., 
potential future occupants).  “Local-only democracy” customs further 
ensure that any entitlement proposed to introduce a new use engages 
few, if any, local supporters.333  Meanwhile, as local (incumbent) 
residents seemingly will not benefit directly from the entitlement 
proposal, these residents form either (i) an opponents’ group (among 
those for whom the proposed zoning modification is potentially or 
actually disadvantageous) or (ii) a disinterested group (whose 
members do not share the opponents’ views or are simply apathetic).334 
The opponents’ group often becomes strident, or even irrational, 
about the proposed modification335 (unless they become better 
informed) fearing change in the familiar but segregated, 
homogeneous neighborhoods they occupy.  In any case, those loudest 
voices in the debate invariably oppose the initiative, as proponents 
usually are not current residents and therefore are not “invested” in 
the District.336  Even if opponents constitute a minority of all District 
dwellers, since its real majority more often than not is disinterested, 
opponents may stymie the initiative, essentially exercising “veto 
power.”337  This inclination has exceptions, such as in conditions where 
neighbors are poor and lack influence but are facing politically 
influential developers who want a zoning change, or where project 
leaders induce local residents to drop their opposition through the 
 
through local democracy because local residents have input (albeit perhaps more in 
theory than in practice) on whether zoning changes are made).  In the current 
climate, “battle lines” are drawn in some neighborhoods between those who “value 
stability more than flexibility: middle-aged professionals with children to educate and 
mortgages to pay,” versus “people who value flexibility more than security: students 
who want to supplement their incomes; bohemians who can afford to dip in and out 
of the labour market; young mothers who want to combine bringing up children with 
part-time jobs; the semi-retired, whether voluntarily so or not.”  Irving Wladlawsky 
Berger, The Rise of the On-Demand Economy, WALL ST. J. CIO JOURNAL (Mar. 13, 2015, 
12:04 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2015/03/13/the-rise-of-the-on-demand-
economy/.  
 333  See Vallee, supra note 332.  
 334  See id. 
 335  See John R. Nolon, Champions of Change: Reinventing Democracy Through Land Law 
Reform, 30 HARV. ENVTL L. REV. 1, 16 (2006) (noting the “instinctive, rather than 
thoughtful, reaction”). 
 336  See Vallee, supra note 332.  
 337  See id. 
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developer’s creating or improving public parks, plazas, or other 
amenities in exchange for their silence.338 
Districts must decide to ban or accommodate these proprietors, 
as will local governments’ land-use administrations.  Districts should 
retain the right to their predominantly residential character.  City 
planners need capacity to inventory home occupations and maker-
spaces within District boundaries, and consistent with ranges 
prescribed by regulation, to avoid overwhelming magnitudes of non-
residential uses.  And where necessary, temporary moratoria may be 
appropriate pending closure of sufficient numbers of sharing 
producer sites.339  District Councils assessing these inventories, aided by 
city planning staff, are entitled to maintain balance among residential 
dwellers, conventional retailers, office providers and sharing 
producers, to retain a neighborhood “feel.”340  Local government 
employees should maintain the District’s flow of information, using 
platforms like Nextdoor (private District social networks)341 or 
Neighborhood Link (a website platform)342 to maintain current 
information on District entitlement actions, building permit 
processing, and current or pending business licenses.  Those 
municipal employees must acquire vital skills to explain the processes 
of sharing provider licensure and zoning entitlement to stakeholders 
and to moderate passionate conversations of disputants struggling over 
the introduction of unconventional “business models” into 
traditionally residential neighborhoods.343 
In one regard, this quest for accommodation foments a struggle 
among generations; a struggle between established neighborhood 
dwellers and youthful sharing producers seeking to house their 
business operations in a historically “improper” zoning district.344  
 
 338  See id. 
 339  See supra Part IV.C. 
 340  See Miller, supra note 1, at 45 (arguing that a working committee to draft 
regulations should include representatives of the relative “interest groups” in the 
enclave). 
 341  See NEXTDOOR, https://nextdoor.com/ (last visited Aug. 2, 2015). 
 342  See NEIGHBORHOOD LINK, http://www.neighborhoodlink.com/ (last visited 
Aug. 2, 2015). 
 343  Cf. Nolon, supra note 335, at 33 (describing trained local land-use leaders in the 
Hudson Valley facilitating “concept committees” involving stakeholders).  See Miller, 
supra note 1, at 45 (asserting that working committees to establish regulations must 
incorporate cross-section of stakeholders). 
 344  See Henry B.R. Beale, Home-Based Business and Government Regulation, SBA OFFICE 
OF ADVOCACY 72 (2004), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/articles/Home% 
20Based%20Business%20and%20Government%20Regulation.pdf (“A home-based 
business is a commercial (or borderline industrial) land use in a residential 
neighborhood. In the past, the conflict between commercial land use and residential 
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From another perspective, the general prohibition on entrepreneurial 
models in residential zoning districts undermines efforts to remake the 
social landscape of some urban communities, especially those mired in 
joblessness, crime and other indicia of disorder.345  Some invested in 
the sharing economy argue that today’s good land use decisions 
demand subordinating individual inconvenience to the new business 
climate’s benefit to the larger community—the so-called “greater 
good.”346  This argument is premised on the authentically evolved 
successes of walkability and sustainability dimensions—products of 
what Chuck Wolfe describes as “unpredictable, disjointed and 
overlapping,” thrown-together land use patterns—in contrast to an 
artificially prescriptive or planned environment.347 
Conflict will surely expand if regulations disadvantaging everyday 
citizens thwart the emerging, “wired-up city” of sharing producers.348  
This does not suggest imminent Sharing Enterprise-coerced 
neighborhood occupancy.  More likely, their producers will organize 
via social media to get their message to their supporters and to 
regulators in familiar and new forms of lobbying.349  More disturbing, 
 
land use has been resolved by prohibiting home-based businesses.”).  
 345  See Stephen Clowney, Invisible Businessman: Undermining Black Enterprise with 
Land Use Rules, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1061, 1070–73 (2009) (arguing that black-owned 
businesses, especially those operated by entrepreneurs, remain dormant in many 
urban centers due to burdensome municipal land-use practices). 
 346  See, e.g., Roger Valdez, Community Based Land Use: From Individual Rights to 
Community Rights, SEATTLE’S LAND USE CODE (Aug. 8, 2012), https:// 
seattleslandusecode.wordpress.com/2012/08/08/community-based-land-use-from-
individual-rights-to-community-rights.  See also Stahl, supra note 169, at 962 (positing 
that zoning decisions ought to incorporate some notion of the public good). 
 347  CHARLES R. WOLFE, Introduction, in URBANISM WITHOUT EFFORT (2013), available 
at http://northwest.uli.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/39/2013/05/Wolfe_ 
introduction.pdf. 
 348  Scott Kirsner, Dispatch from the Disruption Zone, BOS. GLOBE INNOVATION ECON. 
BLOG (Oct. 31, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/10/31/dispatch-
from-disruption-zone/j23NKZYrcBLdNm1DgOi96I/story.html (quoting Uber co-
founder and Chief Executive Officer, Travis Kalanick).  
 349  Cf. Juliet Schor, Debating the Sharing Economy, GREAT TRANSITION INITIATIVE (Oct. 
2014), http://greattransition.org/publication/debating-the-sharing-economy# 
sthash. mhZQT9V9.dpuf (illustrating the Peers.org collaborative attempting to build 
a social movement of sharers); but see supra note 306 and accompanying text.  Of 
course, success in lobbying for any short-term regulatory change will depend in 
significant part on whether the owners of numerous platforms for Sharing Enterprises 
support such efforts.  I acknowledge that a great number of first-generation enterprises 
depend for survival on the backing of Silicon Valley’s so-called “one percent,” 
consisting primarily of venture capitalists (opposed to crowd-funding).  See Irving 
Wladawsky-Berger, The Continuing Evolution of the On-Demand Economy, IRVING 
WLADAWSKY-BERGER BLOG (July 21, 2015), http://blog.irvingwb.com/blog/2015/07/ 
the-continuing-evolution-of-the-on-demand-economy.html. 
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some sharing producers will decide to operate undetectably whenever 
possible, preferring an underground approach to their operations350 
that stymies efforts to achieve peaceful co-existence.  Little is gained 
from substituting “what you don’t know won’t hurt you” for addressing 
resulting infrastructure burdens or for elevating the residential quality 
of the neighborhood.  Since bending rules is a trait of human nature,351 
sharing producers avoiding land use and licensing issues will prefer to 
work in the shadows, thereby seeking to minimize taxes, fees and other 
administratively imposed overhead items, avoiding entitlements, other 
regulatory requirements and licensure.352  Many consumers will 
cooperate in this endeavor, thereby lowering their costs of goods and 
services.353 
Perhaps venture capitalists will render moot the challenges 
impeding Sharing Enterprise and neighbor détente.  Invariably, 
capitalism engages persons to serially monetize sharing economy 
business models of the best output, extracting optimum value while 
putting proprietor-scale sharing producers out of business.354  But 
Jeremy Rifkin asserts American cities shortly will witness a surge in the 
zero marginal-cost society,355 under which a collaborative commons will 
be sustained by grassroots-owned “skinny platforms” resembling non-
 
 350  See Schindler, supra note 10, at 32–34 (suggesting that some prosumers indeed 
may prefer the thrill of an illegal alternative). 
 351  See ROBERT A. HINDE, BENDING THE RULES: MORALITY IN THE MODERN WORLD 
FROM RELATIONSHIPS TO POLITICS AND WAR 197, 235–38 (2007).  
 352  See Schindler, supra note 10 at 20–21, 24, 32; Gene Johnson, Rethinking Legal Pot: 
Washington, Colorado Face Unexpected Problems, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Jan. 3, 2015), 
http://www.pressherald.com/2015/01/03/rethinking-legal-pot-washington-
colorado-face-unexpected-problems/ (reporting that since recreational cannabis in 
Washington is heavily taxed unlike “medical marijuana,” avoiding such tax (and pass 
through of that burden to consumers) has led to unlicensed sales and increasing 
numbers of registered medical users).  See also supra text accompanying notes 15157.  
Such defection explains why pool punishment ultimately may be inescapable, 
regardless of what land use “permitting scheme” is implemented in a community. 
 353  See Johnson, supra note 352 (reporting that consumers enroll as “patients” for 
medicinal cannabis products and buy from such clinics to avoid the higher price of 
recreational marijuana caused by vendors passing through the tax burden). 
 354  Cf. Rory Cellan-Hones, JustPark and the Sharing Economy, BBC FUTURE BLOG 
(Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-28686606 (reporting Index 
Ventures’ major investment in JustPark, a company that helps drivers look for a 
parking space).  As a sharing economy niche emerges outside its cloak of illegality, 
established market participants will occupy and dominate the new market, since 
barriers to entry are not high and its technology drivers are “commodified” for the 
most part.  Miller, supra note 1, at 17.  Established market participants are equally as 
eager to participate in the sharing economy market space as their sharing economy 
counterparts are to share in the market space of the established market.  See id. at 28. 
 355  See JEREMY RIFKIN, THE ZERO MARGINAL COST SOCIETY 16–25 (2014). 
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profit cooperatives.356  Such an outcome insures that proprietors and 
prosumers will play pivotal roles in sharing production and 
consumption, forever changing the exclusive dwelling “feel” in 
residential zoning districts.  If that society comes to fruition, sharing 
producers’ dispersal within enclaves and ongoing formation of new 
technology-based businesses means Districts will best be served by 
transparency in producer operations and enlightened administrative 
regulation. 
It seems likely that opposing factions in the sharing economy will 
achieve eventual détente through a series of phases transitioning 
through slow and deliberative dialog, perhaps not in precise linear 
order.  In the first stage, everyday citizens will achieve an 
understanding that a community’s economic and social 
competitiveness requires that the needs of the sharing producer 
accommodate those of residents.  These citizens will recognize that the 
most agile communities attract the most entrepreneurially inclined 
persons with the potential to make the largest economic growth 
contributions to a District—and that such persons ought to be 
cautiously welcomed.  A second phase may be a period of 
“coopetition,”357 where regulators seek to eliminate “win-lose 
outcomes” in monitoring and enforcing rules enabling sustainable 
community economic growth.  In that period, master “plans” will yield 
to master strategies nimbly adapting to changes in the environment 
and economic conditions of a local community.358  For example, the 
District may assist the Sharing Enterprise in identifying public halls 
and meeting rooms, along with privately-owned public open spaces359 
 
 356  See id. at 13135, 145, 164–65; Nathan Schneider, Owning is the New Sharing, 
SHAREABLE BLOG (Dec. 21, 2014), http://www.shareable.net/blog/owning-is-the-new-
sharing. 
 357  Instead of stakeholders assuming that their success must come at others’ 
expense (a zero-sum game result), through co-opetition entities competing in the 
same industries act as if there is partial congruence of interests, such as by sharing 
information and expertise.  Transparency about motivations, agendas and goals of the 
stakeholders develops as a result.  See ADAM M. BRANDENBURGER & BARRY J. NALEBUFF, 
CO-OPETITION 5, 98104 (1997). 
 358  TOWNSEND, supra note 47, at 305 (quoting email from Michael Joroff, Senior 
Lecturer, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Department of Urban Studies and 
Planning, to Anthony M. Townsend, author of the book (Jan. 28, 2012)); see also 
BARTON & GRANT, supra note 244, at 49 (describing common-ground exploration for 
individual stockholders’ gain, a “consultative” process leading to recognition of shared 
communities of interest). 
 359  See John King, S.F. Making Sure High-Rise Owners ID Hidden Public Spaces, 
SFCHRONICLE.COM BAY AREA & STATE BLOG (Feb. 9, 2015, 11:50 AM), 
http://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/S-F-making-sure-high-rise-owners-ID-
hidden-6070126.php#/0 (pointing out that citizens do not always know the location 
of accessible public spaces built by developers). 
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within the District, in which work and customer meetings may occur.  
They may also assist in locating cheap storage and workshop space for 
sharing producer use.360  Concurrently, communities may embark 
upon mediated collective bargaining361 for adopting changes in 
regulations applicable to new sharing producer initiatives. 
In a third evolutionary phase, community planners, aided by 
technology, will assume new roles as input-gatherers, interpreters and 
mediators.362  Neighborhood dashboards with real-time information on 
public display will visualize patterns of change, featuring how these 
patterns relate to forthcoming decisions concerning a proposed 
project’s impact on traffic flow and pedestrian safety in its immediate 
vicinity, and prompt citizen input via social media on how to mitigate 
concerns.363  Planning “debates” will become fully deliberative because 
all stakeholders are better informed through inputs of those affected 
by the ultimate decisions reached.364  Crowdsourcing seems to be the 
future architecture of comprehensive civic participation in such forms 
of decision-making.  Reaching greater sophistication in spatial 
planning as a quality of life issue, neighborhoods will become test-beds 
for sustainable-living “settlements.”365  These settlements’ occupants 
become crucial participants in the bottom-up approach to designing 
sustainable development that minimizes individual mechanical 
transportation and non-renewable resource waste by integrating 
harmonious living and working environments.366  Naturally, local 
governments will need to continue delivering critical public services 
with ample capacity and timeliness to all stakeholders,367 avoiding 
favoritism towards any faction of a neighborhood at the expense of 
another. 
In the fourth phase of evolution, District Community Benefits 
Agreements become convenient mitigation vehicles attending land-
 
 360  See BARTON & GRANT supra note 244, at 115. 
 361  See Michael N. Widener, Bridging the Gulf, Using Mediated, Consensus-Based 
Regulation to Reconcile Competing Public Policy Agendas in Disaster Mitigation, 74 ALB. L. 
REV. 587, 613–27 (2011).  
 362  Cf. id. at 617–19 (explaining how scientists act as interveners in the mediation 
process, both interpreting data and building trust among stakeholders). 
 363  TOWNSEND, supra note 47, at 307. 
 364  Miller, supra note 1, at 24 (arguing that concepts of accommodation focusing 
“solely on regulators and the disruptive market participant” will fail; but an approach 
acknowledging the legitimate concerns of all stakeholders likely will yield results that 
are fair to all, creating lasting community benefits). 
 365  See BARTON & GRANT, supra note 244, at 3–5. 
 366  See BARTON & GRANT, supra note 244, at 3–5. 
 367  See TOWNSEND, supra note 47, at 309. 
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use modifications for specific developments368; under these 
agreements, Sharing Enterprises “pay it forward,” contributing to 
neighborhood infrastructure like ICT upgrades or amenity upgrades 
within the District.369  These agreements need to be reached directly 
among persons most affected by the sharing producers’ activities and 
those producers.  These private stakeholders must collaboratively 
substitute their judgments for planning elites having little sense of the 
neighborhood’s immediate requirements.  As Community Benefits 
Agreements become progressively smaller in scope, public-private 
development partnerships may slowly replace elaborate regulatory 
codes and two-faction good neighbor contracts.370  Relatively benign 
but purposeful regulatory overlays will become the norm, and 
technology—capturing and analyzing Big Data—will make decision-
making locally particularized and less “global” and, therefore, 
increasingly more flexible.371  With universal transparency, a Web-like 
operating system with open-access data affords property developers, 
citizens and planning bodies a collaborative ability to design new 
solutions in accommodating business models into residential areas.372  
Providing essential services, at the election of the community, is left to 
social networks of more intimately-scaled neighborhoods.373  Smart 
 
 368  See Courtney Elizabeth Knapp & Justin B. Hollander, Assessing the Potential for 
Integrating Community Benefits Agreements into Brownfield Redevelopment Projects, in 
RECLAIMING BROWNFIELDS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ADAPTIVE REUSE OF 
CONTAMINATED PROPERTIES 131 (Richard C. Hula, Laura A. Reese & Cynthia Jackson-
Elmoore eds., 2012). 
 369  Cf. Vicki Been, Community Benefits Agreements: A New Local Government Tool or 
another Variation on the Exactions Theme?, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 5, 25–26 (2010) (criticizing 
the “diversion of benefits from the local government as a whole to the host 
neighborhood,” by claiming it potentially creates greater inequality among the local 
government’s neighborhoods).  In the case of Sharing Enterprises, their owners might 
incorporate in such CBAs the trading of their services to neighborhoods, instead of 
paying for public amenities with cash, by creating local exchange and trading schemes.  
See BARTON & GRANT, supra note 244, at 115.  Ironically, sharing producers in the 3D 
printing “business” may assist Districts in physically-enhanced modeling of new urban 
planning initiatives. See T. Ghawana & S. Zlatanova, 3D Printing for Urban Planning: A 
Physical Enhancement of Spatial Perspective, in URBAN AND REGIONAL DATA MANAGEMENT 
211 (C. Ellul, S. Zlatanova, M. Rumor & R. Laurini eds., 2013), available at 
http://www.isacsolutions.in/PDF/Modified3DPrintingandGISApplications.pdf. 
 370  See Miller, supra note 1, at 23 (“[I]f the city were to adopt a more flexible 
[regulatory] approach . . . the city and its citizens could also become partners in 
sharing the rewards of this risk tolerance.”). 
 371  See id.; TOWNSEND, supra note 47, at 291. 
 372  See Miller, supra note 1, at 24 (discussing Sharing Enterprises’ acceptance as 
viable, legal business ventures will find resolution only by engaging the full spectrum 
of stakeholders interested in the sharing economy and its manner of changing 
communities). 
 373  See TOWNSEND, supra note 47, at 291. 
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urban microprocessor-driven devices distributing aggregated data will 
not undermine sociability, but will reinforce it, allowing cities to 
thrive.374 
An obstacle to reaching this fourth phase will be wresting enough 
data from the sole ownership of companies bundling data as products 
and services to be sold to cities.375  Cities must resist companies’ 
initiatives to lock them into contracts for proprietary services that 
effectively cede control of such data to private interests.376  Cities need 
to grow their own human infrastructure, enabling amateurs and small 
entrepreneurs to experiment through computational “laboratories” to 
work on future smart city technologies—a form of technology “literacy 
movement,” building leadership networks of citizens.  These networks 
will gather and share data, modeling, software and hardware designs, 
together with business models martialed for city joint problem-
solving.377  Indeed, communities will need to join with the private sector 
to build local capacity to develop municipal technologies toward 
designing publicly-owned smart city solutions.  Such development 
partnerships may even engage groups of citizens or neighborhoods as 
direct participants or investors.378 
In the short haul, sharing entrepreneurs producing goods and 
services without a full time job or generating employment for others 
will grow in numbers.  Communities must accommodate them not 
merely into downtowns and other mixed-use, densely urbanized 
centers, but throughout the general population.  The permissions and 
sanctions local authorities grant and impose are optimized when a 
 
 374  See id. 
 375  See id. at 294. 
 376  See id. 
 377  See id. at 301; Nolon, supra note 335, at 46–47.  One British author urges her 
national government to pilot a UK “sharing city,” in which residents are urged to share 
as a daily routine and within which offices, residences and forms of transportation all 
become assets for joint usage.  See Debbie Wosskow, Unlocking the Sharing Economy: An 
Independent Review, U.K. Dep’t of Bus. Innovation & Skills Ch. 5 (Nov. 2014), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/3
78291/bis-14-1227-unlocking-the-sharing-economy-an-independent-review.pdf. 
 378  See Max Taves, Detroit Tiger Stadium Redevelopment Project Turns to “Crowdfunding,” 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2015, at C6, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/detroits-
tiger-stadium-redevelopment-project-turns-to-crowdfunding-
1423610035?KEYWORDS=MAX+TAVES (using an online crowdfunding platform 
selling preferred stock to local residents (and “unaccredited investors”) in order to 
finance part of the equity for a mixed-use project).  See also Andrew Blackman, 
Crowdfunding Comes to Real Estate, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 2014, at R3, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303725404579459271078527790 
(reporting new websites that allow individual investments in self-storage facilities and 
hotels). 
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District’s residents, dwellers, producers, and prosumers collaboratively 
reinforce rules and join with public administrators in that governance 
process.  Redress against defectors from new operating norms must 
include forms of peer- and pool sanctioning by sharing producers.379  
This form of regulation affords a community its moment to sustain an 
indigenous, organic, street-level culture central to all its citizens’ 
lives.380 
APPENDIX: LEXICON 
Big Data: The manipulation of large data sets generated by 
persons and maintained by computers and by the Internet of Things 
to drive decision-making. 
Citizens: Persons living in the neighborhood who are affected by, 
whether or not customers and clients of, sharing producers. 
Community Benefits Agreements: Agreements between the sharing 
entrepreneur class and the residential neighborhoods that establish 
ground rules for sharing producers to operate businesses in residential 
areas and the quid pro quo payable for that privilege. 
Districts, or Enclaves: Areas of a community aided by large datasets 
that mine resident information and statistics in useful chunks and 
matrices to reach land use regulation decisions affecting those living 
and working within the area.  A “district” or an “enclave” as easily could 
be called a neighborhood, a village or a hamlet; it means a subset of 
the overall community small enough to lend itself to greater local 
inputs or, in the rare instance, to control over entitlements decisions. 
Euclidean Zoning: A zoning scheme that rigidly defines permitted 
uses in each of several zoning districts, initially created to segregate 
residential from non-residential uses. 
ICT: Collectively, information and communications technologies, 
all depending on broadband or telecommunications servers. 
Micro-Jobbers: A subset of sharing entrepreneurs akin to the 
medieval “journeyman” that offers their services to businesses 
involving leveraging of technology, including software coding, but also 
“making” with the use of technology, such as via 3D printing and 
similar software-driven replication, on a daily or hourly basis without 
any form of permanent alliance with any particular business. 
Millennials: Younger Americans born roughly between 1983 and 
 
 379  Cf. Cohen & Sundararajan, supra note 81, at 129 (underscoring the value of 
including sharing producer platforms “as enforcers of the self-regulatory solution”). 
 380  See JACOBS, supra note 26, at 117–25, 133–40; see also FLORIDA, supra note 326, at 
148–54, 281–82, 329–31. 
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2003. 
Peer and Pool Punishment: When certain people start reaping 
benefits of a common good without paying a share of the efforts of the 
group, these exploiting individuals are known as “free-riders.”  Free-
riding behavior is frequently sanctioned in society by punishment.  
Delivery of punishment by individuals (peer punishment) is itself 
susceptible to free-riding; that is, other individuals benefit from the 
“punisher’s” efforts without participating in the cost of punishment 
delivery.  Those non-contributors to the punishment’s delivery are 
known as “second-order free riders.”  Pool punishment occurs (in 
contrast to peer punishment) when individuals contribute to a 
“punishment pool;” then, the punishment is delivered to exploiters 
(free-riders) by an actor funded by its contributors.  This cost-sharing 
occurs even when exploiters do not existtherefore, even in the 
absence of punishment.381  The mere presence of the pool-punishment 
actor is a signal that induces cooperation (and thereby likely reduces 
free-riding).  So, a zoning enforcement agency in a community, 
funded by taxpayers to enforce the zoning ordinance against defectors 
from its rules, is a type of a punishment pool. 
Prosumer: A consumer who becomes a “product and brand 
advocate.” Rather than simply consuming products, prosumers are the 
“voices” of those products, significantly impacting the success or failure 
of companies, products, and brands, particularly through their 
involvement on the social web.  Members of the social web—bloggers, 
micro-bloggers, forum posters and social networking participants who 
spread messages, influence people around the world and drive 
demand. 
Sharing Enterprises: The niche businesses established by sharing 
producers. 
Sharing Producers: The entrepreneurial class that, through niche 
marketing using Web 2.0 technologies and social networking 
platforms, sells goods and services without a visible store front or office 
location; micro-jobbers are one type of such entrepreneurs, except 
their services alone are for sale, frequently on a single engagement 
(“one-off”) basis.  Some sharing producers are creating, meaning they 
produce new goods from their assets; others are extracting, meaning 
they derive value from their existing assets (such as from their vehicles, 
as drivers, or from their real property, as short-term innkeepers).  
Some are independent contractors; others are so-called “dependent 
 
 381  See Todd Bodnar & Marcel Salathé, Governing the Global Commons with Local 
Institutions, PLOS (Apr. 3, 2012), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article? 
id=10.1371/journal.pone.0034051. 
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contractors,” such as persons who “drive for” Lyft, for instance, because 
these producers do not operate their own Web-driven business 
model.382 
Zoning Adjustment: Use permits (sometimes known as “special 
exceptions”) and area/dimensional variances, as well as zoning 
ordinances interpretations, any of which processes may result in 




 382  See Christopher Mims, How Everyone Gets the ‘Sharing’ Economy Wrong, WALL ST. J. 
TECH (May 24, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-everyone-gets-the-sharing-
economy-wrong-1432495921. 
